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Abstract
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In the twenty-first century, the issue of privacy—particularly the privacy of
individuals with regard to their personal information and effects—has become highly
contested terrain, producing a crisis that affects both national and global social
formations. This crisis, or problematic, characterizes a particular historical
conjuncture I term the namespace.
Using cultural studies and the theory of articulation, I map the emergent ways that
the namespace articulates economic, juridical, political, cultural, and technological
forces, materials, practices and protocols. The cohesive articulation of the namespace
requires that privacy be reframed in ways that make its diminution seem natural and
inevitable. In the popular media, privacy is often depicted as the price we pay as
citizens and consumers for security and convenience, respectively. This discursive
ideological shift supports and underwrites the interests of state and corporate actors
who leverage the ubiquitous network of digitally connected devices to engender a new
regime of informational surveillance, or dataveillance. The widespread practice of
dataveillance represents a strengthening of the hegemonic relations between these
actors—each shares an interest in promoting an emerging surveillance society, a
burgeoning security politics, and a growing information economy—that further
empowers them to capture and store the personal information of citizens/consumers.
In characterizing these shifts and the resulting crisis, I also identify points of
articulation vulnerable to rearticulation and suggest strategies for transforming the
namespace in ways that might empower stronger protections for privacy and related
civil rights.
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1.1 Privacy in Crisis
In the 1999 episode “The Short List” of the Emmy Award-winning television show
The West Wing, U.S. President Bartlet (Martin Sheen) and his advisors are rethinking
their initial choice for a Supreme Court nominee based on their discovery that the
nominee does not recognize privacy as a guarantee of the United States Constitution.
Deputy Communications Director Sam Seaborn (Rob Lowe) argues the importance
of nominating a different judge—one with a stronger belief in privacy rights for
citizens, particularly in light of the shifting technological landscape:
It’s not just about abortion, it’s about the next twenty to thirty years.
The twenties and thirties it was about the role of government. The
fifties and sixties it was civil rights. The next two decades are going to
be privacy. I’m talking about the internet. I’m talking about cell
phones. I’m talking about health records and who’s gay and who’s not.
And moreover, in a country born on the will of being free, what could
be more fundamental than this?
What The West Wing so presciently foregrounded is the degree to which changes to
privacy law and policy, economic and cultural structures and practices wrought in and
through new technologies would become a central concern, for some the central
concern, in an increasingly connected, information-dense, global space of networked
computer media—in short, a privacy crisis. As Google’s privacy disclaimer, so
unwittingly pregnant-with-meaning, recently put it: “We’re changing our privacy
policy. This stuff matters.”
Of course, if an anxious concern over the too-easy sacrifice of privacy remains a
ubiquitous and familiar theme in our modern social imaginaries1, some concept of the
importance of privacy has deep historical roots in western discourse. In various forms
privacy remains one of the most architectonic and abiding concerns stretching back
through western civilization. The oft-cited warning by Roman poet Juvenal, for
example, Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes2, indexes a number of closely related concepts
such as wealth, power, transparency, autonomy, liberty, security, and especially
privacy, which still resonate with us today. In fact, it is Juvenal’s warning that Brian
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
is particularly evinced in the dystopic literature of the last century. See, for
example, Bellamy (1898), Zamyatin (1924), Huxley (1932), Boye (1940), Orwell
(1949), Bradbury (1953), Burgess (1962), Gibson (1984), and Vinge (2006).
2
But who will watch the watchmen?
1	
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Clifton, Google’s former Head of Web Analytics, invokes when asked in an
interview, What central question should drive the current privacy debate? “For me,”
he answers, “the important debate is ‘who is monitoring the monitors’” (question 6,
para. 1). Privacy has long proven a concept central to our thinking about the ordering
of bodies and spaces, citizens and states, beginning with Aristotle’s early distinction
between a political public sphere and a private domestic sphere, evolving toward
contemporary understandings in the late Roman period, and emerging fully as a
distinct social good in what Arendt calls the “modern age.”3

Historically, privacy represents a bedrock economic, social, and political value in the
United States, through its connection to the concept of freedom of autonomy—the
right to make fundamental decisions about one’s religion, politics, education, and
especially the disposition of one’s home and family affairs. Privacy’s strong connection
to freedom and liberty is represented in the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves
with regard to our public and private selves. “The idea of man in control of his own
private sphere,” observe Kennedy and Alderman (1997), “has always been a basic
organizing principle of American society. At America’s birth, we adopted from our
English ancestors the belief that a man’s home is his castle and that man is king of
that domain and, by extension, the whole of his private life…[T]he rugged, solitary
individual was celebrated on the American frontier, in business, and in literature and
popular entertainment, and became an integral part of American mythology” (p. 152).
This narrative continues today, although, as I argue in chapter two, the myth of the
“rugged, solitary individual” has in fact come to oppose the strong right to privacy
that it once supported.
While privacy remains central to American life today through its connection to the
notion of liberty, explicit references to privacy are not found in the U.S. Constitution.
With regard to privacy, the Bill of Rights includes explicit protections against
government intrusion in the form of two specific rights: the right to make
fundamental decisions for oneself, and the right to avoid disclosure of personal
matters. Like the fictional justice from The West Wing, above, Chief Justice John
Roberts was challenged at length about his interpretation of constitutional guarantees
of privacy. During his 2007 confirmation hearing, Roberts declared that although not
acknowledged per se,4 a penumbral right to privacy is constitutionally protected under
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
For more on the transformation from pre-modern to modern understandings of
private and public, see Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958).	
  
4
While not explicitly addressed in the U.S. Constitution, many states constitutions
explicitly guarantee a right to privacy, including Alabama, Arizona, California,
Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington
(Lenz, 1997).
3
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the First Amendment (securing the right to free exercise of religion, and prohibiting
the government’s establishment of religion), the Third Amendment (securing one’s
home against the quartering of troops), and the Fourth Amendment (securing a
person, their house, papers, and effects against unwarranted search). Many jurists also
recognize additional privacy provisions in the Fifth Amendment (securing personal
information through the protection against self incrimination), the Ninth
Amendment (protecting the possibility of other unenumerated rights), and the
Fourteenth Amendment (protecting infringement of one’s liberty without due
process).

Privacy protections also derive from legislation and a significant body of tort law.
Anchoring the latter is Warren and Brandeis’ Harvard Law Review article, “The
Right to Privacy” (1890), which problematized the popularity of the emerging snapphotography technology first made available by Eastman Kodak in 1884. Warren and
Brandeis were the first to address, jurisprudentially, the need to protect individual
privacy from an emerging ‘social medium’ populated by overly avid amateurs
photographers. These “Kodak fiends,” as they came to be known, threatened to
invade the “sacred precincts of domestic life,” argued Brandeis and Warren (p. 195).
Citing an abbreviated version of Cooley’s definition of privacy as the “right to be let
alone,”5 the article sparked a small body of case law bolstering personal privacy rights
over the next decades. However, it was Prosser’s 1960 article “Privacy” which revived
attention to personal privacy law by gathering and delineating extant case law into
four distinct torts: intrusion (the invasion of another’s solitude); private facts (the
publication of a private citizen’s personal information not of public concern); false
light (the portrayal, typically but not necessarily negative, of a person in a misleading
way); and appropriation (the damaging use of another’s name or likeness without their
consent). Although Prosser’s taxonomy encouraged, over time, a far larger body of
case law supporting personal privacy, the type and extent of privacy protections
continue to vary because tort-law is state-specific. Even in states that do offer similar
protections with regard to particular privacy rights, these rights may be interpreted
differently. For example, in 2011 the California Supreme Court ruled that police may
search the contents of any arrested person’s password-protected cell phone. The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, has rejected the right of law enforcement officers to search
the phones of arrested individuals, arguing that the use of a password grants
protections analogous to those who use a physical safe—an added level of protection
for which law enforcement officers must obtain an additional, specific search warrant
(Gahran, 2013). Each state thus represents a unique context from within which
privacy must be continually negotiated. Personal privacy rights are, in each case,
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  “The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alone” (Brandeis & Warren, 1890, p. 29).	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

10
weighed against the possibility of other stronger rights, or societal interest compelling
enough to trump individual privacy rights.
Thus, while privacy is putatively recognized as a social good and, in many cases, a
legal right, the specific nature and value of privacy continue to be vigorously debated
and legislated. Since the publication of Warren and Brandeis’ article over a century
ago, their definition of privacy has become but one of many competing for primacy.
For example, as Allen points out, “If privacy simply meant ‘being let alone’, any form
of offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another person could be
characterized as a violation of personal privacy. A punch in the nose would be a
privacy invasion as much as a peep in the bedroom” (1988, p. 7). Attempting to
navigate the muddled state of contemporary privacy research, Solove (2005)
delineates some of the disparate ways in which theorists have tried to define it: as “the
right to be let alone,” as “limited access to the self,” as “secrecy,” as “control over
personal information,” as “personhood—the protection of one’s personality,
individuality, and dignity,” and as “intimacy—control over, or limited access to, one’s
intimate relationships or aspects of life” (p. 13). Defining privacy is notoriously
difficult, he explains, because privacy is both communally and contextually defined.
For these and other reasons, privacy remains for some theorists “nebulous…too vague
and unwieldy a concept to perform useful analytical work” (Wacks, 2010, p. xi).
Ultimately, admits Solove, while a concept crucial to social organization, privacy
continues to resemble a “concept in disarray” (p. 8). “It seems as though everybody is
talking about ‘privacy’ but it is not clear exactly what they are talking about” (Solove,
2008, p. 5). It would seem not much has changed since Alan Westin’s seminal
Privacy and Freedom (1967) in which he proclaimed, “Few values so fundamental to
society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory” (p. 7).
Despite an acknowledged difficulty in reaching agreement about the nature and value
of privacy, an overwhelming and growing number of voices register urgent concern
over the use, by state and commercial actors, of invasive new information-based
surveillance technologies and practices associated with what has been termed,
variously, the computer age, the digital age, the information age, the network society, and
so on. Whichever term you prefer to characterize the highly technologized
contemporary socio-historical moment, privacy argues Frau-Meigs, “has emerged as
one of the salient issues of the twentieth century…[and] most researchers
acknowledge that [it] is eroding in cyberspace” (2010, p. 80). This claim is supported
by a 2008 Pew Internet & American Life Project survey in which nearly 1,200
leading Internet activists, builders, commentators, and stakeholders were asked to
predict the effect of transparency and diminished privacy on the social, political and
economic changes wrought by the Internet by the year 2020. At least half the
respondents agreed that privacy is either changing and/or becoming scarce, pointing
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Though scholars are divided as to the nature and value of privacy in its various
contexts, Nissenbaum (2010) points out that the danger of lingering too long in
definitional stasis: “Believing that one must define or provide an account of privacy
before one can systematically address critical challenges can thwart further progress”
(p. 2). As my focus here is on informational privacy, I rely on Westin’s definition of
privacy, in which he defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967, p. 158). I have chosen
Westin’s definition because its focus on informational privacy allows me a careful but
decisive start to mapping the privacy crisis with regard to the changing nature of
informational privacy in our contemporary historical conjuncture.
1.2 The Emerging Surveillance Society
“To participate in modern society,” writes David Lyon, “is to be under electronic
surveillance” (1994, p. 4). Large-scale political, economic and cultural transformations
have been associated with what Lyon and others have termed the “surveillance
society,” including: the global spread of western capitalism, the emergence of an
‘information’ economy, the displacement of the social-welfare state with the ‘security’
state, as well as a broad technological and cultural convergence in which we move
from relatively unidirectional electronic and other communication and media devices
to a society of multi-directional, constantly communicating, ubiquitous, networked
“smart” devices. For these reasons and others, the diminution of privacy under
emerging surveillance regimes represents, according to Lyon, “the single most
controversial and potentially alarming social issue prompted by the massive expansion
of computer power in human affairs” (1994, p. 11). These transformations both drive
and are driven by a significant reorganization of the structures and functions of the
first version of the World Wide Web (Web) and correspond to radical advances in
computer chip size, speed, data storage capacity, and reduced manufacturing costs,
leading to the global ubiquity of the networked computing device. To put it
somewhat reductively, where early iterations of the Web connected hobbyists,
academics, and later mainstream consumers through networks of stationary desktop
digital computers, the contemporary technological and cultural configuration that
underwrites our current Web—often referred to as Web 2.0—represents a paradigm
shift toward the articulation of new protocols, policies, and practices of ubiquitous
computing, and a culture of openness, transparency, sharing, and collectivity through
constant connectivity. Tim O’Reilly, who coined the term, describes it in this way:
Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices;
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Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic
advantages of that platform: delivering software as a continuallyupdated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and
remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while
providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by
others, creating network effects through an “architecture of
participation,” and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to
deliver rich user experiences. (para. 1)

This explains why in an increasing number of technologically developing countries,
we constitute ourselves and our communities in part through our use of personal blogs
(e.g., Blogger, LivePress, Wordpress), professional blogs (e.g., Boing Boing, Gawker,
Lifehacker, Mashable), micro-and videoblogs (e.g., Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram),
Massively Multiplayer Online games (e.g., EverQuest, World of Warcraft), social
bookmarking sites (e.g., Delicious, DIGG, Pinterest Reddit, StumbleUpon, Twitter),
video sharing sites (e.g., Vimeo, YouTube), social networking (e.g., Facebook,
LinkedIn, MySpace, Orkut), location tracking (Loopt, Foursquare), crowdsourcing
platforms (e.g., Kickstarter, RocketHub, Wikipedia) as well as hundreds of
commercial sites from Amazon to Zazzle. We text. We email. Many of us consume
music, literature and other forms of entertainment in digital forms, we buy and sell in
digital forms, we report very many of every movement and thought online—in a
word, we share immensely more personal data than we have in the past through
digital devices. The preponderance of these new media are economically incentivized
to privilege and promote sophisticated forms of surreptitious surveillance, including
location tracking, the recording and databanking of personal information, all of which
feed the newest form of hyperconsumerism—behavioral prediction of consumers
through statistical modeling. Thus, in our increasingly technologized social landscape,
the emerging imperative to share everything online represents both new possibilities
for community, and new pitfalls for privacy.
While increasing numbers of contemporary critics spark concern over this surveillance
society in which our lives are collected and recorded in massive databanks, serious
concerns over the profound effects of digital computers on informational privacy are
roughly coterminous with the birth of programmable computers around the middle of
the twentieth century and the emergence of networked computing which followed. In
an article in The Atlantic, jurist Arthur Miller reviewed the proposal for a National
Data Center, the first large-scale databanking of citizens’ personal and public
information in a centralized digital repository. Writing in 1967, two years before the
existence of the first packet-switching digital network and internet-precursor
ARPANET, Miller predicted a future remarkably like our own: “Computer systems
will be tied together by television, satellites, and lasers, and we will move large
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quantities of information over vast distances in imperceptible units of time” (p. 52).
The national data center would, he warned, combine with the “numerous subsystems
or satellites” owned both by state governments and perhaps private organizations to
form the “heart of a government surveillance system that would lay bare our finance,
our associations, or our mental and physical health to government inquisitors or even
to casual observers” (pp. 53-54). Without federal regulation, databanking proposed a
radical new threat, warned Miller: The collection, by “relatively unskilled and
unimaginative people who lack discrimination and sensitivity,” of ever greater
amounts of de-contextualized but essentially indelible data collected in personal or
professional digital dossiers which, through either simple data corruption or the
intervention by those with malicious intent, might have catastrophic consequences to
one’s life (p. 54). Moreover, cultural assumptions about the infallibility of data, as well
as hierarchies of control, access, and ownership could prevent citizens’ awareness of
inaccuracies or corruption in their own dossiers and/or prevent them from emending
them.
If Miller’s scenario seems all too familiar, it is because the practice of databanking and
of dataveillance, has become not only possible but standard practice for both state and
federal governments, innumerable corporations, and even individual citizens. Debates
over the diminution of informational privacy are thus often characterized by rising
concerns over the development of an emerging “dossier society,” whereby personal
information from myriad networked computer “databanks” can be joined to create
totalizing and readily accessible personal portfolios with sometimes deleterious effects
for individuals’ personal and professional lives. Roger Clarke termed this powerful
new form of data-driven surveillance “dataveillance” (1988, p. 500). Popular
treatments of the rise of dataveillance have treated surveillance in “colorful, at times
even hysterical, fashion,” argued Clarke, resulting in a “visionary, yet paranoiac
‘literature of alarm’” (p. 498). Dataveillance, can be defined as use of networked
computers to systematically collect information and/or communication about a
person, persons, their associates, associations, and activities in order to document,
predict, or promote/deter particular actions or behaviors. Dataveillance thus
represents the possibility of new and powerful forms of electronic surveillance in
which computer systems aggregate and analyze personal data. Whereas early forms of
electronic surveillance represented an extension of the methods of visual and aural
surveillance (e.g., binoculars, parabolic microphones, telephone wiretaps),
dataveillance opens radically new possibilities of privacy violation. Clarke takes a
balanced approach to dataveillance, however, suggesting that dataveillance need not
lead to the tyranny of totalitarianism, as certain types of surveillance have always been
necessary to the safety and stability of the state and that through proper regulation,
dataveillance ultimately represents a social good.
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While it is objectively true that many surveillance practices are necessary to the
functioning of families, communities, organizations and governments, some studies
have shown that predictive algorithms can use ostensibly innocuous data such as
‘Likes’ shared on the Facebook platform to predict with great accuracy: age, ethnicity,
gender, happiness, intelligence, parental separation, personality traits, political views,
religious views, sexual orientation, and the use of addictive substances (Kosinski,
Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). Similarly, the work of Acquisti and Gross (2009)
supports the concern that statistical modeling of interconnected data sets may allow
for privacy violation on a grand scale. By using the dataset that emerges from
combining information from the publicly-available Social Security Administration’s
Death Master File and an individual’s birthplace and birthdate available from any
number of publicly-available databanks and/or social networks, they were able to
algorithmically predict narrow ranges of numbers corresponding to social security
numbers of large numbers of citizens. “Such findings,” they explain, “highlight the
hidden privacy costs of widespread information dissemination and the complex
interactions among multiple data sources in modern information economies” (p.
10975). The algorithmic prediction of social security numbers opens up a range of
problems, including not least among them, identity theft. Predictive demography has
also led to problems such as redlining, the practice whereby statistics are used to name
particular groups who are then victimized by predatory commercial pricing, or the
denial of goods or services such as health insurance. It’s logical to infer, then, that as
these systems grow in the volume and type of data capture, and as the ability of
computers to process powerful predictive modeling grows, so does the potential for
privacy violation, with effects ranging from personal embarrassment, to the loss of
reputation and/or employment, to, in some cases, even death.
With the emerging popularity of the social networking paradigm, the popular media
has become rife with moving accounts of the dangers of sharing private information
on public social networks. There have been a rash of suicides among teens attributed
to the Web publication of personal details. For eighteen year-old Rutgers freshman
Taylor Clementi, for example, the humiliation of the Web publication of video of his
intimacy with another male student6 ended in Clementi’s suicidal leap from the
George Washington Bridge. The potential for serious privacy violation in digitally
interconnected spaces is why, suggests Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Marc Rotenberg, privacy may be “the top concern” for
consumers of new media products and services. Nissenbaum also sees privacy as “one
of the most enduring social issues associated with digital electronic information
technologies” (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 3). The now global embrace of social
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
footage was taken surreptitiously through a hidden webcam and broadcast on a
social media platform by Clementi’s then college roommate Dharun Ravi. 	
  

6	
  The

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

15

networking points to a larger challenge to privacy, then, in that consumers are
encouraged to share large amounts of information about themselves with global
multinational corporations such as Google and Facebook for the “free” services they
provide. These services come at a cost, however, requiring consumers to enter into
new and complex personal, professional, and sometimes financial relations with these
organizations. Many critics also recognize that Web services which offer ostensibly
free services in exchange for personal data are, in fact, receiving implicit payment in
the exactly the form of currency that drives the information economy—information.
A few of the data surreptitiously collected from users by these databanks include one’s
daily schedule and/or travel itinerary, search activity, personal and professional
affiliations, the content of one’s communication with others, academic affiliations,
native language, and any other languages one speaks, images of one and one’s social
circle, and one’s purchases. This tracking is supported by large-scale consumer
ignorance of the extent and types of tracking taking place. The blurring of private and
public produced by this popularity of social networking also raises a host of questions
about the legal rights of those who live online with regard to intellectual property and
especially privacy. For example, while information classified by the user as ‘public’ has
for some time been allowed as evidence in legal proceedings, more and more judges
have recently begun to allow information posted on social networks and classified
‘private’ to be used as evidence at trial. The benefits of social networking are thus
balanced by the problem confronting millions globally, argues Jeffrey Rosen—the
question of “how best to live our lives in a world where the Internet records
everything and forgets nothing” (2010, para. 2).
As each of Miller’s predictions have been fulfilled, this growing privacy crisis has
come to pervade both the popular and academic media. “We have to recognize and
address the problem of web-based information disclosure before we reach a point of
crisis—a point that I believe is rapidly approaching,” worries Conti (2006, p. xv).
“Privacy itself is in jeopardy,” worries Nissenbaum, “not merely in one or another
instance but under attack as a general societal value” (2010, p. 6). “The manner in
which information is collected, stored, exchanged, and used has changed forever,”
agrees Wacks, “and with it, the character of the threats to individual privacy” (2010,
p. ix). Because of the global pervasion of dataveillance, the privacy crisis has become
global as well. That crisis is undergirded by a steady stream of data communicated by
ubiquitous, sophisticated information and communication technologies (ICTs) such
as cell phones, tablets, laptops, and other ‘smart’ digital devices.7 The anxiety over
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  For Lievrouw and Livingstone (2002), the term ICT denotes a relationship between
particular artifacts, practices and social arrangements, which have transformed global
practices in a number of ways. Specifically, the spread of networked information and
communications technologies which leverage an increasingly global, relatively unified
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our seemingly diminished privacy rights at the hands of governments and private
corporations has only intensified after the September 11, 2001 (9-11) terrorist
attacks. Many critics see the terrorist attacks of 9-11 as the impetus for the rapidly
burgeoning $3-5 billion industry in surveillance technology (Horwitz, Asokan, &
Tate, 2011). Moreover, in the decade following the attacks, attendance at the
surveillance tradeshow nicknamed the “Wiretapper’s Ball” has grown by 40 times, to
host over 1,500 participants currently. The most recent tradeshow was attended by
representatives from at least 35 U.S. federal agencies (Elgin, 2011).

The U.S. government’s laws and policies surrounding surveilling its own citizens have
been the sites of intense ideological struggle, both historically and again very recently.
In fact, as I write this, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration is struggling to
re-legitimize its leadership in the area of domestic and foreign security policy in the
face of a mounting wave of privacy-related scandals that has energized public protests.
This crisis of authority is the product of the articulation of multiple individual crises
with regard to the violation of constitutional guarantees: Early and sustained critique
over initial discovery of, and continuing failure to close the Guantanamo Bay Prison
facilities have raised questions of due process violations by the government. These
combine with critiques over the discovery of a U.S. attack drone program which raises
questions about the president’s power to avoid due process and perform political
assassination. Lastly, the recent re-discovery8 of widespread direct and indirect
blanket surveillance of U.S. citizens’ telecommunications data and metadata by the
National Security Administration (NSA) has sparked a singularly strong and focused
public showing of antagonism in the popular media for the Obama administration,
and the government in-general.
1.3 Conjunctural Analysis and the Problematic of Privacy
This burgeoning array of privacy violations, and especially the responses to it, suggest
that privacy has become what cultural studies theorists term a problematic. A
problematic is “usually lived (but not necessarily experienced per se) as a social crisis
of sorts…when [particular] instabilities and contradictions appear at almost every
point in the social formation and when [those] struggles become visible and self	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
network of computing and other analog and digital information processing
technologies, has engendered fundamental shifts, both positive and negative, across
the articulation of behavioral, cultural, economic, institutional, and political and
technological facets of the social formation (p. 1).
8	
  The same discovery was made during the Bush administration. However, likely due
to the recentness of the 9-11 attacks, the story gained much less traction than it has
during the Obama administration (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005).	
  	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

17

conscious” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 41). Problematics emerge from a unique historical
context and constitute a “conjuncture,” which describes a social formation which has
become “fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, planes, and scales, constantly
in search of temporary balances or structural stabilities through a variety of practices
and processes of struggle and negotiation. It is the complex product of multiple lines
of force, determination, and resistance” (Grossberg, 2010, pp. 40-41). A conjuncture
is neither historically given nor entirely constructed by the critic. The critic must
carefully map the historical context, attending to what he or she sees as those
particular lines of force and determination that seem to best explain the emergence of
a particular problematic or problematics.

We can understand the concept of conjuncture by examining Jesse Schell’s Visions of
the Gamepocalypse (2010), in which he offers a map of an emerging conjuncture he
terms the “gamespace,” a technologically powered form of fast capitalism in which
play becomes the socially ubiquitous point of articulation connecting an information
economy and networked dataveillance practices. For Schell, powerful new technologies
(e.g., ubiquitous computing, information communication technologies, wi-fi and
cellular networks, enhanced sensor and screen technologies, biometrics, geo-tracking,
cloud computing, corporate and government databanking, and digital dossiers) will
articulate to new cultural forms and practices (e.g., shifting definitions of ownership,
authenticity, and privacy, the blurring of work and play distinctions, the pervasion of
play into virtually all sites of cultural production and economic consumption, the
embrace of social networking), as well as to new economic forms and practices (e.g., the
pervasion of virtually all sites of cultural production by net-enabled consumer
incentivization, micro-tracking, a shift to quantifiable extrinsic rewards, advergaming, the pervasion of human dreams by advertisers through what he calls “REMtertainment,” and ubiquitous gaming aimed at training consumers to notice
advertisements). The gamespace emerges through the interconnection of these
particular subjectivities, ideologies, affects, technologies, cultural and economic
practices, etc., which combine to produce radically new social designs, resulting in,
among other things, the blurring of work and leisure driven by commercial transmedia information conglomerates promoting whole-life tracking for economic profit.
However, an historical context may yield multiple conjunctures, and each
conjuncture, multiple problematics. Schell’s choice to name this conjuncture the
“gamespace” represents his recognition of the emergence of a ‘ludic’ problematic,
wherein the struggle to redefine the relation of work and leisure can be seen as
articulated to cultural and economic imperatives. My mapping work here draws upon
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a majority of the same elements of Schell’s conjuncture (i.e., ubicomp, digital
dossiers, consumer incentivization, etc.), but is focused on the problematic of
informational privacy as it is transformed through its articulation to regimes of
technologically-empowered surveillance. While both conjunctures emerge from the
same socio-historical context and investigate the emergence of highly technologized
forms of culture and deeply cultural technologies and their significance for social
structures, I connect to Schell’s focus on commercial actors with an economic interest
in the diminution or transformation of privacy those state actors with a parallel
political interests. Although I concede that the changing work-leisure balance is a
recognizable feature and perhaps even an impetus for the conjuncture I map, the
pervasion of play into socio-cultural life, at least as Schell envisions it, cannot happen
without a transformation of privacy driving and driven by the cultural, economic, and
political embrace of radical transparency.
9

Changes to the social and cultural, political and economic nature and value of privacy
(i.e., particularly the diminution of privacy), thus represent the requisite and perhaps
single-most-powerful change constituting the conjuncture I map here. For reasons I
elaborate below, and playing on the pithiness of Schell’s moniker, I term this
conjuncture the namespace. I offer the term tentatively and advisedly, as the
technocultural complexity of our current moment is especially resistant to
terminological boundaries. As Resmini and Rosati (2011) point out, no term
adequately captures the complexity of our current social-historical context, in which
the economic, political, cultural, and technological are so completely imbricated and
mutually constitutive: “We can call it ubiquitous computing, the Internet of things,
Web Cubed, or the Intertwingularity. We can talk about smart things, sensor Webs,
product-service systems, and collaborative consumption. But none of these labels
begins to describe the extraordinary diversity of the ambient, pervasive, mobile, social,
real-time mashups unfolding before our very eyes…But as we wander blindly in this
landscape of vernacular chaos, one thing is clear: we need a new map” (p. xi). The
namespace thus represents a proposed map of the complex conjuncture which I see as
the articulation of economic, juridico-political, and ideological elements, including
but not limited to the following: the rise of ubiquitous computing, including the
widespread availability of wi-fi and cellular technologies connecting ICTs (e.g.,
laptops, ‘smart’ phones, and tablets); powerful advances in screen and sensor
technologies which both promote the social and communal uses of ICTs and enable a
radically invasive new surveillance regime; juridical and political forces, laws, policies
and practices driving cultural imperatives toward an open public/closed state in the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9	
  It does not share, however, Schell’s imaginary “REM-tertainment,” as I mean to
keep my conjunctural analysis grounded by extant cultural and technical practices and
apparatuses and ideologies. 	
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continuing ‘war on terror’, including the multi-agency sharing of databases of citizen’s
digital dossiers; the articulation of technical and economic forces in the shift to cloud
computing, corporate and government databanking and dataveillance, and
staggeringly detailed but secret personal digital dossiers; the emergence of a new
Web-based advertising paradigm driven by consumer incentivized micro-tracking and
the corollary forms of fast capitalism built around ‘information’ economies. Each of
these and many other elements of the Web 2.0 world involve—require, we are told—
a tradeoff between stronger forms of personal privacy and security and convenience.
1.4 The Namespace
The namespace thus describes a space of concerted effort by both corporate and state
actors to reimagine privacy in weaker forms that promote a burgeoning information
economy, and a rising security state, respectively, driven by practices of dataveillance.
Privacy in the namespace is thus part of two interlocking binaries deployed by the
state and commercial sectors, respectively: privacy vs. security, and privacy vs.
convenience. The namespace, similar to what Siva Vaidhyanathan (2008) terms the
“nonopticon,” represents an effort to control people not through direct coercion, but
through dividualizing them to the point that they can be accurately named by the
behaviors their data reveals and predicts about them:
Even the state wants us to be ourselves. It wants subversive and
potentially dangerous people to reveal themselves through their habits
and social connections, not slink away in the dark to avoid obvious
surveillance. After all, the Stasi lost in its efforts to control the East
German people, despite exacting long-lasting damage to both the
observers and the observed. Our state does not want social or cultural
conformity. Domination does not demand it. The state wants to ferret
out and punish the ne'er-do-wells and hooligans among us and limit
due process along the way.
Everyone in the namespace (i.e., everyone with a digital identity) must be named, i.e.,
discovered/identified, categorized, quantified, quantized, dividualized, tracked, traded
or sold in the interests of national security and economic prosperity. As Luke (2006)
argues, the Web can also be seen as a space of political domination for states, a
“governmentality engine” in which the subaltern publics represent “subpolitical
assemblies of informatics artifacts” to be manipulated (p. 526). Under such a regime,
privacy remains a primary locus for the re-articulation of socio-cultural forms
constructed in and through emerging forms of surveillance. That rearticulation is
having both positive and negative consequences for individuals who correspond to
these “information artifacts.” I explore privacy in the namespace along three levels of
the social formation, the ideological, juridico-political, and economic, specifically

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

examining popular discourse surrounding the changing nature of privacy, law and
policy defining and interpreting privacy rights, and the economic practices and
protocols which shape the new information economy.
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Though I delineate each level of the social formation into its own chapter, each level
overlaps with and influences the others in multiple directions and intensities.
Technological advances, for example, may be driven by social-cultural shifts which are
themselves encouraged by economic forces enabled or resisted by jurists or politicians,
leading to new law and policy enforcing technological restrictions, further leading to
new or transformed techno-cultural forms. Likewise, economic forces may elevate
political practices which drive the development of particular technologies, resulting in
a cultural groundswell encouraging an economic boycott enacted with the help of
social media which results in political regime change. And so on. The important
thing to remember is that relations, phenomena, agents in each social formation
interrelate in what Althusser describes as overdetermined—that is to say, no single
force, phenomenon, or agent in the social formation is totally determinant of another,
but each exists in a complex relation with varying strengths, intensities and durations
with regard to each of the others.10 A conjuncture thus represents a heterogeneous
“unity in difference,” formed in and by “forms of coalition…rather than a battle
between two completely distinguishable and separable camps” (Grossberg, 2010, p.
42). While privacy represents a point of crisis, then, I don’t want to suggest here that
reactions to changes in privacy are somehow unified, coherent, or singularly critical.
Conjunctural analysis requires understanding a conjuncture as a space of ideological
struggle. That struggle takes place, according to Gramsci, through the alignment of
political ‘blocs’ which take their unity from the contingent and temporary alignment
of actors across a range of political and other commitments. In order to map the
namespace, the theorist must carefully note the multiplicity of voices and perspectives
in the privacy debate which emerge from a variety of political orientations.
And in fact, it is certainly not the case that all theorists completely reject a diminution
of personal privacy. Some argue that the adoption of too conservative an
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
10	
  For a fuller discussion of Althusser’s understanding of social determination, see his
essay “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in For Marx (1965). I have relied on
Gramsci’s work in this area, which Althusser praises in a footnote to that essay:
“[Gramsci] touch[es] on all the basic problems of Italian and European history:
economic, social, political and cultural. There are also some completely original and
in some cases genial insights into the problem, basic today, of the superstructures.
Also, as always with true discoveries, there are new concepts, for example, hegemony:
a remarkable example of a theoretical solution in outline to the problems of the
interpenetration of the economic and the political” (1965/2005, p. 114).	
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understanding of personal privacy may conceal domestic forms of oppression; may
contravene or compromise national security; may hinder economic flows, particularly
with regard to the emerging information economy; may limit the rights of
individuals, corporations or the state; may violate the norms of particular
communities; or may lead to forms of historical revisionism. Some argue that a more
traditional notion of privacy is incompatible with the technologies which make up a
completely integrated networked society. Others argue that privacy must be sacrificed
in the name of both political and economic security. For example, the “privacy crisis”
has a manufactured air for writer Jonathan Franzen, with “all the finger-pointing and
paranoia of a good old American scare” (2003, p. 40). Public Parts: How Sharing in the
Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (2010) represented Jarvis’ paean to the
new “ethic of openness” he terms “publicness.” And in a Wired article aptly entitled
“Get Over It,” Jeff Jarvis likewise critiques what he calls the “political press frenzy”
which he claims has been manufactured by an over-zealous media: “It’s not privacy
that concerns me now…I fear our supposed privacy crisis…could result in our missing
many of the opportunities the net affords to connect with each other” (2011b, para 2).
Potentially invasive facial recognition technologies might be used, he insists, to “find
missing people…(or terrorists)” (2011b, para. 3). Abandoning equivocation
altogether, Peter Cashmore, founder and CEO of Mashable.com, is famous for
declaring “Privacy is dead, and social media holds the smoking gun” (2009, para. 5).
And of course, Cashmore merely echoes Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun
Microsystems, whom a decade before had famously observed, “You have zero privacy
anyway—get over it!” (Sprenger, 1999, para. 1). What all this suggests is that, even
lacking a clear consensus on the precise definition of a legally-, culturally- and
politically protean term, there is a social crisis at hand, in the form of ideological
struggle, centered on the changing nature and value of privacy. While cavalier
statements made by Schmidt, Cashmore, McNealy, and others suggesting that the
surveillance society is a fait accompli may contribute to the public’s rising concern
over privacy, they also certainly point to the fact of a widespread continuing and
spirited debate—in a word, a problematic.
1. 5 Radical Contextualism and Articulation
If we are to weigh arguments fairly, we require a critical methodology with a
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of social determination with which we can
map the ideological, political, economic and technological forces in play—particularly
if we are to contribute in any meaningfully way in the political struggle to ensure a
society in which privacy policies ensure the greatest social justice and the preserve the
constitutionally protected rights (and those as yet unenumerated) of individuals. This
dissertation contributes to that project, and to the growing literature on privacy,
by understanding the struggle which constitutes that crisis in terms of cultural studies’
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concept of “radical contextualism.” Radical contextualism can be understood as the
claim that any carefully mapped conjuncture represents a complex of specific, but
never pre-determined or guaranteed “articulations,” formed by lines of force and
determination across the economic, ideological, and juridico-political levels of the
social formation (Grossberg, 2010, p. 20). The object of study in conjunctural analysis
is thus never isolable to a particular text, event, subjectivity, or discourse, but takes as
its object “a structured assemblage of practices—a cultural formation, a discursive
regime…located in overlapping formations of everyday life (as an organized plane of
modern power) and social and institutional structures” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 25).

Cultural studies thus recognizes social formations as dynamic, radically contextual,
contingent, overdetermined, non-necessary unities, and articulation names both its
theory, its practice, and its object of study. Hall defines an articulation as “the form of
the connection that can make a unity of two [or more] different elements, under
certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and
essential for all time…it has no necessary, intrinsic, trans-historical belongingness. Its
meaning—political and ideological—comes precisely from its position within a
formation” (qtd. in Chen & Morley, 1996, p. 142). The practice of articulation thus
involves laying bare the contingent and heterogeneous elements that constitute
conjunctural articulations for the purpose of intervening in them, and through
disarticulating and rearticulating particular, and particularly important lines of force,
reconstituting the conjuncture and changing the nature of the historical context itself.
The theory and practice of articulation thus offers us a sophisticated way to both map
and intervene in power and its effects among and between the various levels of a social
formation. Rearticulation does not represent a ‘step forward’ in a grand narrative of
progress, but represents the disconnection and reconnection of contingent and nonnecessary elements whose relation may be manipulated in the interests of certain
positions of power. The goal of the critical work of the articulation theorist—the
rearticulation of conjunctural relations—thus represents the hope, but never the
necessary guarantee, of greater social justice. For this reason, the critic must carefully
map the conjuncture for those nodes which afford dis- and rearticulation, in the hope
of transformative political change.
The namespace represents a conjuncture in which we find the articulation of state and
corporate actors to information economic forces and structures, to the ideological
formation of individuals as citizens and consumers, to the emerging technologies of
ubiquitous networked digital communication technologies. This conjuncture opens
progressive possibilities for transparency, connection, community, individual
expression. As it is currently articulated, however, those benefits increasingly come at
the cost of individual privacy rights. By mapping the namespace as an active sociopolitical process in which we may hope to intervene, I attempt to recognize those
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lines of force and determination open to change in order to once again
rearticulate/reassert stronger privacy protections, foregrounding and prioritizing them
in this nascent namespace conjuncture, while also maintaining its progressive
possibilities.

An accurate understanding of the ways in which contemporary technology articulates
to social, economic, and political elements is crucial to accurately mapping the
namespace. Although I argue that dataveillance, as currently deployed, may represent
a radically different, new and powerful form of surveillance producing and produced
by new social designs, and that such practices correspond to a powerful new
technologies, I am not espousing a technological determinism in which networked
computers have singularly produced a radical historical break which can be addressed
with uni-lateral or uni-dimensional approaches. Thinking with articulation helps us
imagine how social, political, and economic relations might be differently arranged,
and to resist more reductive understandings of the relation between technology and
culture, such as Nicholas Negroponte’s famous declaration in Being Digital (1995),
“Like a force of nature, the digital age cannot be denied or stopped” (p. 229). I reject
any approach that ‘solves for privacy’ merely through proper technological safeguards,
or through stricter legislative oversight. My use of articulation theory to map this
conjuncture instead foregrounds the need, described by Slack and Wise in their book
Culture and Technology (2005), to understand culture and technology together, to
support and further their demand for “a model and a vocabulary that brings
technology fully into the concept of culture” (p. 5). In their primer, they use the term
“technological culture” to recognize that technology is and has always been cultural,
culture always technological, and that neither technology nor culture stands as the
sole causal agent in any social formation—both technology and culture, so imbricated,
are inseparable for any theorist of social formations. This perspective lies at the heart
of how cultural studies understands social formations. Cultural studies’ radical
contextualism represents a rereading of the Marxist model of determination,
accepting as it does the importance of a non-necessary and contingent
correspondence between ideology, social/cultural structures, and material relations of
production, including, of course, technology. It understands each of these levels as
imbricated and mutually constitutive, mutually determinant. In The Long Revolution
(1961), Raymond Williams describes it as follows. It is worth quoting at length:
We have got into the habit…of asking about these relationships in a
standard form: “what is the relation of this art to this society?” But
“society,” in this question, is a specious whole. If the art is part of
society, there is no solid whole, outside it, to which…we concede
priority. The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the
trading, the politics, the raising of families. To study the relations
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adequately we must study them actively, seeing all the activities as
particular and contemporary forms of human energy. It is then not a
question of relating the art to the society, but of studying all the
activities and their interrelations, without any concession of priority to
any one of them we may choose to abstract….I would then define the
theory of culture as the study of the relationships between elements in
a whole way of life. The analysis of culture is the attempt to discover
the nature of the organization which is the complex of these
relationships. (1961/2001, p. 61-63)

There is no culture and art, argues Williams. There is no culture and technology,
argue Slack and Wise. These ‘individual’ elements, frequently abstracted and
separated either through ignorance or for the sake of convenience, must be thought in
terms of articulations. In each of the three chapters which follow, then, I explore
those particularly tendential lines of force at work across the ideological, political, and
economic levels of the social formation, respectively.
In chapter two, I use the work of Gramsci to powerfully extend Marx’s theory of
ideological struggle at the level of the conjuncture. Using Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony I explore the popular media’s role in helping to construct a narrative of
privacy that serves the interests of the dominant political bloc. This political bloc
articulates the ruling-class fractions in the form of state and corporate actors, to
subordinate/subaltern class fractions made up, broadly, of citizen-consumers who are
persuaded to trade privacy for security and/or convenience. I look specifically at the
discursive constructions of the changing nature and value of privacy in examples from
popular news, film and video game entertainments, explicating the various ways in
which popular media narratives of technocultural privacy draw on a cultural fund of
values, visual and textual tropes, and generally accepted understandings which
Gramsci terms “common sense,” in ways that attempt to make natural and inevitable
the use of surveillance by corporate and state actors.
In chapter three, I take the state as the locus for an historicized examination of the
ideological struggle over informational privacy at the juridico-political level. I examine
the rise of the Total Information Awareness program, and examine its role in
producing the nascent security state of our present conjuncture. I also explore the way
in which the terrorist attacks of 9-11 produced a moment of expansive hegemony,
leading to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and other pieces of legislation
that have systematically dismantled a significant number of those privacy protections
established over the last 125 years.
In chapter four, I take the commercial sector as the locus for an examination of a
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fundamental technical and economic shift toward an ‘information’ economy powering
the consumer Web today, and the challenges it poses to personal privacy. I look
specifically at the way in which the two largest social networking corporations,
Facebook and Google, lead technical and cultural innovation in databanking and
dataveillance, articulated to a new advertising paradigm (targeted marketing), and the
embrace of the technocultural form of social connectivity, ambient findability, which
underwrites and emerges from the rising information economy.
Having mapped the articulation between public (state) and private (commercial)
actors, I conclude by exploring what actions might be taken to engage in the privacy
crisis at first the individual level, and finally the conjunctural level. I offer short-term
and long-term, individual and collective possibilities for intervening in and
rearticulating the namespace in ways that take advantage of the hegemonic crisis, the
crisis of moral and intellectual leadership, which is now beginning to reveal cracks
and fissures. These ‘dominant’ state and corporate actors, desperate to regain
legitimate hegemonic leadership, may be pressured, I argue, to make concessions with
regard to restoring increasingly diminishing privacy rights. The namespace, I
conclude, is in fact ripe for rearticulation.

Chapter 2. A New Public Narrative of Privacy

26

2.1 Privacy in the Popular Media
In the previous chapter I described the conjuncture I term the namespace and argued
that it represents an articulation of particularly tendential lines of force in the form of
particular discourses, laws and policies, economic conditions and practices, and
technical codes and protocols. Each of these serves as a point of articulation between
the dominant social bloc (an articulation of social fractions in the form of state and
corporate actors), and the subordinate social fraction (a broad public of what I term
citizen-consumers for which communication and other cultural and social structures are
largely mediated by networked digital computer technologies). This articulation,
which has emerged to dominate the namespace, at least in the U.S., is one in which
the dominant social fraction overwhelmingly sets the terms of the debate on many
social issues, including the diminution of certain civil rights previously enjoyed by the
subordinate social fraction. This is especially true of privacy, which has been
successfully reframed as a double-binary in which the diminution of privacy is
necessary to maintain the balance between both security and privacy, and convenience
and privacy. In this chapter, I examine the ideological nature of the struggle to
maintain that articulation, and the cost it has to personal privacy as it plays out in the
discursive practices of the popular media.
It is putatively understood, particularly in developed western countries, that while the
mass media represent a heterogeneous symbolic field, the news media generally draws
from and helps reify a broadly shared set of cultural, social, and political values and
assumptions. “It is here [in the news, advertising, and entertainment media] that
dominant interpretations of reality and cultural values become stamped upon, or
‘anchored within’ the media products sold to the public in the form of news,
entertainment, and culture. Hence, by providing the basis of a shared symbolic
universe, the mass media ultimately foster a common (if contested and unstable)
culture as a lived system of meanings and values” (Marmura, 2010, p. 6). Cultural
values, beliefs, understandings, and assumptions are never immutable, but those
which are particularly tenacious often move into the realm of ‘common sense’ where
they have particular staying power. We draw upon these ready-made truths for the
stories (both fiction and non-fiction) we tell ourselves about ourselves in the popular
media. For this reason, it is important to recognize the role of news and popular
entertainments in the struggle to [re-]frame the nature and value of privacy in the
namespace. The popular media represent a particularly important force in this
conjuncture, and must be examined if we are to engage with the ways in which people
think, feel, and act with regards to the privacy crisis.
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Below, I examine the way in which particular elements from that common symbolic
fund are mobilized in particular popular media (i.e., news, film, and digital video
games), underwriting the articulation of dominant and subordinate social fractions
described above, through a tendency to draw on commonsensical understandings in
describing or depicting the relation of technology to privacy and social control.
Examining influential exemplars of the way we portray informational privacy and
privacy violation in news and entertainment media, I draw out a ubiquitous and
particularly tenacious narrative which naturalizes the vision of a society in which the
diminution of informational privacy is a juggernaut that may not be resisted, but only
fought from within by those who have mastered it by first accepting and inhabiting it.
The question of whether we might resist the adoption of particular technologies and
practices constituting a particular surveillance regime is often elided entirely in this
narrative. In each popular medium I describe below, privacy violation is often
understood in terms of overly-reductive literary tropes and narrative commonplaces
which pit individuals against a monolithic state or corporate entity; little allowance is
made in this narrative for the complex nature of social determination, nor for the role
of public consent in underwriting the diminution of its own privacy rights. The story
of privacy crisis in this narrative is an action-adventure in which, in the process of
being hailed as the hero who fights for his or her privacy and other civil rights,
individuals are necessarily subjected to a disempowering regime of technological
surveillance they are required to accept in order to marshal any agency, any resistance
to it at all.
2.2 Ideology and Common Sense
Before moving on to the discursive analysis of news and popular entertainments, I
must define what I mean by ‘ideology’ and how I understand its role in political
struggle. Though the term enjoys wide use in both critical-theoretical and popular
discourses, uses of the term in each area diverge significantly. As Raymond Williams
notes in Keywords (1983), in popular parlance ideology continues to denote an illusory
understanding of real socio-economic relations, material conditions, facts, etc. “[I]n
popular argument…[s]ensible people rely on experience…or have a philosophy; silly
people rely on ideology” (p. 157). While Marx’s view of ideology was more complex
than this, this sense of ideology as false corresponds to that typically attributed to a
classical or vulgar Marxism. In the field of cultural studies, the work of Antonio
Gramsci has been central to reshaping the terrain of the Marxist problematic,
contributing a more nuanced understanding of political power, social determination,
and ideological struggle for advanced capitalist societies. A brief review of these
concepts will help clarify the uses to which I mean to put them, here.
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Marx embraces ideology as a concept central to the analysis of the social formation by
positing an historical materialism in which societies are structured according to
material conditions rather than philosophical ideas.
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these
relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development
of their material powers of production. The sum total of these
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—
the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The
mode of production in material life determines the general character of
the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the
contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness…In
considering such transformations the distinction should always be
made between the material transformation of the economic conditions
of production which can be determined with the precision of natural
science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in
short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict
and fight it out. (1859/1904, p. 11-12)
For Marx, a society’s forces of production (the labor power, materials, and
technologies—this technology, these machines, these human bodies, etc.) determine
its relations of production (the social relations specific to modes of production—these
working hours, these gendered working spaces, this wage variance, etc.), which
together form the economic base of a society. The economic base, for Marx,
determines the superstructure of a social formation, i.e., the social, political, legal,
religious, and metapysical spheres of a society. The superstructure in turn produces a
dominant ideology which functions to reproduce the material conditions of
production.
Industrial capitalism, the economic form which for Marx most alienates humanity,
thus emerges from material conditions which pit the bourgeoisie (dominant, capitalowning, ruling class) against the proletariat (subordinate, labor-owning, working
class). Under this system, workers’ labor only increases the capitalist’s wealth as it
increases the division of labor, alienation, and impoverishment of the worker.
Ideology thus represents for Marx, a “false consciousness” functioning
propagandistically at the superstructural level, and wielded by the ruling class to
conceal the exploitative nature of economic structures under capitalism, by providing
simplified and compartmentalized models of society which privilege the capitalist
project. Though these structures are highly exploitative, ideology works to persuade
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the proletariat that capitalism represents the highest stage of civilization, the rational
ordering of an industrial society through which they might progress toward entering,
ultimately, the ruling class.
The work of Antonio Gramsci powerfully extends and complicates Marx’s
understanding of social determination, particularly with regard to the mechanism of
ideology in social determination, expanding and enriching the relation between the
state and civil society. Gramsci, rejects Marx’s class-correspondence, seeing the state
in coordinated relation to a host of other institutions in civil society. Arguing that the
ruling class need not correspond to a single equivalent ideology allows Gramsci to
reject universal class conflict as a necessary condition of every state, recognizing
instead that particular socio-historical conjunctures may produce provisional alliances,
or “blocs,” through bridging particular social fractions. The ruling bloc unites a variety
of dominant social actors with varying political and ideological commitments.
However, to win power, this ruling bloc must articulate to subordinate or subaltern
social fractions, which must be persuaded to locate their own interests within the
larger set of interests established and carefully maintained by the dominant bloc.
Gramsci (1934) thus framed political power as a continuum of coercive and
ideological methods of control. “The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in
two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group
dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps
even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups…it subsequently becomes
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must
continue to ‘lead’ as well” (1934/1971, p. 57-58). Though sometimes necessary to the
ruling bloc, coercive power is far less productive than ideological leadership and may
in fact undermine its authority to lead.
Ideologies are built, Gramsci argues, upon two “floors,” or levels of abstraction in the
social formation. At the philosophical level, ideologies may be coherently elaborated.
However, philosophically-elaborated and -unified ideologies are only effective when
they engage with and ideally transform the more established and accepted ideologies
at work in popular thought, against which they must contend. Gramsci is concerned
with the power of popular thought as an historical force, and understands it as central
to the production of political leadership. This “chaotic aggregate of disparate
conceptions,” i.e., maxims, folkways, received truths, ‘homespun’ wisdom, etc.,
Gramsci calls “common sense” (1934/1971, p. 324). Common sense is thus both a
resource for and a central terrain for ideological struggle. When not specifically
“arbitrary, rationalistic, or ‘willed’,” ideologies are simply requisite, functioning to
“‘organize’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (1934/1971, p. 377). In the U.S.,
common sense is mobilized powerfully through popular media, though Gramsci
recognizes it at work in “everything which influences or is able to influence public

opinion, directly or indirectly…libraries, schools, associations and clubs of various
kinds, even architecture and the layout and names of streets” (1934/1971, p. 15).
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From this complex rereading of Marx’s concept of ideology, Gramsci develops his
concept of “hegemony.” Hegemony describes a process of ideological struggle
resulting in a period of political stasis, rare in practice, in which, successfully
articulating the subordinate social fraction to itself, the dominant bloc secures for
itself—always temporarily and contingently—a moment of political settlement which
allows it to frame itself as the natural and inevitable moral and intellectual leader in
the social formation. In Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order
(Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1979), Hall et al. offer a succinct but
thorough description:
When a ruling-class alliance [or bloc] has achieved an undisputed
authority and sway over all the levels of its organization—when it
masters the political struggle, protects and extends the need of capital,
leads authoritatively in the civil and ideological spheres, and
commands the restraining forces of the coercive apparatuses of the
state in its defence—when it achieves all this on the basis of
consent…we can speak of the establishment of a period of hegemony
or hegemonic domination. Thus what the consensus really means is
that a particular…[bloc] shapes the whole direction of social life in its
image…it encloses the material, mental and social universe of the
subordinated classes, for a time, within its horizon. It naturalizes itself,
so that everything appears ‘naturally’ to favour its continued
domination. But, because this domination has been secured…on the
basis of a wide consensus…that domination not only seems universal
(what everybody wants) and legitimate (not won by coercive force), but
its basis in exploitation actually disappears from view. Consensus is not
the opposite—it is the complementary face of domination. (p. 216)
Hegemony may never be understood as a decisive, totalizing, or final victory by the
dominant bloc, but is rather a temporary and precarious preponderance of influence
in the balance of forces that make up a particular historical conjuncture. The
dominant bloc must agree to particular concessions and compromises to win the
consent of the subordinate bloc; this, though, necessarily alters the project of the
dominant bloc. This contingent and temporary alignment of interests must be
maintained continually, through both discursive and material means, as the dominant
bloc works ceaselessly to negate or diminish the interests of other competing groups,
while depicting their own goals as commensurate with the values and needs of the
subordinated bloc. Hegemony must finally be understood, then, as the briefest stasis
in a process of extended struggle, derived from the successful attempt by the ruling

bloc to set the intellectual and moral shape of a particular socio-historical context,
allowing it to successfully define, redefine, or resolve the nature and meaning of
particular conjunctures and problematics that may emerge.
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The 9-11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. produced a unique moment of hegemony,
producing a conjuncture overwhelmingly defined by the problematic of national
security. The security crisis is coterminous with a concerted and multi-headed “war
on terror,” prompting legislation and other policies and practices which aimed to
bolster national security at the cost of personal privacy. Thanks in part to the
devastating nature of the attacks, the state was able to easily obtain the consent of a
public only too relieved to trade privacy for security. Roughly a decade later, however,
citizen-consumers face a fundamentally different conjuncture in which the
problematic has shifted from a crisis of security to a crisis of privacy. The
security/privacy binary appears to turn on its head, as it were. The articulation of
particularly influential events and conditions such as the global economic collapse, the
largest U.S. debt in history produced in part by two failed wars and the perpetual “war
on terror” campaign, the deleterious effects of partisan political gridlock, and the
demonstrable willingness of the state to violate constitutional rights of due process
(e.g., the failings of Abu Graib, and Guantanamo Bay) and other civil rights such as
privacy (e.g., the discovery of blanket domestic surveillance by the NSA), among
others, have led to a rapidly diminishing public faith in the government. This
demonstrable failure of moral and intellectual leadership has weakened the consent of
the subordinate bloc to suffer what it now understands as illegitimate invasions of its
privacy and other civil rights. However, while these and other factors help to
foreground the emerging privacy problematic in the popular news and
entertainments, it often remains characterized by the narratives and symbols that
serve the dominant power interests. The ideological underpinnings of this
commonsensical narrative must be carefully mapped if we are to insist on more
nuanced accounts.
2.3 Privacy in the News
My project here is not to make an exhaustive study of the news, but to draw attention
to the ideological dimension of the construction of news accounts with regard to the
way in which they support the hegemony of the dominant bloc. While there is no
single monolithic, narrative—a growing number of powerful interests produce
counter-narratives which foreground the need for a strong right to personal
informational privacy—I focus here on the dominance and ubiquity of a particular
narrative in the news which, while ostensibly bemoaning privacy violation, actually
works to naturalize privacy’s diminution. This narrative encourages the news media to
describe the privacy problematic in simple, unreflexive, commonsensical terms which
wittingly or unwittingly underwrite the politics of an American surveillance state.
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To say the news is socially constructed to favor a dominant politics is not, however, to
place it in knowing collusion or political alignment with dominant ideologies. Rather,
by drawing on professional codes, tropes, metaphors, and ways of seeing (and not
seeing) established in a cultural fund of ‘common sense’ on offer in public discourses,
the news is structurally predisposed to reinforce dominant ways of seeing. What is
produced and presented to the public as news derives from the media’s process of
selectively defining what is newsworthy. When selecting what is newsworthy,
journalists face an imperative to make events interesting, comprehensible, and
meaningful to a relatively wide public. They do so, in part, by drawing on this shared
fund or repertoire of metaphors, simple narrative structures, ‘truthy’ facts, commonlyheld beliefs and values, and other figurative language densely packed with meaning.
Common sense, that body of ready-to-hand explanatory elements, represents,
according to Gramsci, an accumulated, sedimented record of other more elaborated
philosophies which were once more systematized and contextualized, but have
become decontextualized and reified, ultimately transformed into simply ‘sense’,
which by virtue of being reduced and decontextualized, allows for greater
identification by varied audiences. However, by readily employing and accepting
commonsensical characterizations, the media and public remain mired in discussions
of privacy in which the terms of the debate are often informed by symbolic
representations of the now-reified politics by the dominant bloc. Hall et al. describe
the structural relation in this way:
There is of course no simple consensus, even here, as to the nature,
causes and extent of the crisis. But the over-all tendency is for the way
the crisis has been ideologically constructed by the dominant
ideologies to win consent in the media, and thus to constitute the
substantive basis in ‘reality’ to which public opinion continually refers.
In this way, by ‘consenting’ to the view of the crisis which has won
credibility in the echelons of power, popular consciousness is also won
to support…the measures of control and containment which this
vision of social reality entails. (Hall et al., 1979, p. 220-221)
For example, when looking to an authority on the significance of cloud-computing
technology, the popular press will naturally select an author such as Google Chairman
Eric Schmidt. As a spokesman for one of the wealthiest and most successful global
multi-national Web service/cloud computing businesses, he represents a putative
authority on the subject, and what Hall et al. term a “primary definer” (p. 62)—those
cultural spokespersons drawn upon by the media to define the outer boundaries of
sense. A book such as Schmidt’s The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People,
Nations and Business (2013), co-authored with Director of Google Ideas, Jared
Cohen, is useful for understanding the technologically determinist arguments made
by certain commercial actors—that traditional notions of privacy and anonymity are
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economically stifling, militarily dangerous, and culturally quaint, among others. Julian
Assange described the book as a “startlingly clear and provocative blueprint for
technocratic imperialism,” as essentially a manifesto defining “a new idiom for United
States global power in the 21st century,” and a thinly veiled marketing statement for a
global communications mega-corporation to define itself as “America’s geopolitical
visionary” (para. 1). Not only the argument of the book itself, but in fact, the
testimonials on the book jacket from politicians such as former U.K. prime minister
Tony Blair, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former CIA Director
Michael Hayden, immediately rhetorically align the authors’ politics with those state
actors known for favoring a policy of total information awareness, which I discuss in
chapter three.
However, this process of reductive transformation, as more elaborate theories make
their way into the public fund of common sense, is a largely unconscious process. By
selecting and reproducing the ideological positions of the primary definers (those
“‘accredited sources’” with access to the media), “the media stand in a position of
structured subordination [emphasis added] to the primary definers” (Hall et al., 1979,
p. 59). In this way, common sense indirectly underwrites the social construction of
the news media, and offers powerful, if often unintended, support to the hegemony of
the ruling bloc whose influence on the media, when not direct, persists structurally.
To be sure—a dominant bloc does not merely supply the subordinate bloc with a
particular ideology, nor does the subordinate bloc wholly adopt the dominant
ideology. Instead ruling ideologies establish the limits of the sense and structure of
meaning which bound the lived relations of the subordinate bloc. “Hence, in action as
well as in thought, [members of the subordinate bloc] are constantly disciplined by
them” (Hall et al., 1979, p. 154).
2.4 Big Brother as Common Sense State
With regard to the privacy crisis, an important way in which the news media
underwrite the power of the dominant bloc is through overwhelmingly framing the
privacy debate in vague but Orwellian terms, most often through employing the trope
of “Big Brother” or referencing the author whose name has become an adjective
(“Orwellian”) synonymous with the surveillance society. While it’s true that many
understandings of the relation of culture, technology, and social control compete in
the popular media, “Big Brother,” as the culturally recognizable symbol of the
machinery of total surveillance from George Orwell’s dystopic novel Nineteen EightyFour (1992), is by far the most ubiquitous narrative invoked in the popular media to
frame discussions of the violation of informational privacy. “[T]he influence of 1984
has been felt far beyond the merely literary. The metaphor of ‘Big Brother’, now
expresses a profound cultural fear in areas quite remote from what Orwell originally
had in mind” writes Lyon (1994, p. 11). For example, after revelations in June that

the government has engaged in broad, warrantless surveillance of phone and email
metadata for hundreds of thousands of customers of telecommunications giants
Google, Facebook, AT&T, Verizon, and others, sales of the novel spiked 5,000
percent for online bookseller Amazon.com (Riley, 2013, para 4.). Moreover, in
responding to the scandal, President Obama, too, framed the question in Orwellian
terms: “In the abstract, you can complain about Big Brother and how this is a
potential program run amok, but when you actually look at the details, then I think
we've struck the right balance” (“Obama’s Remarks,” 2013).
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In fact, the number of articles and books which in some way reference Big Brother in
framing privacy (particularly with regard to technological surveillance) is so large,
ranging across a wide array of discourses in the popular media, that I can offer only a
brief sketch of it here. Inaugural member of the field of surveillance studies, David
Lyon observes: “When I tell people that I am studying surveillance, and in particular
investigating the ways that our personal details are stored in computer databases, the
most common reaction is to invoke Orwell; ‘This must be a study of ‘Big Brother’”
(1994, p. 57). Fox News’ Sean Hannity moralizes, “Big Brother is monitoring your
every move, whether it be online or on the telephone…This is America, and as lawabiding citizens, you have a right to privacy” (qtd. in Gibney, 2013). “The way some
people see it,” warns popular television personality Katie Couric, “Big Brother is
watching and his name is Google.” “You are being watched,” writes privacy scholar
Raymond Wacks, “The ubiquity of Big Brother no longer shocks” (2010, p. 1). “Of
course, technology has been tracking what people do for years,” writes Thomas Goetz
in a recent issue of Wired, with “top-down, Big Brother techniques” (2011, para. 16).
And as Adam Bessie worries in Truthout, youth in this country, so smitten with social
networking, don’t recognize the real threat of a Big Brother attack on their privacy,
represented by the omnipresent surveillance like that in Orwell’s novel: “‘OMG,
Winston, chill out’, one of my undergrads might languidly sigh, while at the same
time deftly posting the big weekend plans on Facebook under her desk” (2010, para
3).
A search for “Big Brother” filtered for “privacy” on the Amazon.com site returns more
than 100 books, in which some authors, such as John McGrath in Loving Big Brother:
Surveillance Culture and Performance Space (2004), argue for the positive effects of
privacy diminution: “[S]urveillance has proliferated not least because we desire it—we
enjoy it, play with it, use it for comfort” (p. vii)1. Others like Mark Dice, in Big
Brother: The Orwellian Nightmare Come True (2011), worry that surveillance
The title of McGrath’s book actually references the television show Big Brother.
However, the show, in which contestants agree to be confined to a house in which
they are constantly surveilled by hidden cameras, obviously indexes Orwell’s novel in
its title and premise.
1
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technologies and practices threaten to “make our world just as horrific or even worse
than the world George Orwell described” (p. 2). A search of NPR’s website returns
512 results, with titles such as, “Self-Tracking: Becoming Your Own Big Brother,”
“Inside Big Brother’s Watchful Eye,” and “Is Big Brother Listening?” A search of the
New York Times returns over 11,000 results, with titles such as “Big Brother is Us,”
“Court Asks if ‘Big Brother’ is Spelled GPS,” and “Is Big Brother Coming, or Is He
Here?” A search of CNN produced over 5,500 results, with titles such as “Big Brother
Awards Highlight Privacy Complaints”2 and “Will Big Brother Track You by Cell
Phone?” Forbes registers 114 results, with titles such as “Dear Conspiricists, Big
Brother Uses Big Data,” and “Big Brother 2.0: What If the NSA Adopts Facebook’s
‘Hacker Way’?” A search of Wired magazine yields over 5,000 results, with titles such
as, “Big Brother is Watching You Shop,” “Another Tool for Big Brother,” and “Big
Brother is Watching Your Travel Habits.” A search of The Atlantic produces 702
article results; The Economist, 50 results; Newsweek, 62 results; Mother Jones, 24
results; Popular Science, 1,160 results; Time Magazine, 107 results; The Wall Street
Journal, 550 results. Put simply, work on privacy in the popular media is shot through
with the trope of Big Brother.
Privacy violation and Big Brother are frequently linked visually, as well. For example,
the recent image on the Guardian Web site which links to an article on NSA
whistleblower Edward Snowden is a black and white photo of George Orwell sitting
at his typewriter. Semiotically, this familiar image of Orwell is meant to link
Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s snooping to Orwell’s dystopic classic, lending it
similar gravitas. By linking Snowden to Orwell directly, Snowden is represented by
association as an heroic chronicler and harbinger of the looming surveillance society.
One of the most creative visual invocations of Big Brother can be seen in the way the
popular web comic Joy of Tech semiotically binds Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to
Big Brother through intertextually referencing Apple’s now famous Orwellian
Macintosh commercial from the 1984 Olympics, directed by Ridley Scott (Nitrozac
& Snaggy, 2009). Apple’s original commercial depicts a futuristic scene of ideological
indoctrination, as the massive face of Big Brother booms out from a telescreen: “We
are one people, with one will, one resolve, one cause,” to an audience of grey-pallored
drones who stare silently as one in their uniform grey jumpsuits. Suddenly a brightly
dressed woman runs on screen to hurl a hammer into the telescreen. Its destruction
awakens the audience from their ideological slumber as the commercial’s announcer
intones: “On January 24th, Apple Computer will introduce Macintosh. And you’ll see
In fact, one of awards offered for those who most egregiously violate privacy by the
international privacy watchdog Privacy International (mentioned in the previous
chapter) is the “Orwell,” a golden statue of a boot stamping on a human head—the
very image the character of O’Brien uses to characterize the future of human
civilization for Winston, in the end of the novel (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 280).
2
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why 1984 won’t be like Nineteen Eighty-Four.” In the Joy of Tech comic, however, it is
CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s face which looms large on the screen as, to similarly
disaffected drones, he extols: “Greetings citizens of Facebookia. This is our land, a
land of people and of privacy! That’s why we have new privacy guidelines! From now
on, by default, all your information is available to everyone on the internet. To remain
private, share everything with everyone!” The rhetorical figure (παραδοξοσ) so
brilliantly used in Nineteen Eighty-Four , “WAR IS PEACE”; “IGNORANCE IS
STRENGTH”; “FREEDOM IS SLAVERY,” is displayed across Zuckerberg’s face
as: “PRIVACY IS SOCIABLENESS,” “SECRECY IS SHARING,” “PERSONAL
IS PUBLIC.”
It has become, then, “pretty clear what everyone mean[s] by the phrase ‘Big Brother’,”
explains McGrath (2004), “they [mean] invasion of privacy,” particularly at the hands
of a panoply of powerful new surveillance technologies and practices (p. vii).
Moreover, Big Brother and the various other Orwellian tropes have become so
ubiquitous in popular media treatments that some critics have taken to praising their
absence. The sheer number of references to Big Brother in the popular media reify its
authority as a framework for understanding privacy with regard to social control such
that even critics who reject an Orwellian frame are required to acknowledge it or
reject it outright. For example, in reviewing Landau’s Surveillance or Security? The
Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (2011), Rothke is moved to praise
Landau for not invoking Orwell: “Surveillance or Security? is one of the most
pragmatic books on the topic in that the author never once uses the term Big Brother.
Far too many books on privacy and surveillance are filled with hysteria and hyperbole
and the threat of an Orwellian society.” In an editorial by Mashable CEO Pete
Cashmore, Orwell’s novel is described as “incredibly prescient yet woefully incorrect,”
and our present historical moment as both “reminiscent of Orwell’s vision and
radically at odds with it” (Cashmore, 2012, para. 1). In his New York Times Magazine
article “Little Brother is Watching,” Kirn rejects references to Orwell out of hand,
calling Nineteen Eighty-Four “a quaint scenario, grossly simplistic and deeply
melodramatic” (2010, para. 2). While describing Nineteen Eighty-Four as “grossly
simplistic” and “deeply melodramatic” seems to me a grossly simplistic reading of a
novel generally recognized as a classic work of dystopic literature, it raises an apt
question: Just why do critics in the popular media cling so to the glower of a Big
Brother who, having failed to manifest in our own present moment, has little critical
purchase in contemporary privacy debates?
The answer to this question is complex and multi-faceted. First, the novel’s standing
as a literary classic results from a rhetorical pathos which brilliantly addresses the
historical conjuncture from within which it emerges and to which it responds. Lane
describes the overwhelming cultural appeal of Big Brother as “a creation so plausible
and so frightening that he instantly took his place alongside other literary metaphors
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for human ingenuity run amok” (2011, p. 141). Orwell’s novel speaks to an
historically established anxious concern over the transfer of our dearest rights and
freedoms to governments which, through powerful technologies of surveillance and
control, strip citizens of fundamental human rights. Many see a direct causal
connection between the emergence of the technologies and practices of pervasive
social surveillance and the rise of totalitarianism—Orwell’s novel dramatizes brilliant
support for this argument. Set in what would be for Orwell a dystopic future,
Nineteen Eighty-Four imagines the struggle of everyman Winston Smith against a
rigidly totalitarian form of English Socialism3 (Ingsoc), a regime under which citizens
have lost or abandoned their rights to free expression, personal property, and
especially privacy. Published at the conclusion of the Second World War, the novel
held remarkable explanatory power for a public attempting to understand the rise of
German Fascism and its ability, through propaganda and other means of control, to
garner widespread support for its radical political program. Orwell addresses the
importance of ideology in the political process, noting that as Ingsoc emerged,
citizens offered little enough resistance to the loss of their social freedoms. “[T]he
choice for mankind lay between freedom and happiness,” explains Winston,
“and…for the great bulk of mankind, happiness was better” (1949/1992, p. 275). This
important aspect, the consent of the general public to have allowed the emergence of
such a repressive regime, is often missed by the news media as Orwell’s novel is fit to
the procrustean bed of ‘common sense’, where Big Brother, simplified to represent
not an articulation of ideological and material forces, but the monolithic state or
corporations, takes on a singular anthropomorphic malevolence. For a public hungry
to understand how something as horrific as the Holocaust could have happened, the
vastly more complex novel offers a striking explication of an articulation of the means
of social control by what were then newly emerging surveillance and computing
technologies. Orwell’s densely woven narrative described the extensive coordination
across the various levels of a social formation necessary to produce such an
unremitting form of totalitarianism. A brief review of that articulation reveals the
complexity of Orwell’s understanding of social determination.
Ingsoc was organized as the articulation of structures of political organization across
the social formation. These were represented by four ministries. The Ministry of
Plenty (Miniplenty) represented the economic arm. While ostensibly it ensured the
distribution of goods and services, it ran the state-sanctioned market in a state of
balanced, planned inefficiency. This bolstered the belief among citizens that they
were sacrificing for the war effort. It also encouraged an illicit free market, which the
government not only ostensibly tolerated, but employed to surveil those who
patronized it.
According to the book by Immanuel Goldstein, Ingsoc is technically organized as a
form of oligarchic collectivism (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 214).
3

38
The Ministry of Love (Minilove) represented the juridico-political arm. It fulfilled
the first of the two primary goals of the State, the ability to surveil and predict the
thoughts of every citizen. The State had abolished all laws but one, “the essential
crime that contained all others in itself. Thoughtcrime they called it” (Orwell,
1949/1992, p. 21) and it consisted simply in having thoughts against the party. While
the machineries of surveillance included standard police patrols, far more terrifying
were the ubiquitous telescreens which both surveilled citizens and broadcast
propaganda unceasingly. Citizens were terrorized by the constant monitoring which
might reveal one’s thoughtcrime, interpellated by the watchful symbolic gaze of Big
Brother not only from the telescreens but from the media which surrounded them,
“on coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and on the
wrapping of a cigarette packet—everywhere. Always the eyes watching you and the
voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in
the bath or in bed—no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic
centimetres inside your skull” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 29).
The Ministry of Peace (Minipax) represented the military arm. Minipax fulfilled the
second of the two primary goals of the State, to ensure perpetual global war between
itself and the states of Eastasia, and Eurasia. Perpetual war was supported by a
military industrial complex which had purposefully abandoned technological advance
in favor of a tri-state balance of military strength. Perpetual war thus allowed the
State to ideologically unite the people as one against an imaginary enemy traitor, in
the form of racialized other Immanuel Goldstein, “the commander of a vast shadowy
army, an underground network of conspirators dedicated to the overthrow of the
state” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 15).
Perhaps the most important was the Ministry of Truth (Minitrue), which represented
the state-controlled media arm. It was charged with encouraging political orthodoxy
through the ideological interpellation of citizens by all means of discourse,
communication, and signification. Minitrue had many functions, including producing
political propaganda, and editing or “rectifying” historical documents by changing
facts, figures, and the truth of historical events. “All history was a palimpsest, scraped
clean and reinscribed exactly as often as necessary” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 42). The
primary goal of Minitrue was its project to revise the English language, creating an
ideologically pure version called “Newspeak,” which would eliminate political
unorthodoxy through the removal of words and concepts that were revolutionary,
eventually obviating the need for machineries of surveillance themselves. All media,
all acts of communication and signification were bound to the war effort, supported
by the Ministry of Truth in the creation of everything from patriotic youth
organizations, to posters depicting threatening racially-stereotyped enemy soldiers, to
endless effigies, lectures, meetings, military parades and processions, novels, rumors,
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slogans, songs, speeches, telescreen programs and films, and waxwork displays. The
“Two-minutes Hate,” for example, provided an outlet for direct and focused
aggression which had taken the place of social and cultural connections which might
organize individuals in collectives no longer possible. They had replaced privacy, love,
friendship with mechanistic and superficial emotions such as fear, hatred and pain
(Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 32). The propaganda machine represented a cultural force in
the breakdown of institutions which might offer citizens anything but the state.
Children were alienated from their parents through early enlistment in the “Spies”
where they learned the techniques of spying on adults. Young adults were also
constrained by membership in similarly focused state-sponsored organizations as the
“Youth League” and the “Junior Anti-sex League.” While prostitution was tacitly
encouraged by the party as “an outlet for instincts which could not be altogether
suppressed” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 68), romantic sex and the creation of families for
other than procreation had been discouraged. This breakdown of the family, and
romantic relations functioned to isolate individuals from each other and to articulate
them solely and constantly to the State. This party view of sex was “rubbed into every
Party member from childhood onwards” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 69). Elimination of
affect through removal of familial bonds was in part replaced by the state-sponsored
opiate “Victory Gin.”
Orwell’s detailed, horrific description of a model of total social control that perfectly
integrates the economic, juridico-political, military, and especially ideological levels,
may explain why it is Orwell’s Big Brother who has emerged as our ubiquitous
cultural shorthand for privacy violation, and not the “Well-Doer” from the less wellknown but important dystopian precursor to Nineteen Eighty-Four, Zamiatin’s We
(1924). Like Orwell’s novel, We understands political domination as the integration
of economic, cultural, political, and technological forces, and in fact, the plot and
setting of We are strikingly similar to those of Nineteen Eighty-Four: In the novel’s
“United State,” citizens abandon personal and familial identities for state-issued
numbers; they consume propagandist music and art; they relinquish nearly all private
property and privacy; and they find themselves surveilled and hailed by a singular
ideological figurehead. We describes very similar discursive and symbolic practices to
Nineteen Eighty-Four for inscribing political orthodoxy, including similar techniques
of surveillance and social control. “Normally,” exclaims Zamiatin’s narrator placidly,
“we lie surrounded by transparent walls which seem to be knitted of sparkling air; we
live beneath the eyes of everyone, always bathed in light. We have nothing to conceal
from one another; besides, this mode of living makes the difficult and exalted task of
the Guardians much easier” (Zamiatin, 1924/1983, p. 18). However, whereas We
emphasizes a warped love story doomed by the dystopia which contextualizes it,
Nineteen Eighty-Four represents a political meditation in which the love story
provides only the impetus for the protagonist to begin his exploration. Likewise,
whereas the Well-Doer of We offered an analog for Italian fascist Mussolini, the
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figure of Big Brother offered an easily identifiable analog for the demagogues such as
Stalin and Hitler whose atrocities were historically unparalleled. In short, Orwell’s
novel could be described as a work of literary political philosophy that tackles the
difficult question of social determination—of how such a dystopia might come into
being and be organized. To theorize such an architecture of control he invokes
Bentham’s model of social control, the Panopticon, of which I have more to say
below. Orwell’s novel thus helped describe for the public at the middle of the
twentieth century the brave new world wherein vast computer databanks were not
merely a dystopic prognostication, but the harbinger of an emerging reality. Published
a quarter century before Orwell’s novel, Zamiatin’s descriptions of the technological
means of total surveillance and total social control must have read like fanciful
predictions. If Zamiatin’s novel seemed prescient in anticipating technological and
cultural changes, Orwell’s novel reflected the terrifying probability of changes
introduced by the co-terminous introduction of the first programmable computer.4
The novel has continued relevance for us in the first decade of the twenty-first
century, as well, anticipating technological and cultural changes in our own time that
have made possible many of the troubling synergies Orwell could only then imagine.
Lane notes that with the rise of digital networked computing in the late twentieth
century, Big Brother and the concept of the Orwellian state becomes “a veritable
mantra” for civil libertarians and those interested in challenging the emerging
practices of databanking and dataveillance (Lane, 2011, p. 220). For contemporary
critics, at least three techno-cultural developments in the Orwellian social formation
are held up as disturbingly predictive of changes we are witnessing in our own time.
First, the state of perpetual war that was used to justify the violation of basic human
rights in Orwell’s dystopia are offered in similar support for the denial of basic civil
rights during our own extended conflicts, e.g., the “cold war,” the “war on drugs,” and
the “war on terror.” Second, the development of the telescreen is frequently compared
to the development of computers and especially ICTs, which are already used to track
our location, and to mine and record what we often think of as personal data. Third,
the Orwellian concept of “thoughtcrime” could only emerge in tandem with the use
of predictive algorithms, such as those now employed by both the government and
consumer entities. Many critics rightly discern the way in which the first line of force
legitimizes and strengthens the second and third.
While the literary quality and technological prescience of the novel are acknowledged,
there are fundamental reasons to challenge its value as a useful model of social control
in understanding the contemporary privacy crisis. To imagine a direct analogy
between Orwell’s model of social determination and our own is problematic in several
Nineteen Eighty-Four was published in 1949, two years after the initial military
service date of the Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer (ENIAC).
4
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fundamental ways. First, Orwell’s novel represents a fictional account of a society
ordered according to the principles of a social design proposed by English
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, termed the “panopticon.” The panopticon was
introduced by Bentham in 1791 as an architectural design for prisons, hospitals, and
schools. It was designed as a circular building with inward-facing cells ringing the
circumference, illuminated so as to be seen by a central watchtower. From within the
central watchtower, shielded from the sight of those on the periphery, overseers
surveil the inhabitants, each separated into his or her individual cell. This total,
continual, and visible but unverifiable surveillance of individual inmates by an
unknown, seeing but unseen principal was designed to eliminate the myriad negative
effects produced by traditional dungeons, which locked the masses away together in
dark spaces. It produces instead a machinery of light and vision in which omnipresent
surveillance inculcates in the inmate the terror of an omnipotent overseer who might
intervene punitively at any moment. The separation of individual from individual was
designed to eliminate contagion in patients, collusion in prisoners, chatter and
cheating in students, and productivity-limiting distraction in workers (Bentham,
1791/2011, p. 29).
Whether experimenting with punishments for prisoners, new efficiencies for workers,
or new pedagogies for students, Bentham’s panopticon thus offered the overseer a
laboratory for the study, creation, alteration, and elimination of human behavior. Nor
were the overseers themselves immune to the imperious gaze of this “machinery of
furtive power….[this] concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes,” as
their conduct and worth might too be read at any time in the condition and progress
of their charges (Foucault, 1975/1995, pp. 202-204). The panopticon thus serves as a
laboratory for power, observes Foucault, a “cruel, ingenious cage…a mechanism of
power reduced to its ideal form” (1975/1995, p. 205). The efficacy of that power lay
in its ability to use architectural structures and geometrical principles to induce,
through an omnipresent psychological terror, self-control in its subjects: “[I]ts
strength is that it never intervenes, [power] is exercised spontaneously and without
noise…Because without any physical instrument other than architecture and
geometry, it acts directly on individuals; it gives ‘power of mind over mind’”
(1975/1995, p. 206).

The social world described in the novel evinces each of the central mechanisms of the
panopticon: constant but unverifiable surveillance, the ideological interpellation of citizens
by powerfully repressive political orthodoxies, the isolation of the individual and
erosion of familial and other traditional communal forms: “With the development of
television, and the technical advance which made it possible to receive and transmit
simultaneously on the same instrument, private life came to an end. Every
citizen…could be kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in the
sound of official propaganda, with all other channels of communication closed. [emphasis
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added] The possibility of enforcing not only complete obedience to the will of the
State, but complete uniformity of opinion on all subjects, now existed for the first
time” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 169-170). As many critics have noted, government
surveillance in the U.S. is no direct analog for Orwell’s Ingsoc. Certainly, limited
panoptic practices are at work in certain banks, retail stores, and other
situations/locations in which the conspicuousness of closed-circuit television (CCTV)
surveillance are used to deter as much as discover criminal behavior. In any case, while
the U.K. has adopted CCTV surveillance to drive law enforcement, with estimates
ranging from 1.85 to 4.1 million cameras deployed publicly, the system has failed to
produce radical reductions in crime. Moreover, even with the ostensible adoption of a
large-scale panoptic regime of surveillance, the U.K. today little resembles Orwell’s
“Ingsoc,” in which a terrified citizenry was ceaselessly interpellated by the ubiquitous
presence of Big Brother: “On coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners,
on posters, and on the wrapping of a cigarette pack—everywhere. Always the eyes
watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating,
indoors or out of doors, in the bath or the bed—no escape. Nothing was your own
except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 26).
In reviewing Rule’s Privacy in Peril (2007) and Solove’s The Future of Reputation:
Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (2007), Vaidhyanathan praises both scholars
for “avoid[ing] describing mass surveillance as a ‘Panopticon’. That too is refreshing,
as that standard model and theory of surveillance has exhausted its utility” (2008, p.
7). While forced to acknowledge his field’s unsuccessful attempt to move beyond the
panoptic model entirely, Lyon posits its usefulness as complementary at best. The
model is fundamentally flawed5, he argues, and may provide only “a diversion, a
distraction from much more important issues that we miss at our peril through an
obsessive fixation with the prison diagram” (Lyon, 2006, p. 9). The prison diagram
offers a model which understands only coercion, and cannot account for willing
participation, active agency and desire of individual subjects, complicit (wittingly or
unwittingly) in their own disenfranchisement. Here the concept of hegemony can
help us usefully complicate such reductive models. Ultimately, then, the panoptic
model offers a too-simplistic, too-reductive understanding of both agency, ideological
interpellation, and social determination. This was a primary reason the panoptic
model met early and sustained resistance in the field of surveillance studies.
Moreover, it was Foucault himself, in Discipline and Punish (1995), who argued that
modern social control was in already in transition, across the social formation, from
panoptic and other “disciplinary” regimes of surveillance and control to a new and
See Lyon’s introduction to Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond
(2006) for a brief overview of the emergence of critical resistance to the panoptic
model in the field of surveillance studies.
5

radically decentered forms coterminous with the rise of emerging information
technologies.
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Another problem represented by thinking the privacy crisis through the panoptic lens
is that in using an Orwellian frame to describe contemporary technocultural
arrangements we may find ourselves aligned with mechanistic models of social
control. Mechanistic models elevate technology as the primary or sole determinant
social force, placing technology at the center of social change. This implies that to
understand technology, we need to begin with the technological object itself, which
either will have inevitable, linear, and unvarying effects to which we have no real
ability to respond (a relation of simple causality), or a varying though finite range of
possible effects to which we may only react after the fact (a relation of symptomatic
causality). Neither approach offers the possibility of intervention, especially on or
before the emergence of the technologies themselves. Non-mechanistic models, on
the other hand, foreground the context surrounding the object, and reject the notion
of technology as either simple agent or effect. Slack (1984) delineates two primary
non-mechanistic models, both of which recognize the co-constitutive nature of
technology and culture: “expressive causality” and “articulation and assemblage.”
However, while expressive causality recognizes the effects of the whole of a structure
on the elements which constitute it, it posits the latter phenomena as the expression
of the intrinsic essence of the former. In this framework, society “evolves” according
to an essential and controlling single logic, with the cultural and social manifestations
reflective of that essence. This allows journalists to draw overly simplistic conclusions
about the relation between ideology, and cultural, technological, political, and
economic forces, and thus to imagine and report reduced possibilities for political
resistance. For Rule (2007), for example, the erosion of privacy is the simple
expression of the nature of such technological systems: “[T]he capacities of
computing systems to absorb, analyze, transmit and use personal data are bound
gradually to find their ultimate expression, until no personal data is safe from
incorporation” and the only defense against this technological juggernaut, according
to Rule, is a system of laws and policies which might constrain it, “laws and policies
that ‘just say no’ to endless extensions of institutional surveillance” (p. xv). But this
type of thinking assumes too linear a model. Instead, by understanding culture and
technology in our present historical conjuncture as related through processes of
articulation—and especially disarticulation and rearticulation—we are able to address
the question of how the relation of culture and technology might be otherwise.
Ultimately, in framing privacy violation as the story of resistance to the various
apparatuses of a Big Brother (whether corporation or state), one is decidedly not
telling the story of agency as a property of systems. One is telling the story of heroic
individuals, and not of negotiation and prolonged hegemonic struggle in which
individuals are persuaded to consent to trade personal privacy for convenience and
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security. The Panoptic/Orwellian model of social control, and the commonsensical
allusion to Big Brother which has come to be a shorthand for it, encourages only a
linear determinist vision of power as coercion, rather than a vision of power as the
property of articulations which come together in the seductive dreams of citizenconsumers. “The era when factories and troops were the decisive order-sustaining
institution is (at least in our part of the world) over,” writes Bauman (1998), “but so
is, as well, panoptical power as the main vehicle of social integration, and normative
regulation as the major strategy of order-maintenance. The great majority of people—
men as well as women—are today integrated through seduction rather than policing,
advertising rather than indoctrinating, need-creation rather than normative
regulation” (p. 4). Put more simply, the surveillance society which emerges will not
be, as is usually predicted, an Orwellian totalitarianism, but more Huxleyan, argues
Schell (2010), “more like Brave New World, where technology controls us because it is
so pleasurable.”
The panoptic frame also supports the dominant bloc in offering a convenient straw
man. The claims of Orwellian domination can be waved away persuasively by state
and corporate actors—after all, most Americans do not fear being disappeared by a
faceless Big Brother. Commonsensical analogies which attempt to understand our
contemporary privacy crisis through the Orwellian lens are thus both understandable
as a strategic response, and problematic in the extreme. While Orwell’s description
fails in its inability to offer a theory of ideology that accounts for agency and
resistance, this is precisely the rhetorical power of the novel for critics—the widely
acknowledged rhetorical power of Orwell’s horrific tale which offers critics a
trope/shorthand, already dense with cultural meaning, for explaining the dangers of
unchecked surveillance. Orwell’s dystopic society is so tightly integrated, so perfectly
engineered, its technologies of surveillance and ideological domination so pervasive,
that there exists no possibility for individual agency or resistance. From the first
moments of the novel, Winston himself admits as much. “You might dodge
successfully for a while, even for years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you”
(Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 21). As readers of the novel we witness the utter destruction
of his human identity, and are interpellated to experience the powerlessness of a
subjection under panoptic surveillance.
Unfortunately, the real power in our contemporary surveillance regime comes not
from a dominant coercive, visible but unverifiable panoptic surveillance, but
surreptitious surveillance which tirelessly and secretly measures the digital footprint of
a majority of citizens. This action-adventure narrative in which individuals are
compared to Orwell’s everyman protagonist serves the government in transforming a
complex articulation of forces and architectures into a monolithic “Big Brother” who
cannot easily be practically ‘grasped’ for political action, but who can conveniently be
discursively waved away, and in fact, often repackaged as a form of individual agency.
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Big Brother, through its invocation of the panoptic model, thus represents a
distraction, agrees Boyne (2000), which severely mitigates critics ability to think with
articulation about the troubling, emerging surveillance regimes: “The idea of a
disciplinary, Panoptical society came to constitute the default background of much
social and cultural analysis through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Analyses of the
historical development and current functioning of private organizations, whose
reception was reinforced by a cultural imaginary feeding off conspiracy theoretic
journalism and a wave of paranoia entertainments emerging from the film industry,
came to focus on the operation and significance of surveillance and control
mechanisms, while on the other hand, discussions of social policy and the welfare
state have, for the most part, taken the necessity of surveillance and information so
much for granted that it is hardly even discussed” (p. 293). “The tendency,” agrees
Frau-Meigs, “to see privacy as protection from intrusive government, with much less
emphasis on intrusive commercial third parties, goes together with the ingrained
belief that the individual, construed as a code user, is empowered to resist in the face
of enormous superstructures like corporations and institutions…The shift from
secrecy towards personal control and autonomy is presented as a means of asserting
one’s identity and individualism” (2010, p. 94). The dominant bloc has a vested
interest in encouraging the narrative of the rational individual everyman, for two
reasons: It opposes the real complexity of the social structures which constitute
dataveillance practices of the state; it helps sell products by interpellating users as
active agents, empowered by the technologies on offer to them by commercial
vendors.

The ubiquity of Big Brother in the popular media thus represents a perfect example of
how an elaborate or nuanced account, theory, or philosophy—i.e., the fully developed
work of literary political philosophy, flawed though it may be, represented by
Nineteen Eighty-Four—enters, in reduced form our cultural fund of common sense as
an explanatory trope. Orwell’s brilliantly complex rendering of interlocking political
forces, though problematic in its reliance on the panoptic model, is simply reduced
metonymically to “Big Brother,” as it moves into common sense, mobilizing a
technologically determinist, economistic, or classically Marxist, narrative of individual
agency, and centralized social control, in which a lone everyman somehow becomes
conscious of the illusory ideological domination of the all-powerful state and resists it
individually. As Gramsci’s work suggests, political control in advanced western
societies is most effective when it relies on building consensus. The Orwellian fable,
then, as a fable in which all political agency is entirely circumscribed within the state,
and of course is foreclosed a priori, tends to express an ideological position in which
political action is at best Sisyphean. After all, “You can’t fight city hall,” common
sense reassures us.

2.5 Privacy in Film
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Above, I describe a general process regarding the news media’s role in drawing from
and depositing to a general fund of common sense. That cultural fund is constituted
as well in and across the various discourses and genres of the popular media. Filmic
discourse contributes to it in a somewhat different but equally important way.
Technologically-themed fiction films often function by engendering what, in
Becoming Biosubjects (Gerlach, Hamilton, Sullivan, & Walton, 2011) Gerlach et al.
term a “social science fiction” (p. 4). These discursive frames from fiction and popular
culture come to oppose current scientific and social realities of technology by offering
us “frames and narratives within which we locate unfamiliar, underdeveloped, or as
yet unknown6…technologies. The future possibilities of these technologies are folded
seamlessly into their present description. In this way, the technology is mystified and
ultimately reified, making it less amenable to critical analysis” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p.
4). Especially in popular entertainments (e.g. blockbusters, star-vehicles, awardwinning films), this may significantly strengthen the power of the dominant
ideologies which underwrite commonsensical, received views of technology, helping
define for the general public the past, current, and potential future role of technology
in society, and in the process mitigate possibilities for the re-articulation of particular
conjunctures. “For scientists, social science fictions empower and protect their claims,
their expertise, and their social function…for the public, social science fictions
translate otherwise inaccessible knowledge into a set of social ramifications that can
be recognized and negotiated” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 21). The practice of
articulation represents the opposite impulse: “It aims to give people an understanding
of the contingency of the present. If the present context did not have to be this way, if
it was not guaranteed in advance, then it could have been otherwise, and it can be
something different in the future” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 57). The enactment of
reification with social science fictions obviates and/or obscures such possibilities,
arguing that “The choice is not, then, whether we should have or use this technology,
but rather, how to deal with its effects, as the social science fictional framing has
rendered it already present” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 4). With regard to surveillance
and privacy, argue Gerlach, et al., social science fictions exist in complementary
relation to the political and legal work of implementing surveillance technologies and
changing laws surrounding personal privacy, helping “ease the entry of this new
surveillance technology into society” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 29). If we are able to
think technology, culture, politics, and the economy together, we are empowered to
see more clearly the relation between ideological and material practices.
Their exact phrase is “unknown genetic technologies” (p. 4). I have omitted the
word “genetic,” which is indicative only of their particular technological focus, and
doesn’t alter the truth of their observation about technological narratives in general.
6
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As an example of this fictional framing work, I want to examine a pair of films which,
read in tandem, demonstrate the mobilization of the social science fiction I describe
above, i.e., the lone everyman fights the monolithic state or corporation that invades
his privacy and abrogates his rights through surveillance: Francis Ford Coppola’s The
Conversation (1974) and Tony Scott’s Enemy of the State (1998). The Conversation,
stars Gene Hackman as Harry Caul, a surveillance expert who stumbles onto a
conspiracy to murder a corporate executive known as “The Director” (Robert Duvall).
An acknowledged expert in his field Caul has devolved into an anti-social paranoiac
because of professional guilt. His surname, ‘Caul’, denoting the protective membrane
surrounding a fetus and symbolized by a translucent rain slicker he wears everywhere,
represents his need to protect his privacy through insulation and isolation. While
performing a surveillance operation for The Director (his ostensible client) he learns
of a possible murder plot against his surveillance targets which forces him to struggle
with his complicity in facilitating similar past murders. Although he initially
withholds the surveillance tapes from The Director, they are eventually stolen by the
director’s assistant. However, Caul ultimately learns that his work was used
purposefully to bait The Director and ultimately facilitate his murder by the
surveillance targets he thought he was protecting. At the end of the film, Caul
receives a threatening call from the murderers, who warn: “We know that you know,
Mr. Caul. For your own sake, don’t get involved any further. We’ll be listening to
you.” The erasure of any and all safe space for Caul is foreshadowed earlier in the film
when he guiltily admits that for his surveillance targets, “There’s no protection. I
follow them wherever they go. And I can hear them.” Caul proceeds to tear up his
apartment searching for surveillance devices. Ultimately unable to find one, he resigns
himself to a chair amidst the ruin of his apartment and does the only thing left to
him—play his saxophone, the only ‘noise’ left to mask his perpetually surveilled
signal. It is the iconic image of a lost man—a surveillance expert who is no longer
protected by his technical skills from a world making radical advances in surveillance
with which he cannot keep pace.
Nominated for three Academy Awards, and the winner of the 1974 Cannes Film
Festival’s Palme d’Or, The Conversation represented a timely comment on the
Watergate scandal, just two years prior, in which the Nixon administration was found
to have broken into the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate complex
in order to photograph documents and install audio surveillance devices. The film’s
success is arguably due, at least in part, to its ability to make public sense of events
that led inexorably to the first presidential resignation in history. Drawing on the
contextual irony of the contribution of Nixon’s own surreptitious audio recordings to
that resignation, it depicted surveillance in ultimately simple terms, as an unwieldy
tool opening society to egregious abuses of power.

48

Nearly a quarter century later, Enemy of the State can be read as an response to the
predictions made in The Conversation about the impending surveillance society. The
film tells the story of everyman Robert “Bobby” Clayton Dean (Will Smith), a
prominent Washington D.C. labor lawyer. When Dean inadvertently intercepts a zip
disk containing footage of the secret assassination of U.S. Congressman Phillip
Hammersley (Jason Robards), he finds himself the target of a rogue operation run by
NSA Director-hopeful Thomas Reynolds (Jon Voight) who is determined to recover
the evidence. It is in fact Reynolds himself who has sanctioned the assassination of
Hammersley when he refuses to help pass the pending Telecommunications Security
and Privacy Act. Terror mounts as Reynolds secretly employs the powerful means of
the National Security Agency (NSA), apparently at his ready command to surveil,
torture, and murder, in order to obtain the incriminating disk. While Dean’s former
lover is murdered by NSA operatives, the director’s most powerful weapon is shown
to be the data-matching algorithms which not only allow him to access Dean’s
various digital records, but to alter them. “Let’s get into his life,” rages Reynolds. “I
want to know about his wife; I want to know about his parents; I want to know about
his gambling problem; his urine samples; his porno rentals; I want to use every means
possible to get what we need.” Dean is soon on the run as a murder suspect, without
money or other resources. There he encounters former NSA operative Edward Lyle
(Gene Hackman), who very reluctantly agrees to help him fight the system by turning
the NSA’s surveillance tactics against itself.
Although Enemy of the State is not a direct sequel to The Conversation, it functions in
a similar capacity, intertextually invoking a continuity between what are in fact two
separate Hackman characters in two separate films.7 This intertextuality can be seen
in the similar way Scott references Coppola’s characters. Like Caul from
Conversation, Lyle from Enemy is a paranoid, anti-social surveillance expert paying an
emotional debt of guilt; both Caul and Lyle work in nearly identical hidden
warehouse labs; both films employ nearly identical scenes, including the signature
scene from The Conversation, in which multiple agents work together to surveil a
couple in a public plaza; when the NSA pulls Lyle’s digital dossier, the photo shown
is of Hackman’s Caul from Conversation. In this way, both films work intertextually
In a chapter from Race Men (1998), Hazel Carby outlines the way in which the
many roles of actor Danny Glover, understood in aggregate, constitute the signifying
practices of a racist politics in mainstream Hollywood film. “In [Glover’s] person
Hollywood, in addition to producing the black male as an outcast who threatens to
undermine the very foundations of America, adopts the black man as a sympathetic
cypher, a means for white men to find meaning within themselves and discover the
true meaning of their existence” (p. 190). Although not the place for it here, a similar
study might be made of the ideological functions performed by the equally iconic
Hackman across his various film roles.
7

to produce a powerful and diachronic map that makes claims about the changing
technical infrastructure effecting new possibilities for surveillance, and the
contemporary meaning of privacy.
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What is most fascinating about Enemy of the State is that when read as a single film,
Lyle assumes the role of guide to Dean. When the films are read together, however, it
becomes apparent that, when Hackman’s characters are read in contiguity, they
describe the evoulution of an orientation to technology—one which supports the
fundamental contemporary changes and challenges to privacy. We watch as
Caul/Lyle (linked semiotically through common characterization of Gene Hackman)
learns to accept, re-inhabit, and master an emerging surveillance state. Caul’s journey
leads him, in the first film, to attempt and fail at isolation/insulation as a strategy for
privacy protection. In the second film, forced by Dean to use his surveillance skills to
take on the NSA, he is forced to realize that the ‘surveillance society’ is a juggernaut
that cannot be the stopped, and that the only real protection one has is to master the
techniques and work within the system.
Unlike Coppola’s film, Enemy of the State is not a visually subtle film. Made a quarter
century later, it assaults the audience with footage of the myriad surveillance
technologies on offer today8 (e.g., networked satellites, GPS tracking devices, digital
dossiers, etc.) through Scott’s trademark frenetic camera style. In the opening credits
alone, we are bombarded with a series of jump-cuts to images of surveillance by
short-circuit television, keyhole satellites, foot, car and helicopter pursuit, all of which
depict the state’s electronically enhanced pursuit and apprehension of citizens.
Surveillance technology, it tells us in these images of ‘criminals’ pursued and
decisively apprehended, is an unstoppable force which cannot be evaded. Drawing on
a particular commonsensical received understanding of technology, the film thus
dramatizes the argument that the surveillance society has arrived. The dramatic foot
and car chases, gun-play, and explosions in the film proper only underscore what each
character affirms for us in dialogue. For example, just before his assassination,
Hammersley warns Reynolds: “[The Telecommunications Security and Privacy Act]
is not the first step to the surveillance society; it is the surveillance society!” To which
Reynolds replies “Liberal hysteria!...This is the richest, most powerful nation on
earth, and therefore the most hated. And you and I know what the average citizen
does not: that we are at war twenty-four hours of every day. Do I have to itemize the
number of American lives we’ve saved in the past twelve months alone with judicious
use of surveillance intelligence?” The ‘liberal’ position is offered here only as a straw
man—easily dismissed by Reynolds’ assassination of Hammersley which follows only
moments later and, thanks to inadvertent surveillance, is captured on tape. Later in
Though the movie was made a decade and a half ago, many of the surveillance
techniques it depicts are still of current concern today.
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the film, Reynolds explains: “Privacy’s been dead for 30 years because we can’t risk it.”
Mimicking Orwell’s Winston Smith,9 though with opposite intent, he concludes:
“The only privacy that’s left is the inside of your head and maybe that’s enough.” If
the viewer doubts the villain’s word that the surveillance society is upon us, it is
nevertheless affirmed by other characters in the film we are interpellated to trust. It is
Lyle, for example, who affirms “[the government’s] been in bed with the entire
telecommunications industry since the 40s. The old days we had to tap a wire to your
phone line. Now a call is bouncing off a satellite, they just snatch ‘em right out of the
air.” And in another scene, Dean’s wife affirms for the viewer: “I told you Bobby! I
told you they had the capability!”
As the film ends the televised words of a U.S. senator revise Juvenal’s words to offer
up what might be understood as a primary argument of the film: “We knew that we
had to monitor our enemies. We also have come to realize that we need to monitor
the people who are monitoring them.” The senator’s words suggest an infinite
regression of continually more powerful technological means for surveillance. At this
point, the film effects the full thrust of its argument to accept the presence of the
surveillance state as necessary political protection: Lyle suddenly hijacks Dean’s TV
with a camera feed of Dean sitting on his own couch. Dean is troubled for the briefest
moment as he realizes he’s still being surveilled. The image of him is then
immediately replaced by a fond message from Lyle scrawled on the sand of a tropical
beach he’s escaped to: “Wish you were here.” Dean smiles then because he knows that
Lyle is ‘watching out’ for him—he is safe thanks to the (continuing, constant and
vigilant) heroic actions of a technical superman protecting him through the very
surveillance technologies that had so vexed him before. Dean and Caul, the
alternating-complementary protagonists with whom the viewer is called to identify
through the movie’s powerful rhetoric, have learned to work the system they cannot
escape. The ideological effect is chilling, in some sense mirroring the final words of
Nineteen Eighty-Four: “But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was
finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother” (Orwell,
1949/1992, p. 245). The ultimate question becomes not whether surveillance is
necessary—that question has been answered for us in the strongest rhetorical
pathos—but how to regulate and live within it.
2.5 Privacy in Video Games
Lastly, I want to turn to an example of the way this action-adventure narrative of
privacy and surveillance has been successfully deployed in contemporary digital- or
“Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in the
bed—no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull
[emphasis added]” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 26).
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electronic video games. Since the release of the first commercial video game console
in 1966, video games have risen to become a major component of the entertainment
industry, with Forbes estimating that the global video game industry may reach $82
billion this year (Gaudiosi, 2012). Not only are they a bulwark of the entertainment
economy, they are culturally pervasive, engendering devoted fan communities, film
adaptions, national conventions, and other forms of cultural engagement. According
to the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), 58% of Americans play video
games. The average gamer, who has been playing for well over a decade, is thirty years
old (“Industry facts”). Demonstrably, filmic narrative has become a well-established
criterion of value for players, designers, and critics of top-selling video games.10 If the
claim holds regarding a film’s ability to ideologically interpellate a viewer, it must
hold all the stronger for a modality in which the interpellated subject is hailed to
more fully inhabit the subject position of the narrative by interactively shaping it.
Many video games whose plots revolve around science-fiction scenarios in which a
significant element of the plot involves computer technology have a hacking mechanic
in which players complete challenges designed to represent breaking into everything
from locked chests to digital networked computer architectures. A majority of games
involve this mechanic, requiring players to routinely violate privacy in order to
complete game objectives. This mechanic represents the enactment of a social science
fiction in which surveillance is ideologically reframed as a tool enhancing the subject’s
agency. “Surveillance is more than a tool in the maintenance of social order; it is also a
fantasy of power…In other words, surveillance is increasingly a social science fiction,
another form of imaginary, in which, at the push of a button, anything can be made
visible and knowable…From this perspective, people are not under surveillance, but
rather coded information about them is collected. As a result, the struggle between
control and resistance becomes less important than a logic of virtualization” (Gerlach
et al., 2011, p. 31).
Lastly, then, I will examine the video game Watch Dogs (2013), in which players are
encouraged to see individuals as “coded information” which can “at the push of a
button”—both the virtual button of the mobile device carried by the character ingame, and the button on the real-life game controller held by the player—“be made
visible and knowable” by hacking into their cloud-based digital dossiers. In an
interview with IGN, one of the lead developers of Watch Dogs, Jonathan Morin,
describes the transformation of subject to digital-virtual object in this way: “A lot of
While there has been some debate among those who theorize interactive electronic
entertainments as to whether the ludic or narrative dimensions of video games are of
greater cultural and critical import, it has generally come to be recognized, especially
with the launch of the latest next generation consoles, that narrative (and specifically
filmic) qualities are an integral part of the ludic dimension of games—that is, they are
best theorized together.
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games will go and invite the player to just explore the environment. Us, we’re kind of
letting you explore human beings as well…Aiden Pierce looks at [an individual]
around him in a different way…you can tap into [a person’s] life…[to] find new sidequests.”
Watch Dogs is a highly cinematic, open-world, third-person action-adventure game
set in a virtually-rendered Chicago of the near-future. Well in advance of its release,
the game has won multiple awards, taking “Biggest Surprise,” “Most Anticipated”
and “Game of the Show” awards at the industry-leading 2012 Electronic
Entertainment Expo. The game also won “Best PC Game,” “Best New Franchise,”
and “Biggest Surprise” by popular gaming organization IGN. The success of the
game is based in part on its ability to tell the currently dominant story of surveillance
in the namespace. Beyond the game’s “obviously polished play mechanics” and
“optimized graphics…[which] had us sitting slack jawed,” the game’s power was in its
ability to address the problematic of privacy, according to a review in Gaming
Excellence: “[I]t came down to a storyline that is bathed in real world possibility and
the terrifying implications of a society that is so interconnected digitally, and the
damage and possibilities of one man gaining control of the entire system” (Game of
the Show, para. 1). The game tells the story of Aiden Pearce—his name puns on the
words aiding and pierce, bespeaking his ability to penetrate the city’s surveillance to
help those in need—a surveillance-obsessed vigilante and technical superman
(analogous to Hackman’s Lyle character, above) who can hack a city-wide network
called the “Central Operating System.” In order to detect and punish criminals,
Pearce must hack into the lives of most of the characters who inhabit this world by
using a hand-held mobile device to biometrically scan them in order to learn intimate
personal details about their health, finances, relationships, employment, etc. Aiden
can also use his mobile device to hack the city’s entire data and communication
interface, tapping into individuals’ cell phones, and CCTV network—in fact he can
effectively control any electronic device in the landscape (cranes, roadblocks, elevated
trains, etc.). Moreover, his hacking device leverages Big Data (combining massive
datasets and sophisticated predictive algorithms) to predict whether other non-player
characters are likely to commit a crime.
According to Morin, the game represents a response to perhaps multiple problematics
of the namespace, but certainly privacy and control, albeit one that unwittingly
underwrites the politics of the dominant bloc.
One thing that’s interesting is that people understand what we’re
talking about…A lot of people have been asking us where Watchdogs
comes from? What’s the concept? Well, it’s typically beer-discussions
about Facebook and information and what’s happening in the world,
right? A human being is always reacting to technology in different
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ways. Like today it’s a new way of people to express themselves
publicly. Some people don’t like that. Like it gets harder to govern a
given society when people have access to information that much. So
we’re talking about those things and instead of talking about being a
victim of that, we started to ask ourselves wouldn’t it be cool to be that
guy? The guy who can tap into the network of information and to
reverse engineer that conversation.

What’s striking, yet predictable, is the game’s answer to that question. Based on the
assumption that political agency resides in individuals, political resistance is equated
with vigilantism. It’s a solution that maps perfectly to the affordances of the virtual
video game world, at least as it is being imagined in the most popular and best-selling
games. These games draw the same narrative of hero/anti-hero, bravely fighting an
antagonistic, typically monolithic, omniscient, omnipotent system alone: “I wasn’t
always this guy,” growls Pearce in the game trailer, “In this city, no one can hide from
me. No one. They crossed a line. And for that, I will make them pay. I’ll turn their
city against them. They think I’m a man out of control. But I’ve never had so much
control.” Rather than depict a narrative in which characters work to radically rearticulate the economic, cultural, political, and technological forces at work in their
fictional world, Watch Dogs depicts a world in which one cannot imagine, nor
demand, the type of society in which unfair surveillance practices are outlawed. Aiden
Pearce’s hope for political resistance lies in becoming an outlaw, assuming in the
process the dominant politics which created such a disempowering regime in the first
place. “The tendency to see privacy as protection from intrusive government, with
much less emphasis on intrusive commercial third parties, goes together with the
ingrained belief that the individual, construed as a code user, is empowered to resist in
the face of enormous superstructures like corporations and institutions…The shift
from secrecy toward personal control and autonomy is presented as a means of
asserting one’s identity and individualism” (Frau-Meigs, 2010,p. 94). In this way,
Watchdogs represents a social science fiction based on the same narrative in the two
films above, and in the Orwellian novel which informs much news media coverage of
the privacy crisis—a narrative which through limiting the complexity of our thinking
about the privacy crisis, limits our ability to address it in a meaningful political way.
In this chapter, I have argued that the signifying practices of popular media demand
to be interrogated as a primary locus of ideological struggle in the namespace,
particularly with regard to one particularly tenacious model describing the relation
between surveillance, privacy, and social control. I align with Vaidhyanathan in
demanding “better terms, models, metaphors, and strategies to control our personal
information” (2008, p. 3) suggesting that privacy research involve not only legal
scholarship, but social science and media scholarship, as well. Such work demands a
way that is both theoretically rigorous, but that mitigates or avoids altogether the
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typical impenetrability, for lay people, of the esoteric vocabulary and other alienating
discursive conventions of academic theory. The commonality in each of these media
with regard to privacy and surveillance is a definition of power and agency as a thing
to be won, rather than a property of systems, arising through articulations. Power is
held by the all-powerful state or corporations, and resisted only by maverick
individuals who work within its architectures, protocols, and ideologies, etc. In the
next two chapters I examine more closely the commercial and state actors who both
benefit from and drive the narratives, such as those described above.
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3.1 Societies of Control
In the previous chapter I discussed one of the ways in which popular media
ideologically underwrites the hegemony of a dominant political bloc of powerful state
and corporate actors which benefits from an increasing transparency that allows each
to access the personal information of citizens and consumers. I examined the
preponderance of a particular model of social control based on Bentham’s panopticon
which is used to frame a majority of privacy debates in popular media. The
overwhelming ubiquity of this narrative represents a tendency to portray the present
privacy crisis in commonsensical, individual-oriented terms, and tends to foreground
the state and the corporations as monolithic Big Brother entities. This narrative
obscures the complex social, political, and economic forces at work in the diminution
of privacy and other civil rights. Narratives of a more convenient and pleasurable
world in which social transparency ensures security and convenience have come to
dominate more nuanced narratives in which strong informational privacy is more than
a quaint, antiquated value.
One of the most important ways we can challenge this vision, and the hegemony of
the security state it underwrites, is to replace this reductive model of social control
with a more nuanced model that can account for the articulation of both private and
public actors. For Vaidhyanathan (2008), in addition to the fact that observable
surveillance has not demonstrably shown to discipline the behavior of individuals in a
non-totalitarian state, the central problem with panoptic thinking is that it cannot
account for the modes of control offered by the emergence of surveillance regimes
powered by Web 2.0 and cloud computing, in which those surveilled often have
limited or no awareness of the extent of state, and especially commercial, surveillance.
This serves the interests of the dominant bloc, commercial and state actors who want
citizen-consumers to increasingly share more and more personal information in order
to better name and map them through the data generated by the choices manifest in
their digital footprint. Commercial actors use that data to sell them more products.
Governments use that data to discover those who would subvert and resist state
control (p. 10).	
  	
  

Vaidhyanathan’s description of a mode of control driven by transparency and mobility
invokes one of the most pervasive and important challenges to panoptic thinking—
Gilles Deleuze’s 1992 essay “Postscript on Societies of Control.” The essay focuses on
the problematic represented in the rise of cybernetic regimes in which, through ever
more powerful technological, economic, socio-cultural, and political means,
governments and corporations construct elaborate systems of information
management through which to surveil citizen-consumers in ways that facilitate a
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dispersed new system of social control. “We don’t have to stray into science fiction to
find a control mechanism that can fix the position of any element at any given
moment.…The key thing is that we’re at the beginning of something new….the
widespread progressive introduction of a new system of domination” (Deleuze 1997,
pp. 181-2). Deleuze works forward from Foucault’s genealogical work on power and
social control in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975), in which
Foucault describes the modern shift from sovereign societies to the disciplinary
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In disciplinary societies, Foucault
argues, individuals moved relatively contiguously and linearly from one social site to
the next—the family, school, factory, military, hospital, and perhaps prison. These
disciplinary sites worked to create and control individuals through ideological
enclosure. In each site the individual was named and categorized, disciplined by a set
of knowledges and expectations, molded by broadly standardized ideological and
behavioral models, and punished when he or she violated site norms. The disciplinary
society relied on ubiquitous and manifest surveillance to interpellate individuals to
conform to these ideological molds.
According to Deleuze, although Foucault never names the form of social control to
supplant disciplinary societies, disciplinary forms represent for him fading forms
which the emerging technological assemblages of our age indicate we are already
moving beyond. Deleuze suggests that with the rise of digital communication
networks and cybernetic structures of control of the mid-twentieth century we are
moving toward a new paradigm of social control he terms the “control society.”
Unlike disciplinary societies, control societies represent a radical blurring of the sites
of ideological subject formation into a kind of dynamic, ubiquitous, mobile
singularity. The control society relies on wide, now global, networks of digital
computers to collect, store, and analyze massive datasets. The coercive drive under
disciplinary societies to force individuals to conform to a particular mold is replaced
by the ability of the pattern-recognition algorithm to create highly flexible systems of
control through real-time analysis and modulation: “We’re moving toward control
societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control
and instant communication” (1997, p. 174). Individuals in the control society become
dividualized into data-points which can be monitored in real-time, producing the
cybernetic loop with influences or constrains human behavior algorithmically and
without human intervention.
In Deleuzian terms, then, the namespace represents a regime of social control
through the pervasion of a surveillance system powerful enough to discover and/or
assign a unique ‘name’ for each element in its network. “We no longer find ourselves
dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividual’s’, and
masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (1992, p. 5). Its ability to map and control
publics is no longer based primarily on enclosure and physical surveillance, but on the
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new form of surreptitious surveillance—dataveillance. As the global Web pervades
ever more completely the daily lives of individuals, policies, practices, and protocols
emerge which leverage the unique data points of each unique actor in ways that may
also constrain and discipline its behavior. As Zadie Smith reminds us, interfaces
validate and invalidate certain responses, disciplining members culturally about the
most important and popular concerns, feelings, and discursive means for sharing
them. She describes the control implicit in interfaces in “Generation Why,” her
meditation on the Facebook phenomenon: “What is your relationship status?
(Choose one. There can be only one answer. People need to know.) Do you have a
‘life’? (Prove it. Post pictures.) Do you like the right sort of things? (Make a list.
Things to like will include: movies, music, books and television, but not architecture,
ideas, or plants.)” (2010, page 2, para. 8). Deleuze’s control society are constituted in
and by such interfaces.

Thus, although the transparency and instant social connectivity powered by ‘Big Data’
may often provide certain forms of security and convenience, it also enables a
powerful new mode of social control. Big Data describes the collection, storage, and
analytical processing of data sets so massive and complex that special software, storage
facilities, processing power, and technical infrastructures must be developed to handle
them. In 2012, the White House announced a Big Data Research and Development
Initiative comprising a $200 million budget across six federal departments and
agencies. According to the White House, the initiative will help “accelerate the pace
of discovery in science and engineering, strengthen our national security, and
transform teaching and learning” (Kalil, 2012, para. 1). Big Data-driven dataveillance
also drives the commercial sector’s promotion of a culture of ambient findability, in
which consumers are encouraged to share their personal information nearly
everywhere and at all times. This shift is manifest in the success of myriad cybernetic
consumer products such as the Nike FuelBand, the Jawbone UP, and the FitBit.
These products capture, store, analyze and provide feedback on a host of biological
data such as daily movement patterns, sleep patterns, and caloric intake. Customer
data is stored on commercial servers where consumers can visualize their own activity
graphically. With access to consumer data, however, these companies can continually
refine their own sales and marketing for these and other products. The central rule
and requirement of those institutions, practices, patterns, protocols, etc., which
articulate to shape the namespace is the algorithmic assignation and/or discovery of
identities in real-time. This is underwritten in part by the trend toward the
elimination of an anonymous Web, as many Web services providers have instituted
the requirement that all users use their real name on their networks. Commercial
Web services providers often do so, in part, in order to map each actor’s real identity
to an extensive collection of data points, which allows them to match those users with
a host of products and services offered by their partners. While government privacy
protections have been diminishing with the rise of the security state—citizens are still
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protected from many types of government surveillance—there remain very few laws or
policies which offer more than nugatory protections against commercial actors. For
this very reason, commercial dataveillance practices continue to be leveraged by the
state to enhance its own surveillance capabilities. I examine these commercial actors
in the next chapter. In this chapter I focus my examination at the juridico-political
level of the social formation, addressing the state’s struggle for political hegemony as
it learns to wield this new mode of control.
Before continuing, I must clarify precisely what I mean by “state actors.” At a broad
level of abstraction, the U.S. government may be understood as unified by a shared
interest in its own continuity, security, and prosperity. According to the Routledge
Encylopedia of International Political Economy (2001), a state generally “mobilizes
populations in defence of its realm; regulates, monitors, and polices conduct within
civil society; intervenes (more or less intensively) within the economy, and regulates
(and, in some instances, controls) the flow of information within the public sphere”
(Hay, p. 1469). In practice, however, the three branches which make up the U.S.
government articulate to each other in a complex system, as the popular refrain goes,
of checks and balances. Within each of these levels, and articulated to them, exists a
relatively heterogeneous assemblage of state actors, including various juridical,
political, and military offices, institutions, and other organizations who often compete
for budgetary and other resources. In practice, then, these various actors may often
have conflicting priorities and agendas. The state actors I refer to herein is constituted
in part by a specific articulation of powerful government interests, particularly drawn
from within the Executive Branch and the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, who are
dedicated to a policy of total information awareness in support of a surveillance
regime that undergirds a nascent and likely growing security state.1 The president’s
role as Commander-in-chief represents a powerful point of articulation joining the
Executive Branch to the military and various intelligence agencies, unifying these
state actors with regard to law and policy on foreign and domestic security. While this
political fraction may be variously opposed by actors in the judiciary, legislature, and
even by other actors in the Executive, military and intelligence communities,
nevertheless, it is those state actors across the three branches who support the rise of
the security state that I refer to, somewhat reductively, as “state actors,” or the “state”
in this dissertation. In the sense that I employ it here, then, the state can be
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  To the question of whether the U.S. might ramp down its aggressive stance on
security in light of massive U.S. budget shortfalls and the essential defeat of Al
Quaeda forces, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano is reported as
answering, simply, “no,” calling the 9-11 attacks “the signal of a change in the
environment that we have to deal with, I think, throughout the foreseeable future”
(Lake, 2011, para. 4).	
  	
  	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

understood as a particularly powerful line of force in the articulation of the
namespace.
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This dominant bloc of state actors approached political hegemony most closely in the
years immediately following the 9-11 terrorist attack by asserting moral and
intellectual leadership over a subaltern social fraction constituted by citizenconsumers and other actors who were persuaded to consent to the diminution of
various civil rights, including privacy, in exchange for an immediate guarantee of
security. As the 9-11 attacks represented a strong kairotic moment for cementing
public fears of terrorism, the historical conjuncture centering around the attacks thus
produced a temporary settlement of forces in which consent was easily obtained by a
terrified public. The USA PATRIOT Act2 was passed with few reservations in a
moment of expanding hegemony, mitigating, and often overriding, nearly half a
century of privacy protections. The Act was passed a month after the 9-11 attacks by
a margin of 357-66 in the House and 68-1 in the senate. Speaking at the Center for
American Progress Action Fund, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), one of only ten
senators to vote against the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act in 2006, describes
the effects of the Act as “the creation of an always expanding, omnipresent
surveillance state that now chips away needlessly at the liberties and freedoms our
founding fathers established for all of us” (Wyden, 2013, para. 11). As the work of
Wyden and other outspoken privacy partisans indicate, changing domestic and
international contexts over the last decade have transformed the Act’s cultural and
political meaning for a broad majority of the public (the subordinate social fraction).
Those individuals and organizations who are increasingly alarmed over the state’s
surveillance overreach are increasingly vocal in resisting it. Because the PATRIOT
Act continues to stand as a major node in the namespace conjuncture, rearticulating
the namespace requires understanding not only the Act itself, but the conjunctural
forces through which it emerged.
3.2 The Snowden Revelations
By the middle of 2013, the privacy problematic had developed to high intensity after
revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden emerged demonstrating that the
government had been spying on American citizens for a number of years. Working
for Booz Allen Hamilton as an infrastructure analyst for the NSA, Snowden had
access to a large number of classified NSA materials, many of which he revealed to
Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald. Greenwald thereafter published several
groundbreaking articles exposing the extent and type of surveillance being conducted
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym that stands for “Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001.”	
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on American citizens through the government’s ‘partnership’ with private
corporations, as well as their efforts to undermine internet encryption standards.
Greenwald’s first article detailed the workings of the NSA’s PRISM program through
which the state ‘legally’ obtained both metadata3 and content from email, chat, VOIP
telephony, and various files (text files, photographs, etc.) from as many as nine
telecommunications providers which service the majority of communication needs for
the world, including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo, Verizon, TMobile, and AOL (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). In an interview with Glen
Greenwald and documentarian Laura Poitras, Snowden explains the scope of the
NSA’s ability to collect nearly everything a user may do on the internet. According to
Snowden, the NSA does not, practically, limit itself to the surveillance of foreign
individuals, but collects all communications that cross U.S. networks. This represents
a large majority of the world’s internet traffic. Through access to a variety of
surveillance systems, such as Boundless Informant (“a global auditing system for the
NSA’s intercept and collections system”) and PRISM (a system providing the NSA
“direct access to the back-ends of all the systems you use to communication and store
data”), claims Snowden, nearly “any analyst at any time can target anyone, any
selector, anywhere” (Greenwald, MacAskill, & Poitras, 2013). Snowden’s disclosure
of the state’s ability to read the content of assumed-private communications
contradicts accounts by government officials, including President Obama, who
affirmed that the data surveilled was metadata only, and Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper, who, during his testimony to the U.S. Select Committee
on Intelligence in March, 2013, replied in the negative when asked by Senator
Wyden: “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of
millions of Americans?”4 On June 6, after the Snowden leaks, Clapper released a
statement admitting that his statement before Congress had been “erroneous” (Ungar,
2013). In addition to its PRISM program, however, further documents published in
the Washington Post at the end of October reveal that through software codenamed
MUSCULAR, the NSA and British GCHQ in fact continue to copy millions of
records directly from fiber optic cables transmitting data between Yahoo and Google
and their respective data centers. As authors Gellman and Soltani note, FISC judge
John Bates ruled illegal under FISA and in violation of the Fourth Amendment a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
is essentially data which describes data. Telephony metadata could include
call pairs (the phone numbers of caller and receiver), caller location, date and time,
duration of call, data amount, cost, etc. Internet metadata could include the computer
type, applications installed, browser used, IP address, and any information stored in
cookies. Such metadata constitutes a digital dossier for each individual, and under
current laws, can often be repurposed, given, sold, or traded to third parties without
consumers’ consent or awareness. 	
  
4	
  Clapper’s exact response was: “No sir. Not wittingly. There are cases where they
could inadvertently perhaps collect, but not wittingly” (Ungar, 2013, para. 2).	
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similar but smaller surveillance operation which copied records from cables also
located in the U.S. (Gellman & Soltani, 2013).
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Even more troubling than revelations that the U.S. has been hacking the servers of
commercial actors were revelations that the NSA has been working with commercial
actors to build security vulnerabilities into commercial software products themselves
(Moyer, 2013). Soon after the PRISM revelations, in a joint article by The Guardian,
The New York Times, and ProPublica, it was reported that the U.S. intelligence
community has been pursuing a long term strategy to undermine stable encryption
(one of the few technologies ensuring the private and secure storage and transmission
of data on the internet). Through its membership in the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), the NSA was able to wrangle its way to being the
de facto author for the encryption standard—inserting its own ‘back door’
vulnerabilities in the process. The standard it de facto authored has been engaged by
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), an umbrella organization
comprised of 114 standards organizations. It was stated matter-of-factly in the NSA
presentation that “For the past decade, NSA has led an aggressive, multi-pronged
effort to break widely used internet encryption technologies,” and that cryptanalytic
abilities of the intelligence community are now strong enough to penetrate encryption
standards formerly thought to be impenetrable. The NSA presentation further
revealed that, based on the 2013 budget request, under the heading “Sigint enabling,”
the encryption-breaking program budget dwarfed the PRISM program, estimated at
$20 million, by ten times, averaging approximately $250 million each year.5 This
funded a variety of operations including an effort to break into 4G mobile devices and
the investigation of possibilities for hacking the servers of Yahoo, Facebook,
Microsoft, and Google (Naughton, 2013). As noted above, the threat of the NSA
hacking Google and Yahoo is no longer a potential threat. It was also revealed that
while the NSA’s Commercial Solutions Center offered companies a resource for
testing the security of their products, they leveraged their working relation with these
clients to discover ways to insert vulnerabilities into their products. Through this close
collaboration with private partners and other intelligence agencies, such as Britain’s
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the NSA has thus taken a
number of steps to weaken digital privacy, including compromising and modifying
codebases in ways that, according to acknowledged security expert Bruce Schneier,
may render encryption altogether meaningless (Talbot, 2013). “I think the most
significant revelation,” observed Greenwald in his honorific speech for Edward
Snowden during the 2013 Whistleblower Awards, “is that the objective of the United
States and its closest allies in the U.K., Canada, New Zealand, and Australia is the
elimination of privacy globally, the idea that there will be no ability on the part of any
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  It’s noteworthy that the U.S. intelligence budget has grown from $30 billion before
the 9-11 attacks, to $80 billion, less than a decade later (Naughton, 2013). 	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

human beings to communicate with one another electronically without it being
monitored, collected, analyzed, and stored by the United States Government.”
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Hours after the release of Snowden’s documents in The Guardian, President Obama
held a press conference in which he acknowledged public privacy concerns and
outlined four proposals to reform the NSA’s surveillance activities, promising to work
with Congress to reform section 215 of the PATRIOT Act in order to develop
greater transparency, oversight, and constraints on the use of government authority.
Declaring “we can and must be more transparent,” the president promised to: launch
a website to promote transparency; direct the intelligence community to find ways to
remain as transparent as practicable; direct the Justice Department to publicize the
legal rationale for section 215 of the PATRIOT Act; ensure that the NSA is “taking
steps” to increase oversight through the appointment a Civil Liberties and Privacy
Officer. This and other public outreach attempts by the Executive ostensibly
demonstrate at least some concern with recovering political legitimacy in the eyes of a
scandalized public (“President Obama Holds”).
The state’s response was far more intransigent and cavalier when in 2005 a
surveillance program analogous to the PRISM program was first revealed to the
public by retired AT&T employee Mark Klein. Klein reported that his former
employer had allowed the NSA to install a network traffic shunt on west coast
communication hubs, including San Diego, San Jose, Los Angeles and Seattle,6
which could assist in secretly capturing communications for millions of Americans.
This surveillance began as early as 2001, according to undisputed documentation
provided in Hepting v. AT&T (2006). According to Klein, this breach involved the
construction of a special NSA-secured room in which the agency installed a Narus
STA 6400 network traffic analyzer7 that allowed the NSA to split the network traffic
stream, diverting millions of records to its own servers without judicial oversight or
approval (“NSA Spying”). In early 2006, seven anonymous executives from the
communication industry independently verified that the NSA had indeed enlisted the
cooperation of not only AT&T, but Sprint and MCI (now Verizon). The ACLU
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
has since asserted the inclusion of many more hubs, nationwide.	
  
7	
  The Narus corporate website describes their line of cyber-security products
somewhat ominously as “Cyber 3.0: Rise of the Machines,” invoking the title of the
third film in the Terminator franchise, Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003). “To
adapt to the future of cyber, we have to rely on machines to make fast, incisive,
critical decisions. Narus cyber analytics solutions apply machine-based algorithms at
the atomic metadata level. They fuse enormous volumes of data and continuously
learn from new data dynamics for deeper, richer knowledge that provides
contextualized, definite answers that are useful for human analysts” (Narus Solutions). 	
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publicly decried the government overreach in no uncertain terms: “Regardless of the
scale of this spying, we are facing a historic moment: the President of the United
States has claimed a sweeping wartime power to brush aside the clear limits on his
power set by our Constitution and laws—a chilling assertion of presidential power
that has not been seen since Richard Nixon” (NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal).
The Bush administration defended the legality of its anti-terrorism programs
unapologetically, arguing that the events of 9-11 had represented an act of war, and
cited the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted by Congress
immediately following the attacks, authorizing the president to engage any and all
methods in the defense of Americans and pursuit of the terrorists. The AUMF’s brief
and relatively vague language gave the president sweeping powers. Specifically, the
president was “authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons.” The most candid account of the government’s emerging
politics of security was voiced by Vice President Cheney. Speaking on Meet the Press
in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, he explained: “We also have to work,
though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in
the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done
quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our
intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be successful. That’s the world these folks
operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal,
basically, to achieve our objective” (qtd. in Calderone & Froomkin, 2012). In practice,
“use of force” has translated in part into a surveillance policy so broad that, if
Snowden’s revelations are true, the long held prohibition against NSA and CIA
surveillance of U.S. citizens may have tacitly and secretly been abandoned. The
AUMF continues in effect today, undergirding the state’s efforts to enhance and grow
its surveillance capabilities. A number of bills, including the AUMF, the Protect
America Act, and FISA Amendments Act, and the PATRIOT Act, articulate to
strongly empower the state to resist all but the strongest challenges to its authority to
surveil with near-impunity. For example, in the case of Hepting, although the lower
courts ruled in the plaintiff’s favor in 2006, it was overturned in 2009 when a federal
judge ruled that the telecommunications companies were immune from prosecution
under the 2008 FISA Amendments Act (FISAAA) signed into law by President G.
W. Bush. Among other sweeping powers, the FISAAA grants the Attorney General
the ability to dismiss such cases by simply ‘certifying’ that surveillance was legal or
authorized by the president (EFF’s Case).

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

3.3 Total Information Awareness
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While the 9-11 attacks precipitated a number of radical changes underwriting the
diminution of civil rights, the expansion of the powers of the military and the
executive branch begins far earlier than 2001, according to Shane Harris, author of
The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State (2010). While the dragnet
surveillance of Americans revealed by Snowden represents the continuation of a
surveillance initiative that had begun immediately after the 9-11 attacks, the
instantiation of a conservative, hawkish, politics of security has been at least several
decades in the making, argues Harris. It does not represent what Gramsci would term
a war of manoeuvre (a sudden, decisive stroke by which a dominant force
overwhelmingly subdues an opposing force), but rather a war of position (a steady,
concerted and protracted ideological and structural positioning of successive
economic, political, cultural, and technological transformations). The politics of
security, the emergent surveillance state, and the privacy crisis we now face begins, he
argues, in October, 1983 with the terrorist attack on the Marine Amphibious Unit at
the Beirut International airport, in which 241 marines were killed. Upon subsequent
investigation, it was revealed that several intelligence agencies were separately aware
of over 100 pieces of intelligence that, had they been combined, might have helped to
prevent the attack. In responding to this crisis, President Reagan’s Deputy National
Security Advisor and Chairman of the National Security Council’s Crisis Preplanning Group, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, argued for combining the
intelligence maintained by the various agencies to create an enormous security
database that could help analysts predict and prevent aggressive anti-state activity.
After several felony convictions8 relating to his participation in the Iran-Contra
Affair, Poindexter retired from public life and military service in 1987. However, the
events of 9-11 eventually led to Poindexter’s return to public service, and to the
fulfillment of his belief in the phrase that would be the motto of the government
security organization he was appointed to lead: “scientia est potentia.”9
Appointed by president Bush in January 2002, Poindexter served as the director of
DARPA’s Information Awareness Office (IAO) for nearly two years, during which
he architected the “Total Information Awareness” program, a program designed to
leverage the power of networked digital computers to monitor, collect, link, and
analyze massive amounts of both transactional (e.g., travel records, phone call
metadata) and biometric data10 (e.g., fingerprints, face and gait signatures), including
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8	
  Poindexter’s convictions were overturned on appeal.	
  	
  
9	
  “Knowledge is power.”
10	
  The types of biometric data which a computer can analyze has become truly
staggering, including, height, weight, gender, race, myriad facial characteristics,
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data both publicly available (data freely provided on social networks, documents in
the public record) and privately available through either purchase11 or statecommercial agreements (data combined from various national security agency files,
medical records, financial records, travel records, and communications such as email,
chat, VOIP, etc.). The project also became an umbrella integrating many of the
surveillance-related IAO and DARPA projects including: Genoa and Genoa II
(developing information decision systems for utilizing big data to make real time
assessments for intelligence analysts); Genisys (developing electronic tools for linking
heterogeneous data sources together to create massive data-banks); Evidence
Extraction and Link Discovery and Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment
(developing automated tools for extrapolating links between and patterns for
predicting likely terrorist suspects across multiple public and private databases);
Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (developing
tools enabling the interpretive and critical processing of human language by machine
algorithm); Human Identification-at-a-Distance (developing tools to recognize
human facial and gait biometric signatures); Bio-Surveillance (developing tools to
detect in real-time the presence of biological pathogens). However, the program’s
goals generated strong concerns about government overreach even after its name was
changed in 2003 to “Terrorist Information Awareness” to appease public concern.
Congress publicly defunded the program in August of that year (Information
Awareness Office).

Although the TIA program itself was defunded and the IAO closed, at least two core
components of the TIA program were transferred to the office of Advanced Research
Development Activity (ARDA), later known as the Disruptive Technology Office
(DTO) and known today as the office of Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Activity (IARPA). Thanks to a provision in the Defense Department Appropriations
Act of 2003, the TIA program could be legally broken into its constituent
components, and these transferred to other programs (Harris 2006). The IARPA
continues today to develop several of these core surveillance technologies, including
tools for collecting, mining, and analyzing enormous datasets of individuals’
information. The programs that worried the public and led Congress to defund the
TIA have thus continued unabated and in secret during the last decade under
different names (Information Awareness Office). For this reason, though the official
TIA program has technically been defunded, I use the term Total Information
Awareness as an umbrella term describing the intelligence community’s continuing
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
physiognomy, fingerprints, capillary patterns, handwriting, voice characteristics,
keystroke dynamics, and social behavior.	
  
11	
  A report by the GAO as early as 2006 noted that the Justice Department and the
Department of Homeland Security spent approximately $30 million on purchasing
private records (“agencies not protecting privacy”).
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reliance on Big Data as the bedrock of a new model of domestic and international
surveillance for ensuring national security and domestic (and to some degree
international) social control. As Nissenbaum (2010) observes, the unquestioning faith
in Big Data analytics to resolve national security questions and enact social order is
likely to produce a worrying spiral of information aggregation: “This faith in
information, envisioned as an asset of enormous value, creates a virtually
unquenchable thirst that can only be slaked by more information, fueling
information-seeking behaviors of great ingenuity backed by determined and tenacious
hoarding of its lodes” (p. 44). Exacerbating that spiral has been the government’s
inability to adequately process the massiveness of the massive datasets it collects and
stores, according to Harris. The sheer amount of data has encouraged the state to
develop a long range policy which includes, on one level, capturing as much data as it
can, while simultaneously working on breaking and undermining encryption
standards and developing the software analytics to eventually penetrate the
encryptions and protections on the mass of communications they have stored:
[The entire intelligence apparatus] has been geared toward collection.
The technology to connect all these dots does not exist. There is no
Google for all the systems that house these different kinds of data…It
has become the default position of the intelligence community to
collect as much information as possible for the broad purposes of
defending against terrorism and other national security threats and to
put off the more complicated task of trying to make sense of it. And in
this arrangement, privacy and privacy protection has become a
secondary concern. (Harris, 2012)
The result of this concerted effort to leverage the power of dataveillance toward a
policy of total information awareness can be seen, then, in the construction of the
NSA’s Utah Data Center, a massive data storage and analysis facility located in the
relatively remote Bluffdale, Utah. The Bluffdale facility is “in some measure, the
realization of the ‘total information awareness’ program created during the first term
of the Bush administration,” writes James Bamford (2012, para. 5). Experts estimate
the center will hold anywhere from several exabytes to a yottabyte12 of information—
space it will use to store information obtained from myriad inputs including
surveillance satellites, overseas surveillance posts, and those public and private data
sources described above and in the following chapter.
The Utah Data Center is the direct descendant of the intelligence program
codenamed “Stellar Wind,” authorized under the President’s Surveillance Program
(PSP) enacted by G. W. Bush in late 2001. The majority of the enhanced powers
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
largest memory standard yet proposed—one septillion bytes.	
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granted by the PSP remain classified, however it is publicly known that the PSP
allowed the NSA to bypass the FISA courts and conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance as long as certain legal and factual standards were met. While these
enhanced powers remain classified today, revealed Bamford, a report by the Offices of
Inspector General of the Department of Defense issued in 2009 had revealed a
pattern of evasion and misrepresentation on the part of the Bush administration and
the NSA in the prosecution of the program that caused serious concern for a number
of senior Department of Justice officials13, namely: The initial legal assessment of the
program was performed by a single DOJ attorney (John Yoo) with no oversight;
attorney Yoo’s legal interpretation was based on an incomplete understanding (likely
from lack of access) to classified activities enumerated in the documents released to
him; when informed by Attorney General Comey of “serious issues” raised by the
PSP, the President simply obviated the standard practice of having the Attorney
General certify his reauthorization, choosing to use White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales, instead. Tellingly, when those classified PSP activities termed the
“Terrorist Surveillance Program” by the administration later were moved under the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), President Bush
chose to allow the program to expire—only to essentially replace it with the equally
sweeping and problematic Protect American Act of 2007, which I describe below (Fine,
2010).
The details of Stellar Wind were publicly revealed by whistleblower William Binney,
a senior NSA cryptanalyst and one of the chief architects of the agency’s digital
surveillance infrastructure. Binney resigned in October, 2001 after more than thirty
years with the agency on the grounds that the NSA’s data collection practices were
unconstitutional. With the enactment of PSP, explains Binney in his sworn affidavit
for Hepting v. NSA, “[The domestic privacy protections of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act] ceased to be an operative concern and the individual liberties
preserved in the U.S. Constitution were no longer a consideration…I resigned from
the NSA in late 2001. I could not stay after the NSA began purposefully violating the
Constitution” (2012). Based on his experience, the enormous size of the proposed
Utah Data Center (over 1 million square feet), and Klein’s testimony regarding the
existence of the NSA’s “Narus” rooms, Binney concludes that the NSA continues to
engage in the indiscriminant data collection associated with dragnet warrantless
wiretapping of both international and domestic citizens, including storing all personal
communication. The bulk collection of communication under Stellar Wind was
discontinued in 2011, according to Obama administration officials, but the existence
of the Bluffdale facility, and of programs like PRISM which feed it, continue to
contradict claims of improvemed privacy protections by the state, and intensify the
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  In fact, several senior Department of Justice and FBI officials planned to resign in
protest of the Bush Administration’s overreach, including Attorney General Comey.	
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problematic of privacy. “We are, like, that far [holding up thumb and forefinger] from
a turnkey totalitarian state” worries Binney (qtd. in Bamford).
Harris’ argument is supported by similar conclusions drawn by political activist Noam
Chomsky in Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda (2002), who
draws strikingly similar connections indicating the ideological continuity between the
Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, and G.W. Bush administrations through the continuing
political influence of a common core of political actors. Chomsky too, argues that
“the war on terrorism was not declared on September 11; rather it was redeclared
[sic], using the same rhetoric as the first declaration twenty years earlier” when
Reagan described Islamic terrorism as the new enemy of the state (p. 70). The
ideological continuity of Poindexter’s role in the Reagan and Bush administrations
has been made clear. However, several other key personnel solidified and carried
forward the ideological stance that we now recognize as the continuity between
Reagan’s foreign policy agenda and the Bush Doctrine (which I describe below).
Donald Rumsfeld, for example—special envoy to the middle east under Reagan, was
appointed Secretary of Defense under G. W. Bush, helping to press a doctrine of
regime-change in the middle-east. John Negroponte, who supervised U.S. operations
in Honduras under Reagan, was appointed Director of National Intelligence under
Bush. And perhaps most importantly, Dick Cheney, who served as Vice President
under G.W. Bush and was a strong voice in “selling” the revived “war on terror” after
9-11, had in fact served as Secretary of Defense under G. H. W. Bush, Reagan’s Vice
President. The tight articulation of these particular individuals over several
administrations speaks to the continuity of a security politics that has been growing,
as both Harris and Chomsky see it, for decades.
Harris’ analysis of how the Total Information Awareness program came to undergird
the mission of national security is astute work. His examination of the origins and
effects of the Total Information Awareness program, and its descendants in statesponsored programs, helps explain the extant structures of surveillance and control
today. I argue for the need to perform a similarly historicized rendition of the
contemporary privacy problematic, in which a dominant bloc of state and corporate
actors have attempted to woo a subaltern social fraction over the nature and value of
privacy. The contemporary privacy problematic in fact draws it shape from shifting
economic and technological formations roughly coterminous with the Nixon
administrations. This lesser privacy problematic reached its zenith in the first year of
the second Nixon administration, during which a group represented by members in
the Executive and the intelligence community similarly betrayed its mandate to
protect the civil liberties of the American people by employing a new and powerful
surveillance paradigm against its political enemies. The discoveries of the Nixon
Administration’s overreach helped fuel an examination of the nascent dataveillance
practices in the commercial sector, albeit with mixed results. Beginning with the
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Nixonian conjuncture may help us to understand our own contemporary conjuncture
and perhaps even dismantle, or at least rearticulate in positive ways, the namespace.
3.4 The Nascent Privacy Problematic
The historical context surrounding the Watergate scandal had already seen a rising
public concern with privacy, and the emergence of networked digital computing
contributed to an incipient focus on privacy. The Warren court (1953-1969) was
strongly focused on the issue of privacy. As Lane (2011) notes, the term appears in 88
decisions in the 166 years leading up to Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 1953
appointment to the high court, but has been featured in 642 opinions since, with 107
decisions during the fifteen-year Warren Court (p. 156). It is generally acknowledged
to have solidified the constitutional right to decisional privacy through the landmark
case Griswold v. Connecticut (1965).14 The liberal Warren Court also produced or
influenced many of the subsequent legislative and judicial milestones in defending
and strengthening privacy rights. As I mentioned in the first chapter, William
Prosser’s 1960 article, “Privacy,” drew together existing case law into a framework of
torts that helped establish privacy as a modern right. The Freedom of Information Act
of 1966 (FOIA) ensured greater government transparency by allowing citizens to
request authorized access to previously unreleased government documents. The
landmark decision Katz v. United States (1967) was central in guaranteeing
individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy, and in centering privacy around
individuals rather than places.15 Alan Westin’s seminal article on privacy argued to
extend this from the protection of one’s ‘person’ to information captured about one.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the “Wiretap
Act”) added judicial oversight for wiretapping and required that surveilled parties be
notified after the expiration of the wiretap order.
With regard to consumer privacy, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 was meant to
address the fact that credit agencies had been operating behind the scenes, mining
customer data with no oversight and reselling the information to third parties—credit
companies could supply information to any state agency, commercial organization, or
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14	
  Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), in which a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives was struck down, was a landmark case for decisional
privacy. It stands as precedent for another landmark decision for personal privacy, Roe
v. Wade (1973), in which a right to privacy was guaranteed under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	
  
15	
  “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection…But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (p.
347).	
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individual they considered credible (Lane, p. 152). The act anticipated the Code of
Fair Information Practices outlined formally in the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems report
“Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens” (1973), which recommended a
standard code governing data collection for all federal agencies, prohibiting the
collection of personal information in secret databases, allowing individuals to discover
the nature and uses of the data collected, disallowing the use of data outside of the
contexts and uses for which it was collected, requiring organizations collecting data to
ensure its reliability and, where possible, prevent its misuse, and allowing individuals
to amend any incorrect or personally-identifying information. The Code of Fair
Information Practices was used as a template for the Privacy Act of 1974, adding
limits to the types of information an organization may collect and the manner in
which it may collect it, as well as limits on the internal uses of information within and
between organizations. The Act emerged in response to the increasing use by state
and corporate actors of computer databases to automate and expedite the process of
capturing, storing, and analyzing large amounts of data for large numbers of
individuals. The Act standardized the Code for government agencies, prohibiting
federal agencies from sharing information about individuals with other agencies
without individuals’ express written approval, and granted individuals the right to
inspect and amend their own records were they not accurate, relevant, timely, or
complete.

However, much like the Snowden revelations, it may have ultimately been the
“rampant civil rights and privacy abuses of the Nixon administration,” writes Lane
(2011), that seemed to mobilize widespread public awareness of the extent of state
and commercial actors’ technological capability for surveillance (p. 189). The public
examination of privacy practices in fact began during the last days of Nixon’s own
administration. In order to appease the public uproar over the Watergate break-ins,
President Nixon appointed Vice President Ford the Chair of the Domestic Council
Committee on the Right of Privacy (DCCRP), charging him with investigating and
pursuing privacy safeguards against the emergence of computer databanking. By the
end of its four-month mandate, the committee had produced few results, although it
had quashed a $100 million project by the General Services Administration (GSA) to
build FEDNET—a network of mainframes linking all federal databases through a
single interface. After Nixon’s resignation, President Ford promised publicly, “There
will be no illegal tapping, eavesdropping, bugging, or break-ins in my administration.
There will be hot pursuit of tough laws to prevent illegal invasions of privacy in both
government and private activities” (qtd. in Lane, p. 190). However, when one
considers the strength of purpose and the continuing attempt, in one form or another,
to engender these various mega-databanks—FEDNET, the National Data Center,
Poindexter’s proposed intelligence leviathan, and the recently operational NSA
facility in Bluffdale, Utah—it becomes clear just how unwaveringly, over the last half-

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

century, the government has moved toward a security policy founded on a network
architecture of total information awareness.
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Watergate helped publicly politicize the issue of privacy and spurred Congress, over
the next several decades, to continue to pursue both privacy protections and
government oversight in this area, solidifying, albeit in a statutory hodge podge, the
value of various forms of personal privacy, particularly informational privacy in digital
modalities. The Watergate scandal prompted a number of oversight committees to
investigate the government’s reach with regard to surveillance. The United States
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities (commonly, the “Church Committee”) thoroughly investigated
the practices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA). The Church
Committee found that the national intelligence agencies had engaged in break-ins,
wiretapping, spying such as opening and recording in bulk the mail of U.S. citizens,
and even attempting the assassination of several foreign government leaders. The
Privacy Protection Study Committee (PPSC) established as mandated by the Privacy
Act of 1974 confirmed the public’s concern over the rising power of the state through
its leveraging of information provided by the credit reporting agencies was entrenched
and, as Lane puts it, “bordered on the incestuous” (2011, p. 197). Most credit
reporting agencies, it discovered, handed over data requested by the federal
government freely and without warrants.
“In retrospect” suggests Rule (2007), “the Watergate scandal, and the public mood it
triggered, represented the high-water mark of privacy concern in American public
opinion” (p. 50). Privacy law, practices, and policies have struggled valiantly since
then to adequately address the speed of technological innovation. Ann Toth, Vice
President of Policy and Head of Privacy for Yahoo, suggests that in our contemporary
technology-rich environment, many state and commercial actors have adopted a
implicit policy of ‘code first and apologize later’. Relying on either the public’s
technological ignorance or a policy of plausible deniability, many companies may
introduce new products and services which may not be well-scoped for privacy.
“Fundamentally, the challenge has been [that]…technology gallops along at a pretty
fast clip and legal institutions and government and law enforcement are sometimes
taking advantage of the fact that we haven’t really figured it out yet…And I think
we’re constantly trying to catch up with the pace of technology” (Glaser, 2011).
Often, where antiquated laws have been updated or amended, those amendments
have not adequately addressed the core problems constituted by the shifting
technological modalities and socio-cultural conventions of the information and
communication media landscape.
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For example, the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988, established after the
video rental records of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork were released publicly,
provides strong protections for one very particular digital medium. The act makes it
illegal for commercial video tape providers to knowingly disclose the personally
identifiable information (PII) of their customers without that customer’s written
consent, or a warrant, subpoena, or court order. Regarding the purchase or rental of
video tapes, PII may not be used in court, and must be destroyed as soon as possible
by any third party vendor—no later than one year after its inception. Unfortunately,
the medium of VHS and the distribution model (VHS rental stores) protected under
the VPPA are essentially obsolete, replaced by new digital formats such as DVD
rental and cloud-based video delivery services (e.g., Amazon, Hulu, Netflix, VUDU).
The VPAA has not been updated to address the emergence of these media or
distribution channels. Protections against data sharing and data-decontextualization
that would guarantee users more than merely nominal control over their data have
been consistently undermined and challenged by state and corporate actors. In
contrasting these practices and prohibitions against the norms, practices, and laws at
work in the current conjuncture with regard to informational privacy, it becomes clear
that a mere decade later, the privacy problematic emerges in nascent form in the
Nixon conjuncture, the shift to what would eventually become the DARPA’s Total
Information Awareness program had already begun.
The discoveries of the Church Committee of the government’s surveillance overreach
and burgeoning powers of the military and the Executive led to the enactment of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The Act was designed to strike a
balance between protecting the U.S. from serious anti-state aggression (e.g., terrorist
attacks), as well as protecting the rights of U.S. citizens from warrantless surveillance
through establishing government oversight. The Foreign Intelligence Security Act
was passed in partial response to the abuse of various protestors, including civil rights
advocates and those protesting the Vietnam War, by the FBI’s COINTELPRO
program (1956-1971), which surveilled and harassed ‘subversive’ groups—those
deemed by the FBI to be politically left of the current regime (Rule, 2007). However,
the act granted the state extraordinary powers—establishing the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), a secret federal court established to grant warrants for the
surveillance of agents of foreign powers, as well as U.S. citizens or permanent
residents suspected of espionage or terrorist activity. FISA also allowed the president
to authorize warrantless physical or electronic surveillance of up to one year of any
non-U.S. individual, and up to 72 hours for any U.S. individual, in cases where that
individual was a party to foreign communication.
While FISA was designed to strike a balance between individuals’ right to privacy and
the state’s ability to protect citizens, amendments to the law and the introduction of
other laws have extended its already problematic framework to seriously endanger
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privacy and other civil rights. The introduction of the AUMF, the PATRIOT Act
and its reauthorizations, the President’s Surveillance Program, the Protect American
Act, and the FISA Amendments Act have mitigated the effectiveness or obviated
outright much of the legislation engendered in response to the Watergate scandal.
“With the passage of the PATRIOT Act,” suggests Lane (2011). “the Bush
administration succeeded in undermining nearly all of the scant privacy protections
adopted by Congress over the last forty years” including Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (p. 248). For example, the
PATRIOT Act broadened the definition of what constituted foreign intelligence
investigation, amending FISA such that the court was no longer required to approve
detailed surveillance plans. In processing the PATRIOT Act, the government relies
on legal opinions which help with the interpretation of the law-as-written. To date,
however, those interpretations have remained classified. Senators Mark Udall and
Ron Wyden, who have security clearance to have read the interpretations, have
argued that current interpretations allow for radically different prosecution of the law
and widen surveillance freedoms beyond the intentions represented by the original
intent of the law. The original author of The PATRIOT Act, Representative Jim
Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), has also stated publicly that he believes the law, as
enacted, does not strike the responsible balance between protection and liberty it was
original intended to (Kravets, 2011).
Some of the more expansive provisions allowed by the PATRIOT Act were the
following: It authorized the use of roving wiretaps and further validated the already
questionable practice of pen register and trap-and-trace surveillance; it removed the
burden on law enforcement to verify that the person speaking on a wire-tapped line
was the person for whom the tap was authorized; it obviated the requirement that
agents requesting a FISA warrant describe in detail their surveillance rationale—
agents are now required only to declare that records are “sought for an investigation
to protect against international terrorism”; it allowed intelligence agents to request a
FISA warrant for tangible items (e.g., books, documents, and other personal records)
from business, medical, and educational institutions (including public and academic
libraries); it provided for the use of National Security Letters, FBI administrative
subpoenas which do not require probable cause, a warrant or approval of the FISC,
and which bar those served from disclosing that fact of their disclosure to anyone—
including legal counsel.
There were specific privacy provisions in place in the Patriot Act, including the
requirement that government agencies who had violated privacy be held directly
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accountable, that citizens be able to file for damages when their privacy rights were
violated, and that Inspector General of the Department of Justice be required to
designate an official to monitor complaints from employee of the Justice Department
over privacy and other civil liberties violations. The law also contained sixteen sunset
provision which specified an end-date for some of the law’s most potentially abusive
provisions. When the Act was reauthorized by President Bush in March, 2006, it
contained only a single improvement to civil liberties, the inclusion that parties
prohibited from disclosing their receipt of a National Security Letter request be
subject to judicial review. The request could only be made a year after service of the
initial request, and the onus of proof lay on the served party to prove the government
had acted in bad faith. The sunset provisions were ultimately struck altogether,
codifying and extending those provisions which were most troublesome (Wyden,
Guthrie, Dickas, & Perkins, 2006, p. 341).
These powers were extended further through the Protect American Act (PAA) of 2007
which radically increased the state’s power to surveil with near impunity. Specifically,
the Act: grants the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence the
power to wiretap any communication which begins or ends in a foreign country
wherein a “significant purpose” of the activity is certified by the state as the
surveillance of primarily foreign agents, reasonably believed to be outside the United
States; it grants the state the right to demand data from telecommunications
providers, and grants civil immunity to those providers retroactive to 2001.16
3.5 Twenty-first Century Statecraft

While the sweeping powers granted in the PSP, AUMF, PAA, and PATRIOT Act
were enacted during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009), they have not
been significantly repealed or amended during the Obama Administration. While the
Obama administration and the G. W. Bush administration which preceded it
ostensibly rest on fundamentally different ideologies, there is much they share with
regard to privacy policy. The Bush Doctrine emerged ostensibly in response to the 911 attacks, although as Harris and Chomsky argue, above, the neo-conservative
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
v. Maryland (1979) established the ‘Third Party Doctrine’, which holds that
telecommunications providers such as telephone and internet providers are ‘third
parties’ and, as such, are not responsible for protecting the privacy of users who had
shared their information voluntarily. This decision has been used as a precedent to
establish the common practice that allows communication service providers to hand
over our data to fourth parties, including the government. Third Party Doctrine has
been successfully challenged however. In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Court
of Appeals ruled that individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy for
electronic communications stored or processed by third parties (Reitman, 2012).	
  

16	
  Smith

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

75

ideology of particular actors from the Reagan administration can be seen to emerge
full-throated in the foreign policy of the G. W. Bush administration. The core
elements of the Bush Doctrine are putatively understood to be expressed in the
administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). The essence of
the Bush Doctrine can be read in the following statement: “It is an enduring
American principle that [the protection of Americans and American interests]
obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of
national power, before the threats can do grave damage” (p. 18). Variously termed
“democratic globalism,” and “messianic universalism,” the bedrock of this doctrine is a
U.S. exceptionalism in which U.S. security, prosperity, and the fulfillment of other
U.S. interests require the unilateral use of political and especially military power to
facilitate the expansion of western democracy and, where possible, regime change.
The doctrine conflates a policy of preventative military counter-terrorism with the
geo-political expansionism through the promotion of U.S. values in strategic regions,
particularly the Middle East (Monten 2005). It favors preventive war and, with the
discursive invention of “the war on terror,” arguably perpetual war (or perhaps, better,
military conflict). While the state enjoyed a moment of hegemony after 9-11, thanks
in large part to the galvanizing horror of the attacks, and the decisive leadership of the
administration, the Bush Doctrine should be understood as a move away from a
politics of hegemony, from Gramsci’s war of position, toward a politics of direct
intervention and coercion, Gramsci’s war of manoeuvre, or what Monten describes as
a move from “exemplarism,” in which the U.S. leads through its ability to sustain
multilateral international relations which are productive of U.S. interests, toward
“vindicationalism,” in which the president, declaring himself “the decider,”17
embraced singularly unilateral policies. As we see above, the Bush administration’s
relative abandonment of due process after 9-11, with regard to civil and other rights,
represented a sea change for privacy. Whereas privacy had historically existed in a
more careful balance between the state’s compelling interests in security and
individuals’ rights, privacy under the Bush Doctrine (and the Reagan-era politics of
security which inform it), exists in a binary opposition with security. Privacy is a thing
to be sacrificed in the name of security. By the end of the second term of the Bush
presidency, the moment of total, expansive hegemony produced by the 9-11 attacks
and which helped to engender the sweeping changes to privacy and other civil
liberties was fundamentally transformed. The practices defined by and enacted
through the Bush Doctrine helped to squander the administration’s role as moral and
intellectual arbiter of domestic and international policy.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2006, President G. W. Bush termed himself “the decider” in an interview
wherein he defended his choice to unilaterally reject the public outcry to replace
Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense: “I hear the voices and I read the front page
and I hear the speculation. But I’m the decider, and I decide what’s best” (Stolberg,
2006, para. 5).
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As a concerted departure from the Bush Doctrine, The Obama Doctrine can be seen
as an attempt to return to the politics of hegemony, favoring multilateralism, and
declaring its intent to wield moral and intellectual leadership in both domestic and
international political theatres. The Obama Doctrine does not eschew the concept of
American Exceptionalism outright, however, but seeks to reclaim it and persuade the
domestic and international community that an exceptional America need not be
conflated with a mitilarist, expansionist geopolitics. President Obama has sought to
defend his approach to exceptionalism as a balance: “I see no contradiction between
believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world
towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent,
depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we can't solve these problems
alone” (qtd. in Dish, 2010). Unlike the Bush Doctrine, the Obama Doctrine is not a
fully formalized statement, but can be extrapolated from the administration’s
discursive positioning in a number of key speeches by the president and other key
administrative officials, through the enactment of particular policies and practices,
and finally through the laws, policies, and practices enacted, extended, or repealed by
the president and the individuals who serve under him.
An important early document in that formulation is a 2007 essay by then-candidate
Barack Obama in Foreign Affairs magazine, entitled “Renewing American
Leadership,” in which the president outlined a policy which represented a rejection of
several of the foundations of the Bush doctrine. The U.S. must, he argued, protect
domestic and international civil rights, embrace multilateralism and pursue improved
domestic and foreign relations through a more transparent and conciliatory foreign
policy. The U.S. must “by deed and example, [lead and lift] the world,” so that
America is “again called to provide visionary leadership” (2007, p. 2). In order to lead,
the U.S. must “[end] the practices of shipping away prisoners in the dead of night to
be tortured in far-off countries, of detaining thousands without trial, of maintaining a
network of secret prisons to jail people beyond the reach of law” (p. 2). “This is our
moment, the essay concludes, “to renew the trust and faith of our people—and all
people—in an America that battles immediate evils, promotes an ultimate good, and
leads the world once more” (p. 2). In the essay he specifically addresses the role of
intelligence in counter-terrorism work, arguing that any successful strategy must
leverage radical advances in technology and explore new practices and approaches
capable of addressing the differences in the geopolitical landscape after 9-11. This
includes the development of “technologies and practices that enable us to efficiently
collect and share information within and across our intelligence agencies” (p. 2).
Strikingly, the Obama administration shares with the Bush (and arguably Reagan)
administration(s) the goal of a unified intelligence network—albeit for fundamentally
different reasons. The creation of this new hegemony relies not primarily on offensive
military might, but on the construction of a namespace which will allow it to build
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American security through Big Data. It hopes to balances security and liberty (albeit
prioritizing security) by leveraging a policy of total information awareness to provide
more granular control through a variety of tactics, meant to demonstrate restraint and
leadership on the geopolitical stage: working more closely and multi-laterally with the
United Nations with regard to international conflicts; replacing large-scale military
intervention with targeted drone strikes; closing a number of CIA-run prisons in
Europe; ending the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and effecting a stable transition;
ending the policy of perpetual war, specifically the “War on Terror.” The goal of total
information awareness is the lynch pin, the sine qua non of this foreign policy shift to
a limited, defensive but proactive leadership on the global stage. If we read the
Obama administration’s foreign policy (i.e., the Obama Doctrine) as an articulation,
it shares many nodes with the Bush Doctrine, but disarticulates from it its strong
neo-conservative ideology, rearticulating a weaker form of American exceptionalism.
However, if it rejects a policy of perpetual ground war, the embrace of total
information awareness may simply mean the articulation of a perpetual, and largely
secret cyber-war.
Two additional important statements constituting the Obama Doctrine and
indicative of the importance of the security/privacy binary are represented by two
speeches given by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton immediately following the leaks
of classified U.S. information by Julian Assange through the Wikileaks website. In
Clinton’s speeches, first at the Newseum, and weeks later at George Washington
University, she delivers the Obama administration’s interpretation on the relation of
information technologies to the development of secure democracies, as well as its
understanding of the relation of economic and political security balanced against
privacy and other civil liberties. She suggests that foreign policy in the twenty-first
century must acknowledge that cybernetic forms of economic and political control are
paramount to national security and economic success. She argues for a transparency
that can encourage a global democracy, through the freedom of information and of
digital assembly provided by an ‘open’ internet. She claims the internet as a distinctly
American space, granting the United States the right and responsibility to police it.
“[A]s the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the internet itself,
we have a responsibility to see them used for good. To do that, we need to develop
our capacity for what we call, at the State Department, twenty-first century statecraft”
(Clinton, 2010). While governments should protect the “privacy of citizens who
engage in non-violent political speech” and who “use the internet for peaceful
political purposes,” this free flow of information does not pertain to groups such as Al
Qaeda who use the internet to “promote the mass murder of innocent people across
the world.” The internet, she argues, should be used as a tool to track down terrorists
who engage in such hate speech. This involves the outreach and funding of academia,
industries and NGOs to create a “standing effort that will harness the power of
connection technologies and apply them to our diplomatic goals” (Clinton, 2010).
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Like the Bush administration, then, the Obama administration has defended the
surveillance programs in place, arguing that privacy and security represent a relation
that must be delicately balanced—albeit heavily balanced in favor of security. In an
interview with Charlie Rose, the president defended his foreign and domestic
intelligence policies: “My job is to both protect the American people and to protect
the American way of life, which includes privacy” (Obama, 2013). The legal
safeguards now in place, he argues, must strike the appropriate balance between
security and privacy, particularly with regard to what the administration regards as a
growing threat of cyber-attack, which Defense Secretary Robert Gates called a “huge
future threat…[and] a considerable current threat” (Montalbano, 2010, para. 2).
Clinton’s earlier speeches display this same rhetoric of balance: “Without security,
liberty is fragile. Without liberty, security is oppressive. The challenge is finding the
proper measure: enough security to enable our freedoms, but not so much or so little
as to endanger them.” While Secretary Clinton describes a perfect balance between
liberty and security, Obama’s understanding of this balance has demonstrably
changed since assuming presidency. For example, in 2005, while still a senator,
Obama resoundingly critiqued the government’s surveillance overreach with regard to
the secretive nature of FISA. Citing the inability of citizens to have substantive legal
recourse to challenge overbroad “fishing expeditions” represented by the FBI’s
National Security Letters, he called intrusive government surveillance “just plain
wrong” (Wheaton, Kim, & Cascarano, 2013). In 2007, then-candidate Obama
critiqued the Bush administration for erecting a false choice between liberty and
security, promising to:
provide our intelligence and law enforcement agencies with the tools
they need to track and take out the terrorists without undermining our
constitution and our freedom. That means no more illegal wiretapping
of American citizens. No more national security letters to spy on
citizens who are not suspected of a crime. No more tracking citizens
who do nothing more than protest a misguided war. No more ignoring
the law when it is inconvenient…This administration acts like
violating civil liberties is the way to enhance our security. It is not.
There are no shortcuts to protecting America. (Wheaton et al., 2013)
President Obama’s actions demonstrate a different ideological position and a different
rhetoric. National security letters have not abated, and in fact have kept pace with the
Bush administration’s numbers. On average, each year from 2008 to 2013,
approximately 19,000 national security letters were delivered seeking information on
nearly 8,200 individuals. In response to the privacy criticisms, and particularly the
Snowden revelations, Obama claims to have modified the legal framework in ways
that redress the shortcomings he earlier outlined in the Bush administration’s
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approach, and lessen the overreach of the government. However, his stance now
reveals the same binary approach to privacy and security he critiqued so stridently in
2005:

I think it’s important to recognize that you can’t have a hundred
percent security, and then also have a hundred percent privacy and
zero inconvenience. We’re gonna have to make some choices as a
society.…I think, on balance, we have established a process and a
procedure that the American people should feel comfortable about.
But again, these programs are subject to congressional oversight and
congressional reauthorization and congressional debate. And if there
are members of Congress who feel differently, then they should speak
up. And we’re happy to have that debate. (Wheaton et al., 2013)
However, having indicted six government officials so far for leaking sensitive
information—already twice the total of all previous administrations, the Obama
administration has been accused of pursuing a policy of retribution for administrative
leaks so aggressive it has produced a chilling effect on the press. Moreover, promises
made by the Obama campaign to promote government transparency, outlined in
several reform agenda documents, were removed two days after Snowden leaked
government documents. Among the language removed was the following quote,
which clearly contradicts the administration’s policy on whistleblowers:
Often the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in
government is an existing government employee committed to public
integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of courage and patriotism,
which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer dollars, should
be encouraged rather than stifled. We need to empower federal
employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance.
(Butler, 2013, para. 6)
And, after it was discovered that the Department of Justice had obtained at least two
months of phone records of various journalists at the Associated Press without
suspicion of specific crimes, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney was asked by
ABC White House Correspondent Jake Tapper how the administration’s stance on
transparency could possibly “square with the fact that this administration has been so
aggressively trying to stop aggressive journalism in the United States by using The
Espionage Act to take whistleblowers to court” (Calderone & Froomkin, 2012, para.
24). President Obama later responded “I am troubled by the possibility that leak
investigation may chill the investigative journalism that holds government
accountable. Journalists should not be at legal risks for doing their jobs” (Remarks by
President at National Defense University, 2013). Comparing his rhetoric to empirical
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evidence, however, the New York Times editorial board responded with a vote of no
confidence, claiming that the Obama administration had “now lost all credibility on
this issue,” and calling the government “reckless in its assignment of unnecessary and
overbroad surveillance powers” (Editorial Board, 2013).

In his 2013 interview with Charlie Rose, Obama declared: “What I can say
unequivocally, is that if you are a U.S. person, the NSA cannot listen to your
telephone, and the NSA cannot target your emails, and have not, by law and by rule,
unless they go to a court and obtain a warrant and seek probable cause. The same way
it’s always been.”18 However, as I demonstrate above, the history of privacy legislation
does not stand on a solid body of tradition but more properly represents a struggle
between dominant and subordinate political blocs in which privacy plays a greater and
lesser role by turns. “We don’t have to sacrifice our freedom in order to achieve
security,” argued President Obama. “That’s a false choice. That doesn’t mean that
there are not trade-offs involved in any given program, any given action that we take.
So all of us make a decision [emphasis added] that we go through a whole of security at
airports. That’s a trade-off that we make” (italics mine). But when the president refers
to “all of us,” he seems to imply a consensus that belies both the truth of the public
privacy crisis, and the truth of the broad powers enacted in the name of the Executive
Branch after the events of 9-11. By framing the distinction between national security
and civil liberties in terms of priorities, Obama is clear about the fact that security
trumps liberty. When Rose asserts, “[Y]ou’ve certainly indicated…that the number
one responsibility of a president is national security, to keep the American people
safe,” the president responds, “[security] is my number one priority because if I don’t
get that right, obviously, we don’t get anything right.” However, like the Bush era
rhetoric it mimics, the notion that without security there might be no liberty must be
understood as a similarly false choice. The ideology at work in this statement is one
which continues to support the security state. Remembering the lessons of Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), we might ask just how secure protagonist Winston
Smith felt without liberty?
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
President Obama’s stalwart refusal to acknowledge more extensive, and
certainly unconstitutional surveillance programs—the existence of which continue to
leak through Edward Snowden’s revelations in the popular media—it is indeed telling
to hear him cavalierly describe the evasions necessary to government leaders and
high-level officials in the service of national interests. When Rose asks about the
Chinese president’s response to accusations of corporate espionage, President Obama
responds, “You know, when you’re having a conversation like this [accusing a foreign
leader of cyber-spying], I don’t think you ever expect a Chinese leader to say, ‘You
know, you’re right. You caught us red-handed. We’re stealing all your stuff and every
day we try to figure out how we can get into Apple.” 	
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Just as it took the Watergate scandal to inform the public of the surveillance practices
of the current administration, the Snowden revelations have encouraged both state
and commercial actors to address privacy issues. “I think it's clear that some of the
conversations this has generated, some of the debate, actually needed to happen,”
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told a defense and intelligence
contractor trade group. “If there's a good side to this, maybe that's it.” (Ackerman,
2013, para. 6). In September, 2013 FISC Judge Dennis Saylor has ruled that the
White House must declassify and release by early October any legal opinions relating
to section 215 of the PATRIOT Act written after May 2011 reasoning that the
release would contribute to a public debate engendered by Snowden’s release of
information regarding specific practice of the FISA Court.
The Snowden revelations have also had an effect on global geopolitics. Several
countries have raised objections to U.S. surveillance practices. Brazilian president
Dilma Rousseff canceled her visit to the White House based on the discovery that the
U.S. had been spying on her emails and the emails of other top PETROBRAS
officials, which, she argued, amounted to nothing less than industrial espionage.
Rousseff has since announced plans to build an undersea fiber-optic cable to obviate
the problem of surveillance of Brazilians’ data, the majority of which pass transits
U.S. jurisdiction, and requiring commercial actors such as Google and Facebook to
store data on servers located on Brazilian soil. Additionally, Brazil’s state-owned
postal service Correios has begun work on an encrypted national email system which
would also eliminate the possibility of U.S. snooping (More in Sorrow Than Anger).
The EU justice commissioner Viviane Reding wrote to US Attorney General Eric
Holder over concerns that US espionage might have serious global consequences. The
New York Times published an open letter from Russian President Vladimir Putin to
the American public and its leaders in which he critiqued the Obama administration’s
embrace of American exceptionalism, and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa
compared Obama’s embrace of exceptionalism to the ideological stance of the Nazi
party during the Second World War (Ecuador’s Correa). In October, Brazil joined
Germany in drafting a U.N. resolution supporting privacy in digital spaces. The
resolution will declare deep concern over “human rights violations and abuses that
may result from the conduct of any surveillance of communications…[including]
extraterritorial surveillance of communications, their interception, as well as the
collection of personal data, in particular massive surveillance, interception and data
collection” (Brazil and Germany). And finally, most recently it was discovered that
the NSA had tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone for more than a
decade—well before Merkel was elected to the office of Chancellor—with full
knowledge of the president, reports say (US bugged).
A number of commercial actors have also spoken out against the state’s surveillance
practices and the legal framework which prevents them from speaking publicly about
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requests for customer data. To date, a coalition of 85 companies has launched the
Web site petition Stop Watching Us, demanding: congressional inquiry into the
NSA revelations, congressional reform of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, revision
of the FISAA, the creation of an investigative committee which might recommend
legal and regulatory reform on U.S. surveillance practices, and the holding
accountable of those public officials responsible for enacting and prosecuting these
policies. Yahoo CEO Marissa Mayer has complained publicly that she worried about
incarceration or being labeled a ‘traitor’ if she failed to comply with government
requests and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has, likewise, publicly distanced
himself from the government, arguing that it failed to balance protection of citizens’
freedoms, the economy, and the rights of commercial actors. Speaking at the 2013
TechCrunch Disrupt Conference, Zuckerberg said “Frankly, I think the government
blew it” (Geron, 2013, para. 1). Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsoft have all
filed suit against the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court demanding to be
released from the gag order imposed on all recipients of National Security Letters.
Umbrella privacy organization Privacy International has asked the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development to investigate top telecoms, including
Level 3, British Telecom, Verizon, Vodafone Cable, Viatel, and Interoute to disclose
the nature and extent of their cooperation in releasing consumer data to GCHQ
(Telecom Firms). Six of the larger telecoms, including AOL, Apple, Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo have authored a letter in support of the The USA
Freedom Act, legislation introduced by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Patrick Leahy and PATRIOT Act author Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, aimed
at reining in the U.S. intelligence community’s sweeping surveillance powers by
requiring greater transparency and substantial reforms for FISA, particularly enabling
service providers to report more information about the number of requests for data
they receive.
The pressure to address the government’s overreach on surveillance and other civil
liberties by government actors, commercial actors, privacy partisans, and a concerned
public only strengthen the hegemonic crisis faced by the current administration (of
which I have more to say in chapter five) and engender strong possibilities for
challenging the construction of the namespace and the total information awareness
that underwrites it. The Obama Doctrine represents a move toward rejecting coercive
tactics, reestablishing political hegemony through gaining the consent of the public to
accede to the state’s intellectual and moral authority. Leveraging the administration’s
demand for the subordinate bloc’s consent may help an informed public and press to
challenge the administration, as it did during the Watergate scandal, to do better by
its citizens. Lane (2011) has argued that just like the Food and Drug Administration,
the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Radio Commission, the Aviation
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, the issue of privacy
protection demands federalization (p. 257). It may be the case that only through a
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standardized bureaucratic apparatus with the power to make policy for both state and
commercial actors—and especially to enforce it—will the rearticulation of the
namespace (i.e., the disarticulation of the ideology of total information awareness as a
viable mode of domestic and international control) be possible.
In this chapter, I have argued that the rise of the security state relies on the policies
and protocols of total information awareness at the level of the state. In the next
chapter, I address the hegemony of a culture of total transparency which has been
widely adopted by the public through its embrace of that product sold by commercial
actors, an ‘ambient findability’, which may in fact represent the most tendential line
of force in the articulation of the namespace.

	
  

Chapter 4. Privacy and Convenience in the Information Economy
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4.1 Ambient Findability
In the previous chapter, I examined the articulation of actors from the Executive,
military, and intelligence branches of the U.S. federal government which actively
pursues the policies and practices of large-scale dataveillance as an intelligence
strategy originally termed total information awareness. In this chapter, I examine
articulating dataveillance practices, policies, and protocols in the commercial sector,
described in aggregate by one of its proponents as ambient findability. The constituent
practices, policies, and protocols which constitute the economico-cultural ideology of
ambient findability must be understood as both analogous to those practices which
constitute the state’s total information awareness, and as significantly underwriting it.
While the practices and policies of state and commercial dataveillance regimes differ,
each relies on the social acceptance of a dual proposition: The transformations to
communication practices, and social life, wrought by the ubiquity of networked
digital communication technologies provide greater security and convenience,
guaranteeing citizen-consumers ‘safer’ and ‘better’ lives; the guarantee of greater
security and convenience must be purchased by the acceptance of less personal privacy
in citizen-consumers’ relations with state and corporate actors. Observes Yahoo’s
Head of Privacy Ann Toth, “Data collection online, the collection and use of that
information, gives enormous benefit to consumers. Right now advertising makes the
internet free and consumers want a free internet. I think that’s pretty clear” (Glaser,
2011). The powerful line of force articulating these state and corporate interests in
mining the data of consumers produces the contemporary conjuncture I term the
“namespace.” As we saw in the last chapter, the namespace doubly serves the state,
which can leverage commercial dataveillance practices (both legally and illegally) to
supplement their own dataveillance practices. In this chapter, I examine the
commercial dataveillance practices, the corollary rise of an information economy, and
the new marketing and advertising paradigm which supports it.
In the commercial sector, then, the public’s acceptance of large-scale dataveillance
relies in part on the popularity of ambient findability, the dominant ideology in a “fast
emerging world where we can find anyone or anything from anywhere at anytime,”
according to Peter Morville (2005, p. 6). What I am calling the namespace represents
for Morville “an inflection point in the evolution of findability” as the public and
private sectors leverage ubiquitous computing technologies to generate myriad,
massive (frequently interconnected) databases filled with the largest digital collection
of knowledge in human history—to include as well the public and personal data of
consumer-citizens. In Morville’s eponymous O’Reilly title, Ambient Findability, the
Web 2.0 phenomenon is held aloft as an essentially unmitigated social good. The
increasing ubiquity and availability of consumer data is cited as a cause for “hope and
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inspiration” and is indicative of “the reality of progress” (p. 6). For Morville, ambient
findability describes the confluence of the technological, economic, cultural, and
psychological to create a vast digital information enclosure (p. 6) that empowers the
individuals with radical new literacies, as well as economic and social opportunities:
“Most importantly,” he exhorts the reader, “findability invests freedom in the
individual” (p. 6-7). Requiring the tracking and recording of individuals’ digital
footprint, ambient findability ostensibly offers a trade-off; it offers to meet and even
predict their needs by offering them custom-tailored experiences. “The promise of
personalization is simple…the benefits to the user are clear. No more searching” (p.
115).
However, after a similar promise made by Google CEO Eric Schmidt at the 2010
IFA Conference in Berlin, Schmidt drew harsh criticism by Consumer Watchdog
over his failure to consider the consequences to privacy in the future role he imagined
for Google: “We can suggest what you should do next, what you care about,” argued
Schmidt. “Imagine: we know where you are, we know what you like” (Tsotsis, 2010,
para. 6). At the 2010 Washington Ideas Forum, he phrased the same statement
somewhat differently, adding: “With your permission you give us more information
about you, about your friends, and we can improve the quality of our searches. We
don't need you to type at all. We know where you are. We know where you've been.
We can more or less know what you're thinking about” (Thompson, 2010). This
allows the ostensibly benevolent Google to match your digital footprint to your
interests in real-time—particularly those interests which collectively define you as a
consumer.
Ambient findability clearly presents more than simple convenience, then, it represents
an architecture of control which constrains and influences behavior as much as it
maps it. In Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” he describes the
architecture of control engendered by a simple identification card. “Felix Guattari has
imagined a city where one would be able to leave one's apartment, one’s street, one’s
neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but
the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what
counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position—licit or
illicit—and effects a universal modulation” (1992, p. 7). Imagine that card held nearly
every personally identifying aspect of your identity. Some nascent version of that
universal modulation is already in place through the protocological architectures of
control developed by the major players in the telecommunications industry. In fact,
the major social networks and telecommunications providers inhabiting the web are
responsible for the development of the code and protocols transforming the Web
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today. In HTML5: Up and Running (2010), Mark Pilgrim , a developer advocate for
Google, suggests that a slight diminution of privacy represents the price we must pay
for the transparency and access of an HTML5-fueled ambient findability which will
pay broad social, cultural, and economic dividends in the long run. “It’s your job to
provide as much data as possible,” he argues, “Let the rest of the world decide what to
do with it. They might surprise you!” (Pilgrim, 2010). “The winners in an HTML5
world, agrees Brett McLaughlin in What is HTML5? (2011) “are those who stop
fearing being stolen from, and actually start handing out their candy to every kid on
the block” (McLaughlin, 2011). And in fact, the inventor of HTML, Sir Tim
Berners-Lee, weighs in on the side of openness for economic reasons: “Lots of
governments make money by selling data….When you look at so many things, I
mean what was the return-on-investment of the Web? You can’t put a number on it,
but everybody thinks, oh, so many things we couldn’t have done without it. Same
with all this data. When you put it out there, it just makes life so much easier for
people. Their life just picks up, you know? It goes faster. It goes more efficiently, the
country goes better…It’s difficult to do the math, but when people have done it, it’s
been often very persuasive that really, making the data available for free is very much,
economically, the best thing to do” (Berners-Lee, 2011).
1

Arguably, the advent of social networking has greatly contributed to the public
embrace of ambient findability as a cultural good, reshaping our digital
communications with other individuals, organizations, and the government in a large
number of ways—many of which we have yet to fathom. For example, “We write,”
argues Morville, “not just to communicate, but to enhance our own personal
findability” (p. 142).2 Perhaps one of the most perfect expressions—an ideological
Ironically, without ceremony or explanation, on October 4, 2011, Mark Pilgrim has
“withdrawn from digital life,” as Eric Meyer put it, deleting his Github, Google+,
Reddit, and Twitter accounts. The only explanation, to date, have been universal
agreement to respect his apparent wish for privacy. This was affirmed by a final
cryptic tweet by Jason Scott, which read: “Mark Pilgrim is alive/annoyed we called
the police. Please stand down and give the man privacy and space, and thanks
everyone for caring. The communication was specifically verified, it was him, and
that’s that. That was the single hardest decision I’ve had to make this year” (qtd. in
“Searching”).
2
While it would be difficult, in the face of the popularity of social networking, to
deny the last claim, it does not follow that desires by younger “netizens” to share their
lives in online spaces, are necessarily informed decisions. As Frau-Meigs warns,
“Young people have no recollection of the tyranny of public opinion nor of the public
pressure for social conformity…nor do they fathom the risks that homesteading on
the cyber-frontier could lead to cyber-lynching, as reputation building can derail into
denunciation and defamation” (p. 91).
1
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paean, really—of ambient findability can be found in a recent Sprint commercial for
the iPhone 5, entitled “I am unlimited: Picture Perfect,” in which the concept of a
‘network’ is portrayed in images as the natural interconnection between universe,
planet, ecosystem, organism, and computer technology. The commercial means to
invoke the values of harmony and human freedom as the narrator triumphantly
intones: “The miraculous is everywhere. In our homes, our minds; we can share every
second in data dressed as pixels. A billion roaming photojournalists uploading the
human experience and it is spectacular. So why would you cap that? My iPhone 5 can
see every point of view, every panorama, the entire gallery of humanity. I need to
upload all of it. I need—no, I have the right—to be unlimited!” Here, the ability to
share our every personal detail online is not a duty, but a right—ideologically linked
to, and arguably conflated with, the concept of human freedom and liberty. The
grand narrative represented in this single commercial is in fact strikingly ubiquitous in
the popular media. Because privacy is weighted against compelling social goods,
because it is contextual, decided by the publics it defines, the voices of the those with
the strongest interest in promoting it must be the loudest. The continual public
statements on privacy by those promoting ambient findability can thus be seen as
motivated by the need to continually reinforce the message of ambient findability as a
social good. When asked by interviewer Leslie Stahl if he is “trying to turn everything
we do on the web into a social function,” Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg answers:
“I think that we’re really gonna see this huge shift where a lot of industry is and
products are gonna get remade to be social.” In such statements, Zuckerberg inhabits
the voice of the expert commenting upon a social phenomenon that he in fact helps
to architect through the creation of digital code and protocol, cultural and economic
practices through the interface of Facebook (and all of the more than 100,000 Web
sites it interfaces with). Social networking, we are told continuously by these ‘expert’
service providers, means that to be a truly ‘social’ animal means to share everything
online.
Although the growth of social networking has slowed to roughly 4% in the three
years since 2010, overall media market penetration on average has risen from
approximately 45% to 65% in the last five years. The internet and other mobile digital
forms of media lead television, radio, and print media across all demographics
(Universal-McCann, 2012, pp. 16-20). Globally, the average consumer owns an
average of four devices capable of connecting to the internet. While almost 80% of
these consumers owned a personal computer, 44% owned smart phones and 14%
owned a tablet (Universal-McCann, 2012, pp. 57-62). Public privacy concerns have
also risen by several percentage points. “Our research shows that concerns about
sharing personal data online [sic] is real and building” (Universal-McCann, 2012, p.
29). One study found that in the USA, Spain, the U.K., Canada, Poland, and Japan,
privacy was more important than the opportunity to network socially. However,
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Korea demonstrated the opposite trend

88
(Universal-McCann, 2012, p. 33) with the ability to network socially outweighing the
possibility of privacy violation.
Without invoking the argument that social networking represents a technocultural
juggernaut that cannot be stopped, we must acknowledge the cultural pervasion and,
in fact, the very real benefit of social networking, of transparency, and of social
connectivity broadly. As I mentioned in my first chapter, and Morozov’s challenge
notwithstanding, the Arab Spring can be seen as one positive effect of the collective
intelligence and political activism that emerges when communities of people connect
virtually. Certainly, people use social networking Web sites and applications for a
growing range of social, cultural, economic, and political purposes, including
organizing their schedules, making personal and professional contacts, shopping,
consuming news and entertainment, self-publishing, engaging in political debate,
engaging in religious practice, and a host of other activities newly shifting to digital
spaces. Many people spend large amounts of time updating their online presence
(62%) and updating their status (52%) (Universal-McCann, 2012, p. 30). Sites like
Alice.com are harbingers of the new economics of this age of social networking.
Alice.com allows consumers who volunteer their personal information and
consumption habits in return for which manufacturers supply these consumers with
cheaper and often free products about which they share their information (Gerzema
& D'Antonio, 2011). However, these ostensibly free services are ‘purchased’ through
the information we provide in order to ‘sign on’ to their Web sites (through the
necessary step of creating a site profile, the information contained in which
immediately becomes the property of the parent site) to accept their services. In order
to discover the degree to which our personal information has been monetized on the
Web, The Disconnect Web site, which offers tools and tips for protecting individual
privacy while Web browsing, offers a tool to estimate the monetary value of the
information provided on an individual’s Facebook page.3 This sale of personally
identifying information to data brokers and/or the in-house use of that information,
both of which are typically used to drive targeted advertising to the user, constitutes
the bedrock of the information economy that has, as yet, emerged as the only
demonstrably successful means (besides direct billing) for monetizing Web service to
date.
4.2 The Information Economy
While lines of direct causal determination would be impossible to draw, the
articulation of emergent digital communication technologies, changing interpersonal
communication habits, changing domestic and global economic practices, and
As reported in the Huffington Post, staffers who used the tool reported a range from
$143.27 to $394.63 (Palis, 2012).
3
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changing geo-politics have produced a namespace constituted in and by dataveillance.
In the commercial telecommunications sector, this has been coterminous with the rise
of what many theorists term an information economy (Langenderfer & Miyazaki,
2009). The importance of the revenue stream generated by the information economy
to the larger U.S. economy was recently underscored by President Obama, who
mentioned both social network mega-corporations Google and Facebook in his 2011
State of the Union address, as milestones of American invention and ingenuity:
“Thirty years ago we couldn’t know that something called the internet would lead to
an economic revolution…We’re the nation that put cars in driveways and computers
in offices, the nation of Edison and the Wright brothers, of Google and Facebook.
In America, innovation doesn’t just change our lives, it is how we make our living.” In
the speech, the president ties the success of Google and Facebook to nothing less
than the economic revitalization of the American economy. The state’s commitment
to the development of ambient findability (and it own analog—total information
awareness) months earlier in a speech given by Secretary of State Clinton at the
newseum. The speech, entitled “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” (Clinton, 2010) also
vaguely tied digital connectivity to economic prosperity: “A connection to global
information networks is like an on-ramp to modernity…There are 4 billion cell
phones in use today. Many of them are in the hands of market vendors, rickshaw
drivers, and others who’ve historically lacked access to education and opportunity.
Information networks have become a great leveler, and we should use them together
to help lift people out of poverty and give them a freedom from want.”
For the state, the promise of ambient findability represents not only a strengthening
of the commercial sector (as greater numbers of individuals engage in internet
commerce), but also offers the promise of massive data stores that the state may tap
with near impunity. There remain relatively few laws structuring data collection and
protecting personal privacy in the private sector. And since 9-11, the government has
increased its purchase of consumer information for law enforcement purposes.
Individual credit accounts make up the backbone of the contemporary digital dossier.
Rule (2007) calls the U.S. credit reporting system, a $4.6 billion industry, constituted
by the near-monopoly of a small number of companies including Experian, Equifax,
and TransUnion, “a manifestation of surveillance virtuosity unsurpassed by any other
system, government or private” (p. 97). The online advertising industry estimated at
$36 billion for 2011 and has continued to rise steadily and is estimated by the Wall
Street Journal to reach $67 billion by 2016 (“Finding Value”). The advertising model
on the internet and for each of the larger social networks is targeted advertising. It
was, in fact, Google that developed targeted advertising, reshaping the entire internet
economy in the process.
This emerging online economy, worries Mark Andrejivic, “increasingly seeks to
exploit the work of being watched,” as consumers are “recruited to participate in the
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labor of being watched to an unprecedented degree by subjecting the details of their
daily lives to increasingly pervasive and comprehensive forms of high-tech
monitoring” (2002). These new forms of sharing might best be understood to
represent Deleuzian forms of social control through continual modulation of the self.
“The power in question is not the static domination of a sovereign Big Brother, but
that of a self-stimulating incitement to productivity: the multiplication of desiring
subjects and subjects’ desires in accordance with the rationalization of consumption”
(p. 231). Andrejivic describes a primary driver behind the new information economy
as a form of labor derived from the ability of service providers to monitor consumers
through the technological power and sheer ubiquity of ICTs, and through the appeal
of convenient and ostensibly “free” services. But customization also allows for
customized pricing. As with customer loyalty cards, the number and type of a
consumer’s purchases are tracked. Providing a service provider with information about
which products are most purchased, likely provides them with information about
which products should cost the most. “The process of naming everything in the
universe turns out to be a prelude to enfolding it into a monitored totality subject to
the manipulations and ministrations of marketers…an omniscient gaze for the
purposes of convenience and profit” (pp. 102-103).
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is one state organization responsible for
protecting consumer interests. In its report Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of
Rapid Change (2010), the FTC called for powerful “do not track” mechanisms to be
built into Web browsers. FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, addressing mounting
privacy concerns at the 2011 Berkeley Browser Privacy Mechanisms Roundtable,
outlined the importance of adopting a new model of privacy protection that can
account for the ways in which changes in the amount and uses of data has changed
the way consumers use technology and the importance of the industry’s ability to
address these changes with alacrity and openness. We have moved, she argues, from a
notice and choice model which placed the burden on consumers to choose from among
what were often myriad confusing, sometimes obfuscating, incomprehensible choices,
to what she calls a harm-based model which was “reactive” and is only useful in
addressing breaches in privacy, such as security breaches and identity theft, after the
fact. The harm-based model, she notes, also fails to recognize breaches which are
difficult to quantify in terms of monetary damages, such as social stigma or
embarrassment. The state of consumer privacy protection today is represented by the
following realities: Collection of consumer data is ubiquitous, both on and offline;
consumers remain ill-informed and ill-prepared to make informed choices about data
collection; privacy emerges as an overarching concern for consumers, yet targeted
advertising is responsible for many of the received benefits to consumers; the
distinction between personally identifiable and non-personally identifiable
information is blurring as technological systems, organizations, and individuals
articulate in ways that may inadvertently violate the privacy of individuals.
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The FTC report attempts to develop a set of best practices (heavily leveraging the
Fair Information Practice principles developed in the 1970s) to address these realities,
including: Promoting privacy by design—the principle that a concern for consumer
privacy should drive the design of systems not offered as afterthoughts; aligning levels
of security are commensurate with data sensitivity; ensuring the collection of data is
restricted to only those data required; ensuring that those data retained only as long as
needed. Consumer choice should be effected, it argues, through mechanisms which
uses simplified language while remaining informative and meaningful to consumers.
The interface/mechanisms of privacy should be judged by five indicia: Ease of use;
effectivity and enforcibility; universality of industry participation; consumer ability to
opt out of data collection; and interface persistence of consumer choice with regard to
data collection. Brill ended with a warning to the browser industry suggesting that a
self-regulatory response to these requirements would be sufficient if advertising
industry shows that it is willing to honor consumer choices. “It’s still [the FTC’s]
position that if the industry does not act quickly and sufficiently, we will ask congress
to take up this issue.” In response to the FTC’s report, Google, Mozilla, Apple, and
Microsoft have added Do Not Track functionality into their browsers. Unfortunately,
however, the FTC has no power to enforce these recommendations among data
brokerages. Internet privacy issues are generally taken up by the FTC which is
empowered act only when a citizen has been defrauded by a service provider.
4.3 Data Brokerages
Hagel and Rayport (1997), predicted a privacy backlash would accompany the
ramping up of data mining of consumers. However, they suggested that rather than
being strictly concerned about their privacy being violated, consumers might be more
concerned by a lack of remuneration for their information. They coined the term
“infomediaries” to represent the emerging data brokers who might help consumers
aggregate their own data, and negotiate on their behalf for payment for their
information. “Businesses have generally assumed,” they write, “that information is a
resource waiting to be claimed, like land in the western United States during the great
land rush of the mid-nineteenth century” (p. 53). One company, the now defunct
Lumeria, Inc., proposed to do this by building a unified uber-profile that would drive
targeted marketing by reimbursing the consumer for the info they provided. The
platform would allow users to monitor and correct their own data. Lumeria would
take a small commission, for which it would store and manage the data transactions,
as well as facilitate legal action when third parties violated consumers’ privacy.
Infomediaries have not emerged as a private service designed to protect consumers.
Unfortunately, instead, we have hundreds of what Nissenbaum terms “omnibus
information providers,” or more commonly in popular parlance, simply “data
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brokerages.” Affirming Hagel and Rayport’s description of consumers as a resource to
be mined, Nissenbaum sees the burgeoning array of data brokerages as “evidence of a
spiraling feedback loop: the availability of vast repositories of digitized records of
personal information spurs demand in all walks of life, demand spurs further supply,
and so on” (p. 49). Data brokerages provide their clients (typically advertisers, and/or
law enforcement agencies) personal, professional, and financial information,
aggregated from a wide range of sources, about millions of individuals. The Dataium
data brokerage, for example, can tie a consumer’s real life identity to his or her
browsing profile it builds from analyzing the links he or she clicks on. Applying
advanced analytics to that data, Dataium builds a user profile which it sells to
advertisers or vendors who gain additional knowledge, and thus leverage, over the
consumer in order to influence their behavior.
The Wall Street Journal surveyed the top 1000 most popular websites and found that
at least 75% used such tracking software. Among the largest data brokerages,
ChoicePoint is known to work closely with government agencies, frequently selling
consumer data to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Choicepoint’s security
record is not spotless, however. In 2006, the company reached a $15 million
settlement with the FTC after it was discovered that it mistakenly sold information to
a crime ring of identity thieves (Campanelli, 2006). The most important way that
data brokerages function (often entirely surreptitiously—you will likely not have
heard the name of most of the brokerages such as Axciom) is through embedding
cookies, small data files, on user computers. Retargeting, remarketing, or
remessaging, is an analytics service that uses the cookies they store on users’ machines
in the following way: Once a user visits a site with a retargeting “pixel,” a very small
bit of code which writes a browser cookie into one’s device upon simply visiting the
Web page. That cookie can be read by and thus provide information from, any
company or organization whose Web site a consumer visits which has contracted with
the same data brokerage (and thus whose retargeting pixel they have embedded in
their Web page, as well). The result is that a network of companies share visitor data
through the cookies that share your information when you visit a partnering site in
that network. Google uses their personalized retargeting pixel to drive their adwords
service for sites that participate in their Adsense brokerage. Microsoft performs
“remessaging” for sites that participate in the Microsoft Media Network.
Retargeting/remessaging is a powerful way for consumers to return their product to
visibility, then, even after you’ve navigated away from the original company or
organization’s Web page. Remarketing/remessaging has been traditionally difficult on
mobile devices which do not accept cookies. One company, Drawbridge, is
developing an solution which employs statistical analysis to map anonymous location
signals to various devices owned by the same user. By triangulating a user’s mobile
device identities based on location and usage patterns which correlates behavior across
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devices, the company purports to be able to identify unique individuals with a high
degree of precision and thus directly target that user with ads on their mobile devices.

As the information economy has matured, the next logical step toward being able to
market greater number of goods directly to individual consumers has been the move
by these telecommunications and other Web service providers to require their
customers to use or associate their real names in their Web surfing. The famous New
Yorker cartoon depicting a dog using the internet and smugly declaring to another dog
“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,” no longer rings true. Research by the
Wall Street Journal has shown that during the login process on 70 popular websites, at
least a quarter of the time information about the user was passed along to thirdparties (Valentino-Devries, 2010). Google and Facebook have both recently shifted,
requiring the association of users’ real names, ostensibly in the name of greater
convenience. It cannot be denied, however, this such a move also serves to cement
further the practice of the creation of consumer digital dossiers which can increase the
fidelity of the targeted marketing analytics engines.
4.4 Social Networking
Thus, while explicit acts of surveillance are troubling, the more insidious and
troubling challenge to traditional notions of privacy is present in the particular
formation of a culture of ambient findability pervading the social formation. A major
driver in shaping this cultural phenomenon, are the telecommunications service
providers—especially those centered around providing social networking services. In
fact, renewed interest in privacy may be due in part to the constant swirl of negative
publicity surrounding a continuing series of privacy violations to users of their
products and services. The two most important examples, here, are the Facebook and
Google corporations, in no small part because of the sheer scale of the societal way in
which they contribute to the transformation of the lived social reality of hundreds of
millions of people around the globe.
Since the launch of Facebook in 2004, the social networking site has become one of
the largest companies in the United States, estimated at $100 billion dollars. In under
a decade, the popular social networking website has garnered nearly three-quarters of
a billion users worldwide and continues to see steady, rapid growth during 2011, with
profits estimated at $4.2 billion, nearly double that of 2010 (“Facebook IPO”).
Google is likewise a story of rapid growth and financial success. The global
multinational has grown into a telecommunications leviathan, absorbing other smaller
tech companies and now encompassing nearly all digital communication services,
essentially reinventing advertising, email, television, radio.
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Both Facebook and Google have had major complaints by both Privacy Partisan and
watchdog organizations as well as governmental inquiries. Facebook’s history of
privacy violations is so egregious that it has come to define, for many, its very mission.
Facebook violations of user privacy were first uncovered in an expose by the Wall
Street Journal in 2010. At one point, all of the 10 most popular apps transmitted user
data to third parties without users’ awareness or permission (Steel & Fowler, 2010,
para. 6). In 2011, ten of the largest advocacy groups signed an open letter to
Facebook CEO Zuckerberg requesting radical changes in its opaque and unstable
privacy policy: The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Center
for Democracy and Technology, Center for
Digital Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumer Watchdog, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy Activism, Privacy Lives,
and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. In May of 2011, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center filed a complaint with the FTC against Facebook on grounds
that its privacy policies are both too opaque and protean for consumers. It has
violated German privacy laws by mining Facebook’s users’ contact lists to send
unsolicited emails inviting participation in Facebook to user’s contacts. After
purchasing the popular photo-sharing service Instagram in 2012, Facebook suddenly
changed the terms of service to allow the sale of users’ uploaded images to thirdparties; they were forced to reverse the policy when users complained.
Google, too, has had its share of privacy critiques. Google has violated the privacy
laws of several countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada,
Australia, Spain, South Korea, and Germany and is reportedly facing investigations in
more than 20 countries worldwide after the wifi-equipped cars it employs for its
Street View application inadvertently captured information from user’s unsecured
wireless networks (Halliday, 2011). Prompted by Google’s transformation of its email
into a more social networking application called Buzz in 2010. While Facebook’s
privacy violations reach three-quarters of a billion people globally, it remains confined
to a single application. As influential as Facebook is, Google’s power and influence is
rapidly and easily outstripped it. Google’s privacy violations dwarf Facebook’s because
it reaches into and across a potentially much broader media spectrum. Like Facebook,
it has had its share of privacy snafus—none of which have gone unnoticed in the
media and popular press. The Former CEO of Google Eric Schmidt is infamous for
his cavalier and vaguely threatening pronouncements on Google’s plans for
eliminating not only an irrelevant notion of privacy, but of consumer choice. “[O]ne
idea is that more and more searches are done on your behalf without you needing to
type. I actually think most people don’t want Google to answer their questions. They
want Google to tell them what they should be doing next ” (Jenkins, Jr., 2010, para.
10). Hearkening back to 1984, Schmidt’s suggestion chillingly echoes one of “the two
great problems which the [Ingsoc] Party is concerned to solve…how to discover
against his will, what another human being is thinking” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 159).
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4.5 The Californian Ideology
“It is difficult to overlook,” remarks Elliott Sperber in his article “The California
Ideology Becomes Hegemonic,” “that …[the] oligarchs of the Tech Industry begin to
exert more control over national policy” (2013, p. 3). This is precisely what my
research demonstrates in this chapter. In their now famous 1995 polemic “The
Californian Ideology,” Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron critique the rise of what
they see as a “global orthodoxy” that mixes cybernetics, free market economics, and
counter-culture libertarianism empowered to obviate alternative futures which do not
match its libertarian bent. The Californian ideologues argue for a “’Jeffersonian
democracy’ in cyberspace,” which they draw under the sign and the aegis of the “hitech free market” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 2). Juxtaposed against this claim,
the explanation by Google founder Larry Page of Google’s project to digitize the
entire world’s books seems telling: “Do you really want the whole world not to have
access to human knowledge as contained in books? You’ve just got to think about that
from a societal point of view.”4 The Californian ideology “reflects the disciplines of
market economics and the freedoms of hippie artisanship. This bizarre hybrid is only
made possible through a nearly universal belief in technological
determinism…[through which] the new information technologies would realize their
ideals” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, pp. 2-3). Influenced by the New Right, they
argue, the New Left embraced a new form of liberalism—an economic liberalism
which elevates the “liberty of individuals within the marketplace,” (Barbrook &
Cameron, 1996, p. 3) in which “each member of the ‘virtual class’ is promised the
opportunity to become a successful hi-tech entrepreneur” (Barbrook & Cameron,
1996, p. 4). The Californian ideologues reject big government, and foreground the
power of markets, as the only possible means to assure the “full flowering of
individual liberty within the electronic circuits of Jeffersonian cyberspace”—a liberty
available only to the “resourceful entrepeneurs who are the only people cool and
courageous enough to take risks” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 4). Written wellbefore the rise of Facebook and Google, “The Californian Ideology” provides a
faithful picture of the ideology behind the emergence of ambient findability. “In
many cyberpunk novels and films,” they write, “this asocial libertarianism is expressed
by the central character of the lone individual fighting for survival within a virtual
world of information” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 5). The hero of the narratives
embraced by those who embody and enact the Californian ideology through their
technocultural designs, thus appears analogous to the heroic character I describe in
the second chapter. This narrative thus underwrites the radical changes to privacy
The eventual digitization of all the world’s books is a project Google is known to
have begun without consulting a single publisher or other relevant authority on
copyright or intellectual property.
4
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going on around us by valorizing individual and heroic responses over responses based
on an understanding of agency as a process of rearticulation of a variety of economic,
cultural, political, and technological forces and phenomena. The cultural hegemony
of an emerging impulse to openness, connectivity, mobility, and transparency (for
consumers rather than state and commercial actors) articulates to the state’s larger
project of political hegemony, for many reasons, but certainly among them the
Snowden revelations as well as the continuing disaffection with the privacy violations
of the telecommunications and social networking providers, that hegemony is now in
crisis.

Chapter 5. Rearticulating the Namespace
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5.1 Hegemonic Crisis
Americans entering the second decade of the new millennium have come to live in a
nascent surveillance society. The conjuncture I term the namespace is constituted in
and through ideological and material forces in the form of discourses, economies, laws
and policies, technical architectures, codes and protocols, and cultural practices that
articulate to form a surveillance regime constituted in and through the articulation of
ideologies of total information awareness and ambient findability. According to FrauMeigs (2010), our “cyberist moment” represents a continuing historical shift toward
invasive new forms of social control as we shift from an identity politics favoring
acceptance and diversity in the 1980s, to a morality politics of control and regulation
in the 1990s, to our present politics of security in the new millennium, during which
we witness a regime of unprecedented surveillance coterminous with radical advances
in computer technology and associated cultural and economic practices (p. 81).
In the new security state, particularly powerful public (government) and private
(commercial) forces align under the sign of a new transparency, openness, and social
connectivity which promises to engender new possibilities for personal and
professional growth, economic prosperity, more democratic political participation,
and national security. These same forces articulate in ways that enable new forms of
privacy and other civil rights violations. The articulation of powerful state and
commercial actors forms a dominant political bloc for which a major point of
articulation has become a shared desire to reframe strong privacy protections as a
quaint or irrelevant value—even one that impedes progress. A Diminution of privacy
thus serves particular commercial actors by bolstering their ability to obtain and sell
individual’s personal data in what has become a multi-billion dollar information
economy which has allowed many service providers to successfully monetize Web
commerce. State actors subject this data to complex analytics for discerning and
predicting patterns that might expose possible anti-state activity.
The articulation of this political bloc represented a powerful moment of temporary
hegemony after the terrorist attacks of 9-11. However, hegemony is always a
temporary settlement of the forces involved in ideological struggle. The namespace
conjuncture is constituted in and by several lines of force that challenge the hegemony
of the state-commercial bloc. According to Gramsci, when contradictions accumulate
across a conjuncture, the dominant typicaly bloc experiences a crisis of hegemony,
which represents a moment when the dominant bloc, has failed to successfully enact
its political program/agenda or been forced to move along the gamut from consent to
coercion (Hall et al., 1979). In moments of hegemonic crisis, no longer are the
mechanisms that guarantee assent obscured and/or naturalized; rather, they are
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spotlighted by an accumulation of contradictions that foreground the process of
ideological struggle. At the height of the hegemonic crisis, the state “exhibits more
plainly than it does in its routine manifestations what it is and what it must do to
provide the ‘cement’ which holds a ruptured social formation together” (Hall et al.,
1979, p. 217). The contradictions at work in the namespace include but are not
limited to: the U.S. and global economic crises, spurred in part by the failure of major
U.S. banks; the expense and toll in human lives of several (arguably failed) U.S.
military campaigns; the revelations that the U.S. disregarded its own constitution and
other international agreements in both imprisoning and torturing citizens without
due process, and spying en masse on its own citizens; and the realization that
commercial telecommunications service providers have directly or indirectly, through
agreement and compulsion, supported the de facto creation of a global
telecommunications surveillance regime.
This latter feature of the namespace represents one particularly strong and selfevident contradiction, which can be seen in the way state actors have tended in past
decades to simply bypass or challenge (both legally and illegally) restrictions and
prohibitions on particularly intrusive forms of surveillance—i.e., essentially annexing
the commercial telecommunications industry as a wing of its security apparatus. The
articulation of these contradictions belie the boon of the new security and
convenience provided by dataveillance and has spurred the subaltern fraction to an
acute if nascent political consciousness of the problematic of privacy. Certainly in the
popular and academic media, the prominence of these contradictions has encouraged
more critics to recognize the politics of the namespace as the relation of powerful
interests both in the public and private sector. “Were Big Brother to come back in the
21st century, he would return as a public-private partnership,” notes one Guardian
reporter (Ash, 2013, para. 1). These media are increasingly beginning to recognize
and foreground the binary of security/privacy in which privacy represents the
subordinated value. A July, 2013 poll by ABC News and The Washington Post indicates
that by a margin of 57%-39%, the public sees it more important to violate individual
privacy than to protect it, in order to protect against the threat of terrorism. While
still a significant majority, what is important to note is the degree to which that
margin has been rapidly narrowing. The number of people who question government
privacy invasion in the name of security is 10% points higher than in previous
ABC/Post polls of 2003 and 2006. While 42% of those polled say the NSA
surveillance is increasing security, 47% do not see it as contributing to Americans’
security, with 5% seeing it as contributing negatively (Cohen & Balz, 2013). Because
the hegemony of the dominant bloc relies on the consent of the subordinated bloc,
and that consent seems to be significantly diminishing, the moment is thus ripe to
contribute to the counter-hegemonic struggle to rearticulate the namespace in ways
that strengthen privacy and other civil rights, to explore the alternatives to an
information economy in which consumers are commoditized and mined for their

	
  

personal information, and to resist those calls for a state organized around a
surveillance-driven security politics.
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As an example of the dynamic and contingent nature of struggle that characterizes the
uneasy settlement of political hegemony, and of the political opportunity available to
the subordinated bloc in the process of re-articulation, I point to the contemporary
example of the changing American Republican party. This example speaks to the
possibility for political change in noting how the dominant bloc, in winning the
consent of the subordinate bloc, must agree to certain concessions. The granting of
such concessions is never simply nominal, notes Jones (2006), and always produces
the possibility of instability and change within the dominant bloc itself. During the
last two election cycles, the Republican Party has sought to attain a more expansive
hegemony by articulating to itself a demographic of conservative, white, middle class,
often evangelical Christian voters. During the 2004 election, the party actively
continued to draw upon the conservative religious element it had come to understand
and characterize as its base. This strategy, over two election cycles, from 2000-2008,
represented more than simple capitulation, since to articulate a subordinate group to
itself and thus win its consent, the dominant bloc must “thoroughly recreate itself,”
writes Jones: “A truly hegemonic group or class really must make large parts of its
subalterns’ worldview its own” (2006, p. 46). After articulating to elements of this
conservative demographic, the Republican party thus found itself to some degree
mediated by a populist political wing which described itself as the Tea Party. The Tea
Party was able to successfully claim a large number of seats in the House of
Representative. And, in fact, counted with their supporters, the Tea Party can be seen
to represent a significant force in the Republican party. Through hegemonic struggle
the Tea Party has worked to rearticulate the Republican party itself. As Williamson et
al. note, this poses a problem for Republican moderates, in that Tea Party republicans
have pushed the party so far to the right ideologically that non-Tea Party Republicans
are now seen as closer to Democrats than to their Tea Party compatriots (Williamson,
Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). This example demonstrates the possibilities for political
agency inherent in the hegemonic process, for although a bloc must struggle to
carefully maintain its hegemony, that process has the capacity to transform the
dominant bloc itself.
With regard to privacy, this presents a hope for directly engaging with the dominance
of the dominant state-commercial bloc in the namespace. Privacy partisans must be
able to leverage the intensity of the privacy crisis toward substantial political change,
to harness the collective outrage expressed at the self-evident contradictions between
what the U.S. proclaims as its economic, political and technological ideals and those
it enacts. Such work begins through recognizing the dominant bloc’s tenuous hold on
the position of moral and intellectual leadership, discovering those points of
articulation vulnerable to rearticulation, and working to shift those connections,
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linkages, and alliances to a more positive and just effect. In this way, privacy partisans
may open the dominant bloc to making concessions, and perhaps, like the Republican
party, to significant rearticulation. Shane Harris (2010) suggests that, as we are
significantly distanced from the events of 9-11, the type of security crisis which
promotes jingoist nationalism and helps cement political hegemonies, now is the time
to press for political change:
I think that now in the relative calm before another attack is the time
to start asking these hard questions about how we strike this
balance…If there is another attack on the United States on the order
of 9-11, this question about balancing security and liberty will become
strictly academic. The government will come down decisively on the
side of security because that’s what it knows how to do. It will collect
[private information] on a scale we’ve never seen. It will be clumsy. It
will be driven by urgency and by fear. And then you will see, I believe,
many of the infringements on individual liberty that many of us have
only worried about to this point.
Below, I explore some of the ways that those interested in defending and
strengthening privacy rights can begin to engage with privacy in the namespace,
which I’ve only begun to map in this dissertation. I examine individual praxis—
immediate action average citizen-consumers (those with no special training in the
issues of privacy) might take in their own lives, through engaging directly with
technical practices. I then move to the ways in which these same individuals might
engage in collective praxis—working at a more conjunctural level in concerted
political and economic ways. Finally, I suggest ways in which the contributions of
academics and other professionals might develop an expert praxis, rearticulating the
namespace conjuncture through education.
5.2 Individual Praxis
It does not necessitate adopting the myth of the solitary, rugged, everyman versus the
monolithic social structure, which I describe in chapter two, to recognize that
individuals can and should engage with the privacy crisis at the level of their everyday
lives. One way to work individually for privacy, is to begin to educate oneself about
privacy issues, being careful to contextualize the seductive but overly reductive
narratives I describe therein. Books by what Hall et al. (1979) term primary definers
are valuable, of course, in coming to understand the perspective of the dominant bloc.
Like Google Chairman Eric Schmidt’s book, which I describe in the second chapter,
the work of privacy apologist Jeff Jarvis in What Would Google Do?: Reverse-
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Engineering the Fastest Growing Company in the History of the World (2009) and Public
Parts: How Sharing in the Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (2011) is
instructive at least in the drawing the extreme boundary of resistance to stronger
privacy rights. Juxtaposed together, each represents a clear example of the Californian
ideology I describe in the previous chapter—an ideology easily challenged when we
think with articulation. In this same vein, the dramatic irony in dystopic action films
such as The Conversation (1974) and Enemy of the State (1998) may play a hortative
role, warning us of the dangers of a transformed and diminished privacy right and
calling us to action. However, intellectually we must recognize the influence of
market, industry and other forces which work to simplify the narratives of popular
media (and particularly action films). In the news media, reductive narratives can be
recognized as those accounts which rely on trite metaphors and simplistic models of
social control, which portray agency as the property of individual actors rather than
the complex interplay between technological, cultural, political and economic forces,
practices and ideologies. Reductive accounts are frequently instructive in single
dimensions, sometimes providing important facts, but must be balanced against
counterclaims, and ideally, juxtaposed against accounts that recognize the complex
interplay of forces in any social determination. Narratives that moves us away from
thinking with articulation, toward an heroic narrative of individual agency—one lone
hero against a technological juggernaut—we must be careful to acknowledge the
rhetorical pathos of these social science fictions and problematize them.
1

Kevin Roose (2013) details some of them in his New York Magazine article “The
Surveillance-Free Day,” in which he attempts to live surveillance-free for 24 hours
while still engaging in the activities common to the urban dweller, such as shopping
online, sending e-mail and tweeting, using his mobile phone, and taking public
transportation. The sizable list of preparations required to obscure his digital
footprint included hobbling wi-fi and transmission capability for most of his digital
devices and turning off completely those digital devices which could not be stopped
from transmitting data. To ensure his privacy while staying digitally connected, he
downloaded an application called Wickr to encrypt and auto-erase texts and photos
posted to the Web. He enrolled in a Web service called “HideMyAss,” which
provides a private Virtual Private Network (VPN) to obscure his browsing history and
other network activity. Unable to use a credit card, which are legally tracked by
corporations and the government, he used the anonymous digital currency Bitcoin.
For encrypted email, he signed up for a free Hushmail account, and for Web surfing
he opted to download Tor, a browser which encrypts its Web searches. Finally, and
most absurdly, to combat surveillance by the network of CCTVs which pepper the
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  Jarvis’ title, in which the term “Google” is substituted for “Jesus,” is apt—as his work
generally demonstrates, he understands Google and its work as nothing short of
messianic.	
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urban landscape, he constructed and wore a battery-powered baseball hat with
infrared light bulbs meant to obscure his face from those cameras using infrared
lenses. Of course individuals need not go to such lengths to ensure they have more
privacy when using the myriad information and communication technologies in their
lives. Educating oneself about the types and extent of the data being sent by the
technologies you use, is a strong first step. It is also important for individuals to be
aware of what options they may control in disabling or opting out of the intrusive
tracking from government and telecommunications providers, and to investigate the
protective privacy policies and settings on all major Web sites, apps, and services they
use.
While no doubt a fascinating experiment, it is important to recognize the limited
application of an approach like this. Working as an isolated individual who must
construct his own anti-surveillance technology is impractical for all but a handful of
the techno-savvy. His essay thus fails to contribute useful thinking about the
possibilities of rearticulating the namespace itself, about how our vast technocultural
assemblage might be otherwise. Roose does recognize the articulation of state and
corporate interests and his own willing participation in the diminution of privacy:
“Most of the surveillance I’ve encountered today isn’t part of a vast conspiracy. In fact,
a lot of it has been explicitly authorized by law, and by decisions I’ve made
consciously. I’ve known for years that Google’s algorithms scan my Gmail in-box in
order to show me more targeted ads, and I’ve been aware for weeks that Facebook has
cooperated with the NSA. And yet, even after learning about PRISM, I kept logging
on, because I like having free, useful web services” (2013, para. 7). Ultimately,
however, his article exemplifies the media’s tendency to understand the privacy crisis
through the lens of a panoptic model of surveillance, narrating for us his urban
odyssey as the story of one man’s struggle against monolithic surveillance forces,
rather than a techno-cultural assemblage that we might politically engage with.
Informed by more nuanced accounts, individuals will be better prepared to engage
directly with the information and communication technologies and practices in their
own lives while contextualizing the degree to which individual action can be
politically effective. For example, most individuals are too connected to their banks,
telephones, computers and other networked electronic devices and services to move to
a remote wilderness, eschewing all modern convenience for the sake of privacy. Such
measures are both unattractive and simply impractical for the broad public whose
social lives are constituted by an interconnectivity which is deeply mediated by ICTs.
However, for those who wish to remain digitally interconnected while protecting
their privacy, there are solutions. Under the current articulation of the namespace,
individual praxis (of a more pragmatic and non-heroic nature), remains necessary to
safeguard those privacy violations that are an immediate and preventable result of
users’ failure to learn to change the settings and defaults of technological switches,
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settings, and practices established by the commercial actors who see consumers as
resources to be mined.
5.3 Collective Praxis
However, as the recent revelations of the state’s willingness to simply ignore legal and
technological safeguards in their promotion of the security state, and thinking with
articulation, we should recognize the need for a strong collective praxis, as well. We
move beyond the everyday concerns of the individual into a broader political and
economic action by engaging with larger social and political collectives. Because the
state is not a monolithic material ideological structure, government actors can be seen
and encouraged to support privacy reforms and resist government overreach—and
this form of interaction remains a useful for of individual political praxis. For
example, Senator Russ Feingold, chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on
civil rights, has spoken out against government overreach in this area: “‘Trust us’
doesn’t cut it when it comes to the government’s power to obtain Americans’ sensitive
business records without a court order and without any suspicion that they are tied to
terrorism or espionage” (Miga, 2007, para. 6). Senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, and
25 other senators have collectively plied the Obama administration to declassify and
release information on the extent of the NSA surveillance. In September, 2013
senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, Richard Blumenthal, and Rand Paul crafted the
Intelligence Overview and Surveillance Reform Act to end the warrantless dragnet
collection of phone records of U.S. citizens. This bill would amend FISA Titles IV
and V to prohibit the bulk collection of email and telephone records of U.S. citizens,
respectively. It would amend a number of National Security Letter statutes to both
prohibit the bulk application of National Security Letters, and to ensure greater
transparency from the government in its use of National Security Letters. It would
also reform Section 702 of the USA PATRIOT Act by eliminating the “back door
searches” loophole (thus requiring the government to obtain warrants); prohibit the
collection of ancillary information not specifically the communications of the
investigation’s target; specifically address and outlaw the practice of targeting the
communication of foreign individuals in order to surveil a U.S. citizen(s) known to be
in communication with that individual; place stronger limits on information collected
unlawfully by the government; create an independent Constitutional Advocate who
can balance the court through the imposition of an adversarial role; require the U.S.
Attorney General to declassify those FISC rulings which represent significant
interpretations of the law or the U.S. constitution; permit Constitutional challenges;
permit citizens impacted by surveillance to petition the court for redress; permit
private companies to reveal information about their disclosure of customer records
and increase government reporting; authorize the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) to subpoena and compel the testimony of government
officials (“Domestic Surveillance Reform,” 2013). By focusing on those elected
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officials assigned to select committees which deal with privacy concerns, and those
officials who have shown publicly they support privacy and mean to resist the
emergence of the surveillance state, citizen-consumers may engage politically.
For individuals less familiar with the maze-like hierarchy of government influence,
the assistance of privacy partisan groups is an effective way to navigate the maze of
political activism. The privacy crisis has spurred the growth of the number of
organizations that pursue policies of transparency and equity with regard to
government and corporate actors, document and fight privacy violation, and attempt
to theorize an emerging surveillance society, both in the U.S. and abroad. These
organizations include: The American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy
and Technology, Center for Digital Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumer
Watchdog, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Privacy Activism, Privacy Lives, Big Brother Watch, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
Global Information Liberty Campaign, and perhaps the largest organization, Privacy
International, which emerged in 1990 as an umbrella organization of over 100
individuals and organizations from several countries, including Austria, Bulgaria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Switzerland. These organizations, most of which are non-profit, non-government
organizations, marshal personnel and resources to lobby Washington, write amicus
briefs, and sue for greater privacy protections. Citizen-consumers can contribute to
any group that encourages responsible uses of information technology, particularly
those which foreground the importance of privacy and other civil liberties, through
membership, which often provides an educative benefit, through financial donation,
and/or through contributing their own expertise. By expertise, let me make clear I am
not invoking the technical super-hacker who works surreptitiously within the system
both to subvert code, and to reify the system itself. This was the dream of the
cyberpunk ideology, which, as I note in my fourth chapter, underwrites the
Californian Ideology’s determinist understanding of the relation of technology to
culture. The expert praxis I envision must represent an embrace of transparency, must
abandon assumptions about technology and culture with regard to determination.
Experts must leveraging knowledge, skills, and ethics before and during the creation
of code, machine, and practice.
5.4 Expert Praxis
Expertise is one of the most powerful elements of political praxis. Gramsci recognized
that hegemony is derived in part through the media’s resourcing of members of the
dominant bloc to stand as experts. The Web has opened out traditional circuits of
discursive power to experts (and amateurs alike) who may now construct blogs and
other analogs of traditional media. The Web has enabled greater sharing of expertise,
even among those with fewer financial resources and access to media outlets, allowing
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individuals to organize by leveraging the collective intelligence of entire communities.
Contributing expertise in an open forum is one vital way to get involved politically. In
order to engage with the experts of the dominant bloc—those who are first in setting
the terms of the debate around privacy—the subordinate social fraction must
encourage its own intellectuals to articulate to the namespace, as it is currently
articulated, their own ideologies.
One example of such a forum is Groklaw.net, an award-winning blog which provided
a space to join experts (and other interested and knowledgeable parties) in law to
those in technological fields in discussion on subjects which benefitted from the open
discourse between specialists in these two fields, engendering debates over free and
open source software (FOSS), patents, and intellectual property, among others.
Groklaw ran from 2003 to 2013, when it closed citing the revelation of the
government’s ability to monitor private emails with relative impunity. Such
government powers, argued founder Pamela Jones, prohibited sensitive work that
required confidentiality, abolished the basic human right to live free from constant
surveillance, and represented de facto proof that the surveillance state was a fait
acompli: “There is now no shield from forced exposure” (Jones, 2013, para. 29).
Several other privacy-centric sites have recently closed, citing the same reason. In a
message that supplanted the company’s homepage, encrypted email provider Lavabit
(in the news recently as Edward Snowden’s email provider) explained their reason for
closing after ten years: “I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become
complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years
of hard work by shutting down Lavabit…	
  I wish that I could legally share with you
the events that led to my decision…the first amendment is supposed to guarantee me
the freedom to speak out in situations like this. Unfortunately, Congress has passed
laws that say otherwise” (Estes, 2013). Implied in this open letter is that Lavabit’s
owners have been legally bound under provisions in the PATRIOT Act from
disclosing their receipt of a National Security Letter. While the decision of these sites
to discontinue service was understandable, it only strengthens the hegemonic bloc by
lessening the counter-hegemonic discourses and services available. The increase of
counter-hegemonic discourses is more important than ever, under a burgeoning
security state.
On the other hand, the destruction of company-held data before the state can claim it
should not be seen as an act of cowardice, but an act of moral conscience. The closure
of Lavabit was immediately succeeded by the stunning elimination of a major product
line by company Silent Circle, a company which until recently offered a secure email
service. After the Snowden revelations, and inspired by his courage, the company
took a moral stand and eliminated its database of user information in the interest of
privacy. CEO Michael Janke explains their rationale: “We knew that metadata was
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just as dangerous as email content regardless of if the contents of an email are
encrypted…We were literally sitting on a treasure trove of data that was highly
valuable to many, many nations and intelligence agencies of the world. We made the
pre-emptive decision to just scorched-earth it” (Gewirtz, 2013, para. 7).
Silent Circle’s actions raise the question of civil disobedience. While it is often more
than simply inconvenient for those Davids who take the brunt of retaliation by public
and private Goliaths—Lavabit and Silent Circle abandoned entire revenue streams—
this type of civil disobedience represents a relatively powerful form of political praxis.
In the case of George Christian, executive director of a 27-member Connecticut
library consortium, it was successful counter-hegemonic ideological struggle, when
Christian, and other unnamed librarians, refused to comply with a national security
letter to obtain patrons’ computer records. Christian et al. were successfully defended
by the ACLU, and ultimately were never required to turn over patrons’ records, nor
were they penalized by the government for their non-compliance. This points to the
possibility of political resistance by collectives of expert individuals willing to fight
together for privacy rights against unconstitutional government practice (Cowan,
2006).
5.5 War of Position
In Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don’t (1996), George Lakoff
has argued for understanding the importance of the ideological dimension in political
struggle. Lakoff suggests that after Goldwater’s defeat in the 1964 U.S. presidential
election—a solid blow to the social popularity of conservative ideology—conservatives
embraced a new strategy for encouraging and strengthening a new generation of
conservatives through rearticulating the educational and media landscape in their own
interests. This strategy was built upon tapping wealthy conservative donors to endow
academic chairs, institutes, and organizations for teaching conservative business
practices. Independent conservative think tanks with total autonomy would also need
to be created outside of academia, they realized. To develop rigor and respectability
for their ideological program, conservatives would need to create publications,
journals, magazines, and to purchase media outlets outright to help disseminate a
conservative ideology directly. The limited hegemony of the conservatives is a direct
effect of a concerted effort over nearly half a century—a forty-year “war of position”
as Gramsci would describe it—in which conservatives have successfully re-articulated
the political landscape through a process both infrastructural and ideological, both
material and discursive. Among these various conservative factions (e.g.,
fundamentalist Christians, libertarians, fiscal conservatives, social conservatives, neoconservatives, etc.) some are more powerful than others, but all are articulated
together, Lakoff argues, under a single point of articulation: an ideological vision of
the Christian God as a strict father-figure, and a clear understanding of just what that
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ideology means and how it translates to political life. The problem for liberal
progressives who want to resist this model, he suggests, is that, unlike the
conservatives, they are not well-organized and cannot clearly elucidate and articulate
just what their own ideology is and how it translates to political life.
The long-term ideological struggle Lakoff describes between conservatives and
progressives, is—or should be—analogous to the ideological struggle between the
dominant bloc, and subordinate social fraction which it seeks to articulate to itself,
over privacy, civil rights, security, and surveillance in the contemporary namespace. In
order to fundamentally rearticulate the namespace, I argue, involves finding and
deploying means for dis-articulating and re-articulating the forces that empower the
hegemonic bloc. Thinking with articulation helps us to recognize that the successful
approach by the conservative bloc (i.e., rearticulating the political landscape through
the educative function) might similarly succeed for privacy partisans through the
creation of a bloc constituted in and by counter-hegemonic discourses, institutions,
alliances, etc. This bloc should be made up of both academics and those from private
industry.
The need for diverse expertise is clear, particularly at the juridico-political level
wherein law and policy are enacted and enforced. As I argue in the third chapter, the
repeal of the PATRIOT Act is a necessary first step to restoring the protections
which it renders inert. That single step, however, must exemplify a larger concerted
effort to unify an active political bloc to support the restoration of privacy and other
civil rights. For example, the putative problem of the preponderance of insular,
corporate-funded lobbyists must be adressed if counter-hegemonic struggle is to have
an effect. Corporations frequently allocate staff resources to write amicus briefs and
other educative materials for congressional and other policy bodies. Like the
conservatives, progressives and privacy partisans must find ways to ensure their
expertise and orientations inform the policies being engendered which serve the
dominant politics. Policy decisions which are based on the intersection of technology
and culture, for example, require a nuanced understanding of the interrelation of
each. Steeves (2008), for example, found that the Canadian Supreme Court’s failure
to understand the complexity of privacy in online spaces may have “limit[ed] the
court’s ability to protect us from surveillance technologies that negatively affect our
dignity, autonomy, and social freedom” (p. 334). Informed by a technological
determinism which elevates technology as the central actor, and failing to consider
the shifting social habits of a changing technocultural landscape, the court, she
argues, failed to protect the privacy rights of Canadian citizens. The application of
particular theories and methods of social science, agues Steeves, would allow courts to
make more just decisions, informed by the strong analysis of complex social-technical
systems and human behavior.
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The same educative expertise must be leveraged to inform our own legal system. For
example, speaking at the 2011 Fourth Circuit Judicial conference, Chief Justice John
Roberts was asked about familiarity with, and any specific court policies on, social
media and other Web technologies. Roberts replied:
I don’t think any of [the justices] have a Facebook page or “tweet,”
whatever that is [emphasis added]…The impact of the new technology
on substantive law is really quite significant…But that too is nothing
new. I mean you think of the Supreme Court’s dealing with the wire
tapping cases when wire taps were the new thing. The first decision
says ‘Well, of course that’s not covered by the Fourth
Amendment…then the court came to have some experience with it
and reversed itself…It’s one of the great things, again, with the law
clerks. They come in and they know how all this stuff works and what it
means and they’re a nice resource for kind of educating those of us who are a
little behind the curve [emphasis added].
Roberts’ answer is troublesome in several respects. It seems to indicate he is both
unfamiliar with and dismissive of the cultural, economic, and certainly political
import of social networking. While it is true that rulings shift based on changing
social, cultural, political and technological changes, and that the justices of the high
court cannot be expected to be expert in subjects beyond the law, Roberts’ response
indicates that the court receives its understanding of the workings and significance of
modern information and communication technologies serendipitously, from incoming
law clerks, who are themselves no more likely to be critically prepared in this area.
And in Roberts’ case, such knowledge must be nugatory, since he disclaims any
knowledge of Twitter, one of the world’s largest social networking platforms—a
platform involved for example, in the social transformations represented by the Arab
Spring. Especially in light of the revelations of government surveillance of
commercial communications providers I discuss in chapter three, it is difficult to
imagine that Roberts has not been briefed about the significance of social networking
to the U.S. government, and to the U.S. economy. Roberts’ response thus points to a
particular rhetorical exigency that might be addressed by the bloc of interdisciplinary
experts I suggest above who are able to work with those in commercial and state
sectors to inform those making U.S. policy and law.
One of the important ways in which we might build this expertise is by providing an
inter- or cross-disciplinary education which can help students successfully negotiate
the complexity of the contemporary namespace. While many young people often
already have a relatively strong literacy in the practices of consumption and
production of digital forms of culture, they may not have naturally internalized a
critical approach to the complex literacies of the multiple ICTs which pervade their
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daily lives, nor intuitively recognize the ways in which mainstream media producers
serve the powerful interests of economic and political actors. Even for those who do,
it’s important to recognize, as I point out in chapter two, the ideological power of the
technical and cultural architectures, protocols, and codes through which political
reality is mediated and constructed for them. It is thus important to rethink
traditional disciplinary curricula through the lens of articulation, in ways that might
better demonstrate for students the importance, for example, of thinking culture,
technology, law, politics, and ethics together, as deeply imbricated, deeply articulated.
While I agree with Luke (2002) that “the challenge for new media pedagogy is to
connect students’ everyday interactions and experiences with media technologies, to
classic questions of equity, privacy, fairness, openness, access, power, and so on—to
give the students the critical vocabulary and tools to think with and to encourage
them toward more active and principled media use and participation,” to do this
means engaging students at the point of mythologizing which typically accompanies
any discussion of technoculture by “sustain[ing] the constructive affirmative energy of
the myths, while pointing the way beyond simplistic hype,” or what we might
describe as engaging directly with the dominant codes on offer (p. 561). I provide an
example of this type of work in my second chapter.
In order to truly engage with the discursive myths and social science fictions
mediating our relation to new media, we must understand the role played by
particular digital codes and the logical and material architectures and technologies
which accompany them. To understand the meaning of the rise of networked
computing, and associated socio-cultural phenomena such as social networking,
involves understanding the Web as an articulation across the social formation, notes
Langlois (2005), as “socially shaped and culturally distinct through a renewed focus
on its technological characteristics” (p. 579). We do this by understanding it, she
argues, as a conjuncture—an “assemblage of technocultural layers,” both those which
culturally contextualize and shape it, and the technical architectures which structure
it.
A starting point for examining the layers that constitute the Web is
the analysis of the different cultural values that are encoded within the
technical objects and processes that form the Web….[T]he protocols
that make the Internet an open network are also the ones which allow
for something like surveillance to exist. Furthermore, the actors in
charge of defining the protocols and rules of the Internet
communication can also be criticized for representing specific interests.
(2005, pp. 575-576)
Frameworks such as articulation theory, actor-network theory, and others that
approach the socio-political as conjuncturally determined provide a rich means of
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understanding the way in which social and technical architectures, codes, and
protocols structure and are structured by the emergence of networked digital
computing, and are complicit in strengthening or weakening particular cultural and
social values as well.

Cory Doctorow points to the way in which privacy articulates technology advances in
networked computing to political and corporate interests of power in his 2008 speech
to the American Library Association conference, entitled “Privacy: Is it time for a
Revolution?”
One of the kinds of laws we write is code—software code—when we
build networked societies and systems, we end up evolving the political
systems that will come out of them; they’re interrelated and one grows
out of the other naturally…So really when we start talking about a
society in which people no longer get to choose the circumstances
under which we disclose our information, we’re talking about a society
in which we all end up living under the thumb of a politburo, whether
or not that’s a politburo that’s embodied by faceless bureaucrats or
simply as the outgrowth of our technology, it’s not a society that I
think we should want to live in.
Technical systems which fail to acknowledge the importance of individual privacy, he
concludes, cannot fail to produce political systems in which privacy is simply obviated
as well. In the same vein, Bruce Schneier (2013), security expert and fellow at
Harvard’s Berkman Center for Society and the Internet has called publicly for the
political intervention of expert praxis by engineers whom he urges to engage
politically with the digital architecture by both monitoring and disclosing when they
are called to act unethically by corporations or governments. “If you work with
classified data and are truly brave, expose what you know. We need
whistleblowers…There’s safety in numbers, and this form of civil disobedience is the
moral thing to do.” He also exhorts engineers to promote open source designs which
are less likely to be surreptitiously hacked by the government. “We need to demand
that real technologists be involved in any key government decision making on these
issues. We've had enough of lawyers and politicians not fully understanding
technology; we need technologists at the table when we build tech policy.” Of course
the slight but necessary modulation of Schneier’s important observation here is that
technologists must enter into dialogue with those who make policy and law in a spirit
of negotiation. Each perspective must inform the other. Both engineers and
politicians must come to understand the ethical, moral, social, political, and cultural
dimensions that in our contemporary moment have contributed to the emergence of
the namespace.
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Suggesting the articulation of a politically-active subordinate bloc constituted in and
by experts who would leverage the diverse disciplinary knowledges, theoretical and
methodological frameworks of the complementary fields of its members is nothing
revolutionary. In fact it represents the historical impetus and the continuing promise
of the field of cultural studies. Cultural studies has, since it’s inception, been a critical
project, navigating between the academy and society at large. Cultural studies is
defined by its ethical commitment to make social and political change. It recognizes
the opportunity to resource its work from within the ‘elite’ academy. However,
because cultural processes do not map easily or perfectly onto methods of academic
inquiry, for cultural studies theorists any critical project “has to be out, and away and
into more dangerous places!” (Johnson, 1986, p. 43). Cultural studies negotiates these
two demands through the productive tension between the interdisciplinary and
counter-disciplinary impulses which define it. Cultural studies understands the
conjuncture as the level at which the production of concrete knowledge is best
employed for political struggle and change (Grossberg, 2010). This necessitates an
interdisciplinary approach in the continual questioning of which objects are most
relevant to study and which tools most effective for studying them. The theory of
articulation is used to make that critical selection from an impossibly large and
complex socio-historical context. No single discipline can profess the adequate tools
and scope to map the diverse and heterogeneous elements that articulate to form a
complex conjuncture such as the namespace. Cultural studies’ methodological toolkit
must be inter-disciplinary enough to borrow, responsibly and with due respect to
carefully policed institutional and disciplinary boundaries, those theories, methods,
and practices with which it can best make a study of particular phenomena in their
relevant contexts.
Cultural studies must also be counter-disciplinary if it hopes to resist the canonical
and curricular reification that accompanies institutionalization, allowing itself to
remain flexible and viable as a practice by articulating to institutions and
organizations outside the traditional structure of academia. In this way it hopes to
remain “critical” and deeply committed to an examination of political, economic,
social, and cultural flows of power articulated to any social or institutional structure,
text, event, or cultural phenomenon it chooses to study. Lawrence Lessig’s widely
cited Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace 2.0 (Lessig, 2006) represents a strong
example of conjuncturally-oriented, interdisciplinary work that understands the
deeply imbricated nature of culture, technology, law, and politics. In Code, Lessig
describes the way in which cybernetic architectures and protocols (metonymically,
“code”) are bound to the architecture of social design. Codes and protocols may be
designed in ways that empower users by, for example, protecting informational and
decisional privacy; they may also be designed, he warns, in ways that promote regimes
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of surveillance and control by, for example, enforcing regimes of strict identification
and a security culture of authorization. The latter road leads toward the namespace.
Contemporary legal scholar Julie Cohen, whose interdisciplinary work on privacy
draws from several fields (among them cultural studies), describes the challenge and
reward of such interdisciplinarity:
We need to ask about the properties of the field and the properties of
[the subject] and that requires insights from disciplines that law often
doesn’t pay attention to because they seem messy and alien, like
cultural studies, science, technology, and society, [and] surveillance
studies—they have ‘strange’ terminology, ‘weird’ jargon, ‘no numbers’,
‘everything’s a moving target’…so some work is required there, and it
can be somewhat of a drag. But simple analytical framing is only a
virtue if you’re talking about something simple. So, I think we need to
learn a new language to do information law and policy the right way.
With its focus on social flows of power, and its impulse to discover and deploy those
frameworks and tools best suited to addressing the problematics of particular
conjunctures, cultural studies and other interdisciplinary models of scholarship, offer
us a powerful model of the intellectual networking that must happen across diverse
fields if we are open to informed debate with those in the dominant bloc about the
importance of privacy.
Because of its focus on conjunctures and social formations, the field of cultural studies
provides a useful orientation for mapping outward to more global articulations and
conjunctures. While the scope of this project limits my mapping, centering it on the
articulation of American forces, phenomena, law, technology, etc., the burgeoning
influence of globalism on economic, political, and technological realities demonstrate
that concerns over privacy are far more global scope than I have been able to represent
here. For example, I have not had space to explore the particular economic
dimensions of the problematic, such as the commodity chain that articulates
repressive foreign regimes to the U.S. surveillance technology companies that create
and/or sell surveillance systems. Frameworks such as articulation thus allow us to
imagine problematics like privacy as more complex than simply matters of law,
business, or technology alone. As Nissenbaum and Solove both rightly point out, we
must approach privacy contextually, in terms of concrete ‘privacy problems’. I want to
suggest, however, that this may ultimately mean moving beyond a focus on singular
surveillance technologies and practices, toward a focus on the larger articulations and
conjunctures to which these are undeniably linked.
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While addressing the ways in which the TSA’s policies of airport screening violate
personal privacy is important, it should found a mapping work which prepares us to
answer questions about intra- and international problematics. For example, how are
the changes argued by the U.S. as necessary to rebalance security and privacy
articulated to its role as a world police authority? How have U.S. policies perhaps
promoted a global political climate in which terrorism becomes a political strategy
against which it must continually contend? Questions about the problematic of
privacy and the emergence of the namespace have, then, far larger reach than the
question of whether U.S. intelligence agencies surveil individuals’ email metadata in
the war on terror. They are sizable political questions about national security and
global geo-politics, such as what it means to abandon perpetual ground war for an
inevitable perpetual cyber-war, hinted at in Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 20,
in which are outlined “Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO)” which “offer
unique and unconventional capabilities to advance US national objectives around the
world with little or no warning…and with potential effects ranging from subtle to
severely damaging” (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013, para. 2). The problematic of
privacy thus engenders for me the question of whether it is possible to imagine, let
alone engineer, a world in which we’re not in a technological arms race, a future
which doesn’t resemble a human face being stamped on by a boot.
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